



Title of dissertation:  RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS MADE 
    IN THE CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE:  
    ARGUMENT FAMILIES AND SOCIAL NETWORK 
    LINKS AS POTENTIAL BASES FOR AGREEMENT 
     
    Elizabeth L. Malone 
 
Dissertation directed by: Professor Meyer Kestnbaum 
    Department of Sociology 
  
 The issue of climate change brings together some of the most important 
sociological issues of the age, including global governance, the role of industrialization 
and capitalism in degrading the environment, the relationship between humans and non-
human nature, and the inequality of nations. However, it is an open question whether 
societies and countries of the world can come to agreement about the meaning of climate 
change and actions (or no action) that should be taken to address it. To avoid privileging 
one or another of the issue’s aspects, this study used a discursive and rhetorical approach 
to include all the arguments made in the debate on an equal footing. First, 100 documents 
that make arguments about climate change were analyzed to characterize the arguments 
made and to distinguish four rhetorical elements: the personal and organizational sources 
of authority for the rhetor, the type(s) of evidence used for the claims made, the 
worldview(s) expressed, and the actions proposed. This analysis provided the basis for 
categorizing the documents into “families,” coherent arguments made about the climate 
change issue; and performing a social network analysis to discern linkages formed by the 
argument families and rhetorical elements that might be the basis for coming to 
agreement about climate change issues. The study found coherence within families as 
 
well as multiple links across families, indicating that rhetors in the climate change debate 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 At first blush, global climate change does not seem to be worthy of much 
sociological interest. It looks to be concerned mostly with the physical world, not the 
social. Most people neither know nor care about the science involved: the tropopause, 
gas concentrations in parts per million by volume, watts per meter squared of radiative 
forcing, atmospheric lifetimes and the carbon cycle, etc. Much of the scientific 
analysis of climate change has been from the stance of the physical scientists: 
emissions of greenhouse-related gases from human activities, the physico-chemical 
reactions that produce the greenhouse effect and its enhancements, the impacts on 
crops and water supply, and so on. Most of these “hard” scientists agree that there are 
many uncertainties and that significant climate change will happen very slowly, over a 
century or more. 
 The stance of these physical scientists parallels that of scientists studing other 
Earth processes, like plate tectonics and earthquakes, solar storms and electricity 
outages, and geologic processes and volcanic eruptions. In each case, the large-scale 
processes are studied as intrinsically interesting and as relevant to human life. In the 
case of climate change, the Earth’s climate system is a wonderfully complex and 
nonlinear system – but it also determines the level of well-being of humans and 
societies. 
 Thus, the issue of climate change, seen from the perspective of human 
dependencies, opens up to become a very human, very social issue. 
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 It is the claim of this study that climate change merits sociological attention 
because it brings together some of the most important societal issues of the age. 
Important societal issues are entwined in the debates associated with global climate 
change. It has become, among other things, a political issue; a manifestation of the 
problems associated with modernization, capitalism, and globalization; and a 
particularly good site in which to study the interrelationships and contradictions 
among scientific and other forms of knowledge. And these large-scale issues meet 
each other in the climate change debate. The climate change debate raises questions 
about whether global consensus or cooperation about the environment (or anything 
else) is possible, how the issues raised by Marx and his intellectual descendents apply 
to the environmental byproducts of modernity and capitalism, and what counts as 
knowledge within the world system. In terms of Ulrich Beck’s (1992, 1999) “risk 
society,” for example, climate change may be the limit case, the ultimate risk – 
something that you can’t see or touch and that may not make you sick, but may make 
life on this planet uninhabitable for human beings. How can that societal challenge be 
met by diverse people in diverse places and by people working together? 
 The political, economic, scientific, and social aspects of the debate have 
brought climate change onto the global stage. In the 1980s, climate change emerged as 
an issue worth attention on the international agenda.1 Over the past two decades 
climate change has been described by scientists, environmentalists, and politicians as a 
threat unprecedented in human experience. Many reasons and combinations of reasons 
                                                 
1 Also leading to interesting theories about how items get on the international agenda. 
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have been advanced for this claim, especially the potential rapidity of temperature rise, 
the irreversibility of change once the forces are set in motion, the geographical scale of 
the threat, the complexity and nonlinearity of the natural systems involved, the 
ubiquity and strength of human commitment to combustion technologies, and the 
political challenges of global cooperation that climate change seems to demand. This 
flurry of attention resulted in the adoption of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), agreed to at the 1992 “Earth Summit” in 
Rio de Janeiro. 
 However, climate change has also been described as a threat so slight, with 
costs so high that it is not worth addressing. Several prominent scientists, including 
William Nordstrom at Harvard University and Jesse Ausubel at Rockefeller University 
in New York, characterize climate change as likely “good for you” in bringing more 
salubrious weather to at least the mid-latitudes. These and “climate skeptic” or 
“contrarian” statements provide a basis for opposing swift political action. And 
certainly the U.S. George W. Bush administration epitomizes the it’s-too-expensive 
politicized viewpoint – coupled with slurs about “junk science” and a generally 
isolationist attitude toward global agreements. 
 Research attention has in recent years begun to focus on the political processes 
involved in framing climate change as a social-environmental “problem,” creating 
evidence of it, and developing the processes involved in attempting to develop 
solutions at the global level. After the initial agreement (the Framework Convention 
on Climate Change came into force in 1994; there are now 186 nations that are parties 
to the convention), progress has been slow at best and the Framework Convention is 
 4
apparently at an impasse. The number of policy proposals is legion, but even the 
modest goals of the Kyoto Protocol (generally less than 10% reductions in 
industrialized countries’ greenhouse gas emissions) seemingly cannot be implemented.  
 The explicitly political issues have been taken up by scientists in schools of 
public policy and international relations, with an emphasis on neorealist theories and 
game-theoretical approaches, and by political institutionalists. The focus then narrows 
to the question of whether or not global politics can forge meaningful agreements or 
simply reproduce the historical power struggles of nation-states. Climate change seen 
from this viewpoint becomes just another issue on the global agenda, with the 
expected outcomes of continued dominance, strategic moves and alliances, and 
international negotiations. 
 However, this narrow political focus neglects important dimensions of the 
climate change issue. A strict calculation of nations’ rational maximization and 
Prisoner’s Dilemma games will not provide a satisfactory explanation of the 
agreements reached at Rio de Janeiro in 1992. At the Rio Earth Summit, nations 
agreed to  
Stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, within 
a timeframe to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally, protect food production, 
and allow sustainable economic development (United Nations 1993).  
Moreover, industrialized countries accepted responsibility for the increased 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and for funding mitigation measures. 
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These provisions are seemingly against the economic and political interests of 
industrialized countries; they represent a long-term commitment to a global good. 
 Politics may have brought the climate change issue to the fore but cannot 
contain it. Political discourse is only one dimension of the debate. Until the 1990s less 
attention was paid to sociocultural dimensions of climate change and particularly to 
the discursive and rhetorical aspects, which in many respects underlie the political 
structures and manipulations. Indeed, major shifts in international relations and 
international policy usually are accompanied or preceded by such shifts in discourses. 
Even in the so-called human dimensions programs the focus has been on growth of 
population and consumption and the scale of the energy system (and other emissions-
producing activities), without consideration of the social and cultural belief systems on 
which practices of fertility and consumption (including energy consumption) are built. 
 At issue seem to be several elements that must be addressed separately and in 
interaction. First, this is a problem constructed by scientists, almost totally outside the 
sensory experience of nonscientists and little understood by them. Second, the spatial 
and time scales of the problem are hard for people to comprehend; thus, this seeming 
lack of urgency or immediacy weakens motivation to do something. Third, there are 
winners and losers in climate change, so there is bound to be contention over the terms 
and conditions of policy. This raises issues of equity and rights, as well as 
responsibility to pay any mitigation or adaptation costs; these issues must be addressed 
in a political context. Fourth, this is an attempt at global governance, which must be 
accomplished by agreement and mutual verification, perhaps involving some higher 
authority than the nations involved. 
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Interactions in the Debate 
 The debate provides a space in which all kinds of discourses can be heard. But, 
because different constituencies are concerned in the different strands of the debate, 
the assumptions and terms of the debate about what – if anything – to do to address the 
prospect of global climate change are themselves topics of debate and dissension. 
Although it might be conjectured that because people and groups join a debate they 
attempt to mutually define terms and assumptions, and to “play by the same rules,” 
even the most cursory inspection demonstrates that this is not so. In fact, they argue 
first, and perhaps persistently, about what the terms of the debate are, as negotiators 
during the Vietnam War argued about the shape of the negotiating table. They argue 
about what the questions are, what (and whose) evidence counts, and the values and 
worldview that provide a frame for the debate. The following texts exemplify several 
threads of scientific discourse on global environmental change. Looking at the 
differences among them helps to explain why scientific consensus (outside the 
atmospheric science research community) has not been achieved. The first is a report 
issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The second is an ecofeminist 
essay. The third is a postmodern analysis. The fourth is a narrative by a field ecologist. 
 
Figures 3-14 and 3-15 illustrate the dynamics of thermal expansion and global 
temperatures for selected simulations. Between 2060 and 2090, three of the 
simulations include a sudden decrease in deepwater formation, which results in 
a global cooling of about 1.5 degrees C over a ten-year period. For the next 
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century, the rates of warming are mostly between 0 and 0.3 degrees C per 
decade, but 5 to 10 percent of the simulations warm more than 0.5 degrees C 
during at least one decade (Titus and Narayanan 1995). 
 
The recovery of the feminine principle allows a transcendence and 
transformation of these patriarchal foundations of maldevelopment. It allows a 
redefinition of growth and productivity as categories linked to the production, 
not the destruction, of life (Shiva 1989) 
 
Baudrillard also suggests that the means of information in today’s global 
transnational economy unhinge ordinary metaphorical relations, because the 
operative semiotic principles of this informational order are those of simulation 
rather than pre-industrial counterfeit or industrial mechanical reproduction. 
Abstractions can no longer be seen as “the maps,” “the doubles,” “the mirrors” 
or “the concepts” of any terrain metaphorically regarded as “the real.” On the 
contrary, all abstract frames of the real begin to function as simulations (Luke 
1995:96). 
 
Yet as I stood at the edge of the field, I had a strong intuition of disaster. I 
thought of all the richness of the mature forest, in all its seasons: its dark, 
humid smell on summer mornings, its complex procession of wildflowers 
throughout the spring, its bronzed and rubied canopies in October. I thought of 
the blue-coated nuthatches, the carpenter ants, the hog-nose snake, the shelf 
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fungi, the warblers and vireos and hawks—none of these to return, though they 
might one day be replaced by distant relations. The net result of management 
seemed to be that a complex world had been replaced with a barren field; what 
didn’t seem to get figured into the management plan was almost everything 
that had once been there (Armstrong 1993:13). 
 These writers are all scientists, speaking from different standpoints, using 
different arguments, evidence—and different syntax, diction, and imagery. Personal 
emotion clashes with cool rationalism, delight in particulars with aggregate overviews, 
observer with participant. The visual presentation of each text differs as well, 
indicating differences in orientation and in the bases of evidence for the writers’ 
claims. The first report, issued by the Environmental Protection Agency, presents 
tables and graphs. For the ecofeminist text, occasional mythical drawings illustrate the 
philosophy. The sociology article is pure text. The Armstrong article from the journal 
Orion is interspersed with full-page, color photos. 
 The voices of nonscientists are even more varied. Some see the issue as almost 
a conspiracy on the part of scientists. Others see it as a political issue; those who are 
left of center often favor taking measures to address climate change, whereas those 
who are right-leaning believe in getting on with business as usual and not worrying 
about climate change. Others feel that we are harming the environment in many ways 
and should address all the harms, including climate change. Still others frame the issue 
as a signal that people must reduce consumption of industrial products, waste and 
pollution. Some advocate reconceptualizing our relationship with nonhuman nature, 
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according rights to other living beings and even Earth as an entity, and respecting the 
other inhabitants rather than thinking of them as resources for our use. 
 Thus, there are several perspectives from which to view climate change as a 
sociological topic. The political perspective can be explored in the new social 
movement literature. Along with labor, civil rights, democratic activists, and 
feminism, environmental social movements have been analyzed principally in terms of 
political action: how are people mobilized to make common cause and how do they 
take advantage of political opportunity structures to achieve environment-oriented 
goals? Part of the answer to these questions has been taken up by cultural analysts of 
social movements, who have variously sought to examine how social identities are 
construed within social movements and how narratives, slogans, etc., help to further 
movement causes. Another part of the answer lies in the area of environmental 
sociology. Here the issue becomes a cultural one – the relationship between humans 
and non-human nature, which raises discussions about the modern age’s separation of 
subject and object, so-called Man and so-called Nature. A third area of sociology that 
bears on issues raised by climate change is the sociology of science, which 
investigates questions about how we know what we know, the authority of scientific 
knowledge in society, the politics of the formation of knowledge, and the evaluation of 
scientific and other kinds of knowledge in decision-making. 
 
Social Science in the Debate 
 So far I have argued that climate change is a sociological problem and that 
studying the debate space of the discourse can encompass its wider sociological 
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dimensions. However, social scientists have not studied climate change in this way. As 
partially discussed earlier in this chapter, they have tended to take their framings and 
questions from physical scientists. When social scientists have not followed physical 
science framings, they have stayed at the very margins of the debate space. Following 
is a brief description of the historical contributions of social science to the climate 
change issue. 
 The predominant approach to climate change science and the science/policy 
nexus is what Rayner and Malone (1998; see also Malone and Rayner 2001) and 
others have called descriptive. A descriptive approach takes its cue from the physical 
sciences and the experimental method. In Dilthey’s terms, such an approach seeks to 
describe the world, not understand it. Scientists who use a descriptive approach prefer 
to count, weigh, and measure, using the language of equations and mass balances. 
They see themselves as objective observers of a reality “out there,” much as an 
astronaut can view the Earth as a whole, from a distance. Therefore the descriptive 
approach lends itself to aggregation at the global level, to analyses of Gross Domestic 
Products, and to calculations of what the total cost of climate change mitigation 
measures would be. Its outputs tend to be datasets, charts and graphs, and carefully 
constructed reports that end with Findings and Discussions. 
 Corresponding to this approach is a view of the science/policy relationship 
encapsulated in the phrase “speaking truth to power.” According to this view, 
scientists disinterestedly seek truth and inform policymakers of the truths they have 
“discovered.” Policymakers then consider their options for effective governance in 
light of these truths. The two types – scientists and policymakers – have carefully 
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demarcated roles and relationships. Scientists, in this view, supply the facts, 
policymakers the values and the practical know-how to get something done. 
 This careful distinction is reflected in the international science organization 
whose charter it is to assess the science of climate change. The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which met for the first time in Geneva in November 
1988, was designed to insulate climate change science from broader international 
development issues. The IPCC has reflected a continuing tension between the modern 
scientific and technical conception of climate change, and the increasingly messy 
ethical and political considerations.  
 Three working groups were formed: (1) science, (2) impacts, and (3) response 
strategies. These working groups have persisted through three assessment reports. 
From their subject areas, Working Group 1 should consist of physical and chemical 
scientists (and, because of the reliance on models, computer scientists), Working 
Group 2 of earth systems scientists with participation from economists, and Working 
Group 3 of social scientists of all stripes. In fact, the participation of social scientists in 
the entire process of the First Assessment Report was summarized as “lamentable” 
(Redclift 1992:34). Working Group 1, looking at atmospheric chemistry, climatology, 
and ecology, achieved a remarkable level of consensus and is widely recognized as 
representing the highest quality international scientific collaboration. The other two 
reports proved highly controversial where they touched on issues such as local and 
aggregated projected damages of climate change, because they raised issues of 
economic and social inequality, forms of governance, and human rights. 
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 The social science that predominated in the First, Second, and Third 
Assessment Reports (IPCC 1990, 1995, 2001) was economics. Economists were asked 
to address very specific questions. Calculation of emissions from human activities, and 
damage functions and mitigation costs, calculated at the global level, helped to avoid 
the issue of differentiated impacts. And the results of energy and economic models 
could be debated by policymakers eager to appear to be doing something. 
 In all these mainstream scientific efforts, descriptive science was the 
predominant approach. However, much relevant research outside the mainstream has 
been conducted using an interpretive approach (Rayner and Malone, “Challenge” 
1998). Interpretive research focuses on the meaning of activities and language – on 
“the nature of experience, the structure of perceptions, the recognition of interests, and 
the development of frameworks for collective action” (Rayner and Malone, 
“Challenge,” 1998:42) – that is, the fundamentally social character of the human mind 
and how it operates. In climate change research, interpretive studies have addressed 
the framing of the problem as well as issues of stakeholder involvement, sociocultural 
values, the nature and production of knowledge, and policy implementation (research 
and development investments, technology selection and diffusion, and so on). Cultural 
anthropologists and sociologists have examined the claims and worldviews of 
government, science, and indigenous people in environmental disputes. In contrast to 
macro-level theory about international relations, political scientists have studied the 
ways in which individual actors form networks and epistemic communities. Whole 
literatures focus on behavioral changes in energy and technology use, as well as how 
technologies come to be adopted. Social scientists investigate how real-world public 
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policy and industry decisions are made, as opposed to idealized models of rational 
actors, and analogues demonstrate societal responses to climate changes in the past. 
 But these kinds of studies have not penetrated very deeply into mainstream 
climate change science. Perhaps this is because of the strong original framing of the 
problem as a “hard” science problem and an unwillingness to face up to the 
implications of results from political, economic, and cultural research.  
 Thus, at least two broad-brush histories can be articulated about the role of the 
social sciences in global climate change research. One such history might start, not 
with social science, but with Jean-Baptist Fourier’s 1822 suggestion that “air traps 
heat, as if under a pane of glass” and keeps Earth warm, and Arrhenius’ identification 
of the so-called greenhouse effect late in the nineteenth century; continue with the 
research into the physico-chemical processes by which carbon dioxide and other gases 
play a role in regulating the Earth’s climate; then turn to investigations into the 
economic-energy activities that result in greenhouse gas emissions; then (finally) 
arrive at the recognition of so-called “human dimensions” as an important aspect of 
climate change research. Another history might begin with George Perkins Marsh’s 
work Man and Nature (1864, reprint 1973), which was subtitled “or Physical 
Geography as Modified by Human Action,” follow that thought through the concept of 
the “nöosphere” (a biosphere organized by human activity), then highlight early 
contributions of social scientists to research in the field of climate and society that 
focused mainly on direct human accommodation to the hazards of natural climatic 
extremes and indirect economic effects of climate. Gradually, however (this version of 
history continues), mainstream science organizations such as the International 
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Geosphere-Biosphere Program (IGBP), despite paying lip service to the importance of 
social science research, marginalized such research in add-on organizations (here we 
are back to “human dimensions” programs) or discounted research studies as too 
localized. 
 Two developments have brought more social scientists into climate change 
research and debate in recent years. The first is a recognition that proposals for 
meaningful mitigation are stalled. The most obvious example is the Kyoto Protocol, 
which commits countries to modest emissions reductions and has been in limbo since 
it was formulated in 1997. The second development is a resultant emphasis on 
adaptation strategies, coupled with a willingness to engage in more socially oriented 
research. Adaptation to climate change is inextricably bound up with governance and 
economic development issues that are already being examined in sustainable 
development, natural hazards and disasters, food security and other research areas. 
 Rosa and Dietz (1998) summarize the evolution of sociological research into 
climate change issues. Under the heading of neo-realism, they place research that 
“borrows directly from the science of ecology, adds sociological insights and produces 
empirical results” (Rosa and Dietz 1998:443), and world-systems analyses of the 
environment’s role in economic stagnation and inequality. A second broad category is 
idealist-based social constructivism, which includes studies that focus on uncertainties 
in knowledge claims and on the social and political forces shaping scientific and 
public recognition of climate change as a problem. Rosa and Dietz (1998:446) 
conclude by calling the late 1990s “the incipient stage of our sociological 
understanding of [global climate change].” 
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This Project: Analyzing Arguments in the Debate 
 This research project is explicitly sociological, focusing on the social issue of 
how people in this debate might come to (or toward) agreement. The arguments made 
– the rhetoric and framings employed – reveal much about the dimensions of the issue 
(global level, century scale, cross-cultural scope) and the collateral issues invoked. 
 I will take a cultural-rhetorical approach, drawing insights from three 
subdisciplines of sociological theory and from globalization theory as developed by 
sociologists and other social scientists. Using this approach, I view the issue of climate 
change at the broad intersection of new social movement theory, environmental 
sociology, the sociology of science, and globalization theories. At this intersection, we 
can formulate the problem in the following way: In the various voices of the climate 
change debate, is there any common ground on which to build agreement among 
scientists, policymakers, so-called environmentalists, industrialists, and members of 
civil society about actions that could be taken to address climate change? The topic of 
climate change thus falls within the larger sociological and rhetorical questions about 
how people come to mutually understand an issue and come to agreement about it, and 
ultimately about how society changes; climate change adds scale and science 
dimensions to this issue. 
 
Overview of this Project  
 This project will demonstrate the bases, within the rhetorical contexts and 
arguments, for potential agreements about climate change, both its causes and 
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remedies. That is, the arguments themselves will be the focus of my analysis. I will 
treat situational variables such as class, status, and power as they exist relevant to the 
discourse. The remainder of this section outlines the research study.  
 The next chapter discusses the possible contributions of existing research 
within the subdisciplines of social movement theory, sociology of science, and 
environmental sociology to the research question that I have formulated. Principal 
areas of study in each subdiscipline relate to the climate change debate, but do not 
directly address the rhetorical issues; the limitations of the subdisciplines preclude my 
situating this study within any one of them.  
 Having done the preliminary work of sorting through existing sociological 
research in areas that look to be relevant, I then map out the methods of the current 
study in Chapter 3. The first of these methods is an exploration of globalization 
theory, which has been built by social scientists in every discipline from economics to 
anthropology. The second and third methods involve empirical studies of arguments in 
100 texts related to climate change. The second method is a structured analysis of the 
rhetorical elements of each argument, which facilitates a classification of arguments 
into “families.” The third method involves coding the rhetorical elements and 
performing a social network analysis to help reveal the bases in the arguments 
themselves for coming to agreement. The final chapter summarizes the findings and 
draws conclusions about prospects for coming to – or closer to – agreement. 
 Theories of globalization, discussed in Chapter 4, cover both structures and 
processes, and provide parallels and foundations for thinking about climate change. In 
each topic area, there are strong and disparate voices debating causes and solutions. In 
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each debate area, the differences among traditional, modern, and postmodern 
arguments are important, as are economic and political issues such as inequalities 
within the world system. One major difference between the two debates is the 
prominence of scientific evidence and arguments in the climate change debate; science 
is much less important in globalization theory. 
 However, the parallels between globalization and climate change theories, 
although they help to elucidate the issues, do little to increase understanding of how 
debates at the global level might move toward agreement of the various voices in the 
debate. Politics, economics, culture, and science obviously are dimensions of the 
debate, but, in order to assess prospects for agreement, all dimensions and arguments 
need to be examined side by side. 
 Thus, the next step is to look at the arguments themselves as they exist in 
documents of various kinds from various sources; this is the work of Chapter 5. From 
100 documents that make arguments about climate change and propose responses, I 
abstracted the rhetorical elements of each argument:  
• the authority of the rhetor, as given by profession and organizational affiliation 
• the type of evidence used to back up claims made in the argument 
• the worldview expressed in the argument 
• the specific proposals for action.  
The arguments themselves provide the basis for classifying documents into argument 
“families,” coherent clusters of arguments that share a basic understanding of the 
climate change issue, its causes, and its cures (if needed). The argument families map 
out the whole debate space that has climate change as its topic: scientific, political, 
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economic, modernist, Marxist, and cultural claims of various types. The debate can be 
seen whole instead of from any particular vantage point. 
 Chapter 6 builds on the same rhetorical analysis to illuminate the social 
network links among rhetors within and among argument “families” in the climate 
change debate. Rhetors can be linked by any similarity in rhetorical elements. For 
example, if rhetors use data and computer models as evidence, this is a link among 
them. Those who propose emissions-trading schemes are linked by that proposal. 
Rhetors who think the world is on the brink of climate collapse share that link. The 
social network analysis reveals a dense network of links that may prove to be bases for 
coming to agreement. 
 But are familial relationships and social network ties actually bases for 
agreement? If so, how may relationships and ties be used to move the debaters closer 
to agreement? These are the questions taken up in the last chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: SOCIOLOGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
 Sociology is a latecomer to the debates on climate change – as, indeed, are all 
the social sciences. Questions about climate change and research into those questions 
have been framed by the physical sciences, from the original theorizing by Arrhenius 
(1908) through the measurements of carbon dioxide taken at the Mauna Loa 
Observatory beginning in 1958 to the development of complex general circulation 
models (GCMs) of the climate system. The first contributions from social scientists 
came from economists, in describing and analyzing human activities that release 
greenhouse gases to the atmosphere (beginning in the 1980s); and political science, in 
following and interpreting negotiations having to do with issues such as acid rain and 
the ozone layer. Anthropologists such as Mary Douglas, Steve Rayner, and Michael 
Thompson have taken up such general environment-related issues as environmental 
risks and human-nature relationships as part of social solidarities. Sociologists of 
knowledge/science such as Bryan Wynne and Scott Lash have also contributed to 
environmental issues, taking up such questions as whose knowledge counts in 
addressing problems. But explicit sociological contributions to climate change have 
been infrequent. 
 The three major sociological literatures to be assessed as possibly useful for 
this project are social movement studies, environmental sociology, and the sociology 
of science. Each of these literatures speaks directly to at least some of the issues that I 
am addressing, although not necessarily directly in terms of the climate change debate. 
And many overlaps exist. Within both social movement theory and environmental 
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sociology are studies of environmental social movements. Within international 
relations and environmental sociology is research on the international politics of the 
environment; climate change, as an international problem with highly contested issues 
of cause and remedy, is particularly relevant to the international sphere.2 Within the 
sociology of science and environmental sociology are examinations of how scientific 
knowledge becomes established and is used in defining environmental problems and 
playing a role in formulating candidate solutions. Science, as the “discoverer” of the 
“problem,” lays claim to be the hegemonic discourse in defining it and in formulating 
solutions; however, science-based findings often take a back seat in political 
negotiations. 
 When the environment is a topic in sociological research, often the 
environment is “part of” other, more central foci. The environmental movement is just 
one example (and generally not the best example) of new social movements. The 
environment as a concern is one aspect of globalization, although economic 
globalization and economic-cultural domination are still the central concerns. 
Environment is part of the discourse about the larger problems and dangers of 
modernity and industrialization. And it is a feature of anthropological/ethnographic 
studies that describe indigenous societies. 
 This “part of” treatment fails to account for the spectrum of relevant issues, 
and for the relationship of scientific, policy, and indigenous knowledges and 
                                                 
2 But acid rain and ozone depletion are also relevant to the international sphere and 
have generated more urgency and attention. 
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discourses. Inverting the lens to place climate change discourse at the center allows 
these dimensions to come into focus and serves as a filter to determine the value of 
contributions from these sub-fields. 
 
Social Movement Studies 
 The social movement literature provides a political and institutional vantage 
point from which to view the climate change issue. Recent social movement theory, 
even with its inclusion of cultural and institutional considerations, does not account for 
the role of argument and debate in social and political change. Arguments (even 
symbolic, as in the stories that build collective identity) are interpreted in terms of 
political power and advantage. The underlying metaphor is war, winning and losing – 
not coming to agreement. Social movement theory prefers protests and uprisings to 
discussion and debates. 
 Social movements are by definition purposeful, organized groups outside the 
mainstream of the political system. They try to change (or resist change) in some 
major aspect of society. They may favor evolution of the state or revolution. Thus, 
they construct alternatives to the state’s politics and culture. Doing this involves 
recharacterizing state knowledge, using state knowledge in different ways, and/or 
adding to or deleting knowledge that the state has. For example, the women’s suffrage 
movement sought to recharacterize the state’s knowledge about its citizenship 
category to include women as voters. Social movements are thus both political and 
cultural. 
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 Early social movement theory tended to treat social movements as collective 
action born of increasing grievances against the state. In this view, deprivation and 
relative deprivation gave rise to social movements. However, more recent theoretical 
and empirical analyses about social movements have generally used the approaches of 
historical or cultural institutionalism. In the 1970s, following the rise of social 
activism in the 1960s, the resource mobilization paradigm was introduced and 
elaborated. Drawing on rational choice theory, the resource mobilization approach 
conceptualized social movements as collective political action, dependent upon 
political and economic assets, such as strategies of influence, organizational ability, 
tactics, sponsorship, number and type of participants, use of violence, and so on. Much 
of the theory of social movements relies on arguments about mobilizing and political 
opportunity structures (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 1997; McAdam, McCarthy and 
Zald 1996; Morris and Mueller 1992). Zald (1992:332-333) summarizes the 
assumptions of resource mobilization research: 
First, behavior entails costs; therefore grievances or deprivation do not 
automatically or easily translate into social movement activity, especially high-
risk social movement activity. The weighing of benefits, no matter how 
primitive, implies choice and rationality at some level. Mobilization out of the 
routines of social and family life, out of work and leisure, is a problematic. 
Second, mobilization of resources may occur from within the aggrieved groups 
but also from many other sources. Third, resources are mobilized and 
organized; thus organizing activity is critical. Fourth, the costs of participating 
may be raised or lowered by state and societal supports or repression. And 
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fifth, just as mobilization is a large problematic, so too are movement 
outcomes. There is no direct or one-to-one correspondence between amount of 
mobilization and movement success. 
These issues are tied to state development and transformation through the concept of 
political opportunity structures. Since state development and transformation are the 
major topics for historical comparative sociology, social movement theorists also often 
contribute to theories of state dynamics. For example, Charles Tilly works in both the 
areas of nation state analysis and social movements (see, e.g., Tilly 1992 and 
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001).  
 Although resource mobilization and political opportunity structures were still 
the dominant focus of social movement theory in the 1980s, there were also criticisms 
that this theoretical approach limited the analytic focus to political movements that 
pursue middle-class goals and that the theory assumed a kind of generic social 
movement, eliding the analysis of particular circumstances and goals associated with 
one type over another (Mueller 1992: 17-18). The area experienced a “cultural turn,” 
bringing in the themes of frames (including master frames and collective action 
frames); identity and collective identity; social location rather than atomistic, rational 
individualism; shared group logic; and a focus on informal rather than organizational 
activities (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Johnston and Klandermans 1995). 
Dieter Rucht (1996:186) broadened the definition of a social movement to include a 
network of groups and organizations prepared to mobilize for protest actions to 
promote (or resist) social change and individuals who attend protest activities or 
contribute resources. 
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 Environmental social movements related to climate change have not received 
much attention from resource mobilization theorists. Indeed, most of the studies done 
from this perspective are concerned with the overthrow of the state or gaining political 
rights (e.g., of women and minorities). From the resource mobilization perspective, 
environmental social movements are a puzzle – hardly rooted in social grievances in 
the same way that social movements of oppressed people are. However, McAdam, 
McCarthy and Zald (1996), predicting a synthesis of research in political 
opportunities, resource mobilization structures, and cultural framings, include protest 
activities, grassroots reformist groups, public interest lobbies, and revolutionary forces 
in their definition of social movements. Institutionalists have recently both widened 
the scope of this research to “contentious politics” and introduced mechanisms such as 
attribution of threat and opportunity, brokerage, category formation, certification, 
diffusion, and object shift to gain more explanatory power in their analyses (McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly 2001); these mechanisms also mark a shift to a more culturally based 
analysis (although the focus remains political). 
 The cultural turn provides more analysis relevant to climate change social 
movements. Mediating between opportunities and action are culturally defined 
“framing processes.” The interplay of culturally based expectations may be a fruitful 
way to look at global and national environmental movements. Skretny (1996:231-232) 
challenges the view that social movements can be explained as rising interest groups 
who extend inroads into public policy, using their own organization and resources to 
influence those of the state. His study of civil rights groups demonstrates that such 
groups as interest groups played only minor roles. Instead, he describes successful 
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political groups as understanding, acting within, and pushing the boundaries of 
legitimate actions within established institutions rather than simply embodiments of 
material interests. He discusses Frank Dobbin (1994), who demonstrated in a cross-
national study of industrial policy development that what economic groups fight for 
varies by national context and historical context. 
 Social movement struggles can be seen as efforts to control or define 
knowledge. From a historical institutionalist perspective, the kinds of knowledge that a 
social movement would focus on for the purpose of re-forming the state include 
statistics relevant to taxation, citizenship, and conscription. This kind of knowledge is 
important because it can be the basis for state control of people and resources for its 
own gain, and/or it can be the basis for inclusion in the benefits of citizenship. From a 
culturalist perspective, the kinds of knowledge that a social movement would focus on 
are those related to framings, cultural categories, and identity. In some cases, this 
would be the same information targeted by historical institutionalists, but the motives 
would be different. Information will be seen as political in the historical viewpoint, 
i.e., used in the struggle of the group to gain power. For the cultural analyst, this 
information is important because it represents a reading of what the world, the state, 
and people are like. 
 What is the potential for social movement studies or a social movement 
approach to contribute to this study of arguments made in the climate change debate? 
 Even new social movement theorists have not focused on climate change; it is 
far more common to find studies of the women’s movement, environmental 
organizations that focus on immediate harms, political social movements, and civil 
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rights. This neglect of climate change may be because it is difficult to characterize 
climate change social movement organizations in the same ways that more explicitly 
contentious and political movements are – and there are relatively fewer organizations 
devoted to climate change. Also, the emphasis on the development of the nation-state 
and on rights-based or democratic social movements implies that environmental social 
movements, which tend to be either very local (against specific harms) or 
transnational, are not in the line of vision of many social movement theorists.  
 Moreover, for the subject of this study, another problematic arises. Almost by 
definition social movement theory is seeking to understand difference and opposition. 
In contrast, I am examining bases for agreement within a contentious debate space. 
Therefore, the tools of social movement analysis are likely to be of little help. 
 Finally, social movement theorists are committed to power relations as the 
primary explanatory factor in their descriptions of resource mobilization and political 
opportunity. Studies become largely tactical rather than substantive analyses. Even 
many of the “framing” and so-called cultural studies seek to explain how culture is or 
becomes power. This ideological commitment means that social movement theory is 
inadequate to explore how various opposed arguments in any debate can hold the 
bases for agreement among parties of varying strengths. So-called realist or rational 
choice theorists maintain that power relations will trump any other considerations, but 
in fact weaker-looking parties have gained decisive triumphs over their opponents, 
both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. Analyses of framing and reframing 
capture more of the issues that I wish to explore, but often these analyses are merely 
describing a shift of power, without examining the bases for the shift. The concepts of 
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framing are likely to be embedded in analyses that tend to discount or overwhelm the 
specifically “problematizing” dynamic of framing, linking it explicitly to 
differentiated nations in context with particular capacities to act collectively. 
 
Sociology of Science 
 To the extent that the issue of climate change is a scientific issue, it belongs to 
the sociology of science. Examining the nature of knowledge about climate change 
and the privileged role of scientific knowledge are essential to my study, but not 
sufficient to understand how arguments gain or lose attention and work with or against 
each other in various communities: scientific, policy, and public sphere.  
 The basic tenet/assumption of this subdisciplinary area is that all knowledge, 
including scientific knowledge, is socially constructed. Scientists do not “discover” 
the laws of Nature that exist independently of people, somewhere “out there.” Rather, 
scientists construct knowledge through agreed-on scientific processes, test results by 
agreed-to standards, and mutually accept or reject hypotheses and theories based on 
examination of results and their own discussions of the meaning of results. (This view 
has been characterized in the “Science Wars” as pure relativism, but of course it is no 
more pure relativism than the alternative position is pure positivism.) I will apply this 
constructivist viewpoint to the study of climate change and extend it by examining 
how different knowledges, both scientific and nonscientific, are needed to develop a 
social agreement about the nature and risk of global environmental changes.  
 Much of the work done within the sociology of science consists of what Latour 
terms following scientists around to see what they do when they’re doing well as 
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scientists. Weber’s (1968:8) work on social action, and the identified image of the 
subject matter, “the way actors define their social situations and the effect of those 
definitions on ensuing action and interaction,” fit the sociology of science paradigm as 
it is realized in these ethnographic studies. However, my study will be at a more macro 
level, looking at science writ large and other forms of knowledge as well the global 
societal structures. Taking a different tack, I want to study the intersections of their 
constructed knowledge and other constructions of knowledge. 
 “Truth” is often the criterion for evaluating science. Part of this evaluation is 
whether or not scientific theories are judged to be true—that is, derived from accurate 
and complete data, the product of an organized and transparent (ideally, replicable) 
process, and consistent with those data and other conditions in the world. Another part 
of determining the truth or falsity of a scientific argument is the acceptance of that 
argument by other scientists who are qualified to judge. 
 Physical and social scientists alike long held the view that science has a special 
claim to “truth,” derived from proof, empirical evidence, and survival of informed 
criticism. The early scientists (including physicists and sociologists) looked for 
theories that were lawlike propositions, such as the Law of Gravity or the Law of 
Three Stages. Newtonian physics was used as a standard for axiomatic theory that was 
the goal of all science. But axiomatic theory and even formal theory, what Turner 
(1994:42) calls “watered-down axiomatic theory,” involving the careful statement 
(words and some formalisms) of testable hypotheses are, as such “beyond the capacity 
of virtually all sciences.” That is, Turner believes that intuition and insight are the true 
sources of theory, which may be susceptible to being formalized. Taking a more 
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moderate position, Boudon (1986[1984]:208) asserts that “the only scientific theories 
of social change are partial and local ones”; more general theories are more 
metaphysical than scientific. 
 A social constructionist point of view sets one standard for both physical and 
social science, but this definition acknowledges the contingent and value-laden nature 
of all knowledge in both the natural and social sciences. Thus, to take just a few 
examples, Latour (1987), looking at what scientists actually do, describes how the 
“black boxes” of scientific knowledge are constructed; Garfinkel (1967) demonstrates 
how “discoveries” emerge in scientific conversations; Gross (1990) shows the 
importance of social interactions in science; and Ravetz (1995) analyzes the ethics and 
interests that emerge in and are parts of scientific processes. Richard Harvey Brown 
(1998) analyzes science as narration, replacing the positivistic metaphor of the world 
as organism or machine (a metaphor borrowed from the natural sciences) with the 
metaphor of discourse (a more apt metaphor for the social sciences). 
 The interactions and relationships among scientific and other forms of 
knowledge will be important to this study. Scientific knowledge may become the basis 
for thoroughgoing social change, while at the same time being dependent upon 
narrative, nonscientific knowledge. Latour (1988), in his study of the “Pasteurization” 
of France, shows how scientific theories become accepted and actualized in 
nonscientific settings such as farms. Using mostly historical analysis, he shows how 
“order at all points,” i.e., a consensus among science and “lay” knowledges and 
perspectives, was achieved to improve the health of the milk-drinking public. Lyotard 
(1984), using partition and classification as well as logical analysis, explains the 
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differences between scientific and narrative language games and how they are related, 
science being ultimately dependent on narrative for its legitimacy. Habermas (1984, 
1987), using a critical theoretical method, identifies three types of knowledge 
(positive, hermeneutic, and critical) and how these different types are used in 
communicative actions oriented toward coming to an understanding. Brown (1998) 
demonstrates the similarities among scientific, civic, and social movement narratives, 
and the use of narrative in democratizing science. 
 Beck (1992) directly addresses the issue of the use of science-you-can’t-see to 
provide evidence of environmental problems – and, as well, to provide solutions. 
Miller and Edwards (2001) in general, and Norton and Suppe (2001) for the specific 
case of climate models discuss why scientists – and, presumably, the rest of us – 
should believe what they and we cannot directly observe about the atmosphere. 
Scientists have developed a global concept of climate; this clashes with people’s 
concerns about their local weather and climate. Scientific knowledge about the global 
climate system is based upon highly sophisticated data collection networks, data 
manipulations, and theoretical chemical and physical relationships and dynamics in 
the atmosphere; knowledge so derived may not have salience for nonscientists, 
although it may be, as Norton and Suppe say, “good science.” 
 Sheila Jasanoff and Brian Wynne et al. (1998) provide a constructivist account 
of climate change science that draws on comparative analysis of how scientific 
consensus is formed. They review the cases of stratospheric ozone, the Green 
Revolution, the International Biological Program, the International Geosphere-
Biosphere Program, and environmental computer-based models for “instructive 
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parallels” to the case of climate change. They find that the scientific consensus on 
climate change is weakly grounded, often clashing instead of articulating with local 
knowledge in many places. 
 Although sociology of science approaches help to explain the nature of the 
knowledge issues in the climate change debate, these are not the whole story of the 
debate. The origins and claims of climate science, to be sure, are still elements in the 
debate. The scientific efforts to measure changes in the atmosphere, describe and 
quantify physical and chemical processes, and model the climate system accurately 
enough to forecast changes – all these efforts beget large uncertainties. But the 
scientific efforts and uncertainties are only part of the debate, which is social in a 
larger sense. The debate includes important economic, political and cultural issues that 
cannot be reduced to questions of what the “facts” are and whose knowledge counts. 
 Moreover, by its very nature sociology of science privileges scientific 
discourse. The focus is on how scientists build knowledge, communicate among 
themselves, and affect the larger society. However, the climate change debate is not 
just a matter of scientists building knowledge in a contentious process. (In fact, a 
remarkable consensus has been achieved among scientists, although skeptics remain.) 
Neither is the debate satisfactorily characterized as a problem of communicating 
important knowledge from scientists to nonscientists, including policymakers and the 
general public. The space of the debate includes knowledge claims, but also claims of 
very different sorts: beliefs, logic, tradition, economics, politics, etc. 
 The chief insight that I will use from this area of inquiry is that scientific 
discourse exhibits close parallels to other forms of discourse. Thus, scientific 
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arguments can be placed on an equal footing with political, economic, and 
“worldview” arguments. That is, each type of argument makes one or several good 
claims to legitimacy. All of these arguments make attempts to become the hegemonic 
discourse; the special claims of science often lose out to other types of claims. 
 
Environmental Sociology 
 The term “environmental sociology” can be seen to include sociological 
studies that take environmental topics as their case studies of their real subjects or, 
more narrowly, studies that focus on the environment as the central topic. In the first 
category there are, for instance, environmental economics and research into the 
political debates about the environment. In the second category are explorations of the 
different ways humans relate to the environment; radical varieties include deep 
ecology and ecofeminism. Although these are important framing or worldview issues 
in the climate change debate, two considerations make these lines of inquiry less than 
fruitful for the current study. First, environmental sociology tends to take a one-size-
fits-all approach; that is, all environmental issues are manifestations of the same issue 
and are treated as equivalent. Second, environmental studies tend to assume that there 
are black and white choices: either to continue exploitation and pollution until 
eventual destruction or to initiate wholesale and transformative changes in attitudes 
and practices. The discursive approach of this study assumes, in contrast, that 
agreements may be built on any middle ground as well as at the extremes. 
 On the global stage, many scholars who focus on environment-relevant issues 
seek to extend the powerful tools of modernity to solve problems of pollution, 
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degradation, loss of biodiversity, potential climate change, and so on. There is a whole 
literature about how to “price” the environment and its functions in providing clean air 
and water, food, habitat, and recreation (see Yohe and Cantor 1998 for a review). 
Another literature tackles the issues involved in developing new technologies that will 
be less polluting and less resource-intensive (IPCC WG3 2001 assesses this literature). 
A small subset of the literature on consumption deals with energy consumption (e.g., 
Shove and Lutzenhiser 1998). 
 This study, which analyzes climate change discourses, is explicitly focused on 
an environmental problem, but will make no attempt to do boundary work in defining 
environmental sociology. I hold with Lutzenhiser (2002:7) that what distinguishes 
environmental sociology is a shared view of and focus on 
human institutions and systems, human cooperation and conflict, human actions and 
technologies … as part and parcel of natural systems – systems from which they draw 
resources; systems that they shape, manage, dominate, pollute, overexploit, and 
sometimes destroy. In this view, a society without its environment is unimaginable, 
and sociological imagination that overlooks the centrality of the natural environment 
for society is delusionary – and perhaps dangerously so. 
Within this viewpoint, (largely American) empirical studies of people’s attitudes 
toward the environment have been conducted and (largely European) theoretical 
research has explored the roles of modernity, industrialization, science, social 
solidarity, and forms of knowledge and perception. The viewpoint is essential to my 
study – but the dialogue among those who share it and those who focus on other 
dimensions of the debate is the real focus of my work. 
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 Environmental sociology has become a sub-discipline in sociology over the 
past three decades, achieving formal recognition from the major disciplinary 
associations in the 1970s. As part of the effort to create a sub-discipline, sociologists 
have been concerned to define its concerns, find its foundations, and establish the 
research and theoretical analyses that constitute and continue it.  
 A major area of focus in both defining the concerns and finding the 
foundations has been analyzing, deconstructing and reconstructing the relationship 
between people and the rest of nature. In other words, environmental sociology has 
focused on the issue of how the environment can be included in the premier social 
science.  
 Sociology was founded in contradistinction to the physical sciences in general 
and to biological determinism in particular. Yet it retained the basic concepts, 
metaphors, and theories born in the physical sciences. Darwin’s research spawned 
evolutionary theory; Spencer, probably more popular at the time, applied evolutionary 
theory to society, with the additional assumption that social evolution means progress. 
Newton posited a world that ran like a machine, by immutable and universal “laws.” 
Comte, and many other sociologists after him, sought the mechanistic immutable and 
universal laws that govern society. This effort is carried on by those who develop 
formal theory. Even ecology, originally a biological term, has been appropriated for 
sociological use. The word metabolism, used by biologists and also by Marx, has been 
analyzed as a bridging term between humans and their environment (see especially 
Dickens 1992, 1997) – and, lately, as a term for input-output analysis of industries in 
the term “industrial metabolism” (Opschoor 1997). 
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 However, even in the act of using physical science theories, sociologists have 
carefully drawn a modernist boundary between humans and their environment (the so-
called man/nature dichotomy). “In one move, the opposition between nature and 
culture (or society) made room for social sciences as autonomous disciplines distinct 
from the natural sciences, and undercut what were widely seen as the unacceptable 
moral and political implication of biological determinism” (Benton and Redclift 
1994:3). Environmental sociology, as perhaps its principal task, seeks to put people 
and nature back into relation with each other – or, rather, into a different relation than 
master-servant or subject-object. 
 This viewpoint is nothing new, of course. The Romantics of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries understood both the rift between “Man” and “Nature,” and its 
implications, both for the Man-Nature relationship and for human nature itself. 
Moreover, traditional societies outside the Enlightenment priesthood wove 
interdependence with nature into their structures and processes. In some places this 
prior understanding is being defended, rediscovered, or reconstructed. 
 Catton and Dunlap (1978a, 1978b) have labeled this the move from a human 
exemptionalist paradigm (HEP) to the new environmental paradigm (NEP). That is, 
the discipline of sociology and virtually all of its practitioners prior to the advent of 
environmental sociology have treated human beings as though they were exempt from 
the laws and constraints of nature. Environmental sociology’s task is not “bringing the 
environment back in” – because it was never there. The environment needs to be 
incorporated, integrated, set in relation to society; this effort means nothing less than a 
new paradigm for the discipline. 
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 Indeed, many environmental sociologists feel that the sub-discipline should 
aim at transforming the sociological stance and viewpoints, and the concepts of 
society and societal change (Buttel 1997). This revolutionary change will include new 
units of analysis and new methodologies – the nation-state will change dramatically or 
be superseded by another form of social organization or anarchy, for example. The 
nature-culture dualism can be eliminated, replaced by an integrated vision of humans 
and nature coevolving or co-creating each other (like structure and agency co-create in 
Giddens’ structuration theory; see also Redclift and Woodgate 1994). Or, in “deep 
green” philosophy (Tobias 1985), modern sociopolitical structures such as the nation-
state, which are based on human domination of nature, will be superseded by a 
biocentric world, where people live in the consciousness that they are simply one 
species among many in the world. Bookchin, who vigorously disagreed with the deep 
green theorists, also proposed a kind of anarchy as the environmental alternative to the 
modern state (see also Murphy 1994). 
 However, many other sociologists have attempted instead to emphasize or 
recover the environmental threads to be discovered in the writings of sociology’s 
founding fathers (none of the mothers). These reconstitutions provide theoretical 
rationales for considering humans and the environment together (see, e.g., Dunlap et 
al. 2002). Most often, Marx and Engels are the relevant figures. Foster (1997) has 
analyzed the contributions of Marx to the theoretical underpinnings of environmental 
sociology. Dickens (1992, 1997), although acknowledging that reading Marx and 
Engels as environmentalists would be wrong, culls statements from their early 
writings to demonstrate that they considered the environment to be “man’s inorganic 
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body” and that “by thus acting on the external world, changing it, [man] at the same 
time changes his own nature” (quoted in Dickens 1992:48). Man’s relationship with 
nature was considered to be the crux of man’s natural happiness (species-being) and 
the very relationship distorted by capitalism’s various alienations.  
 A contrasting view of Marx is provided by Norgaard (1997:160), who 
characterizes Marx’s ideas as “based on Newtonian mechanical systems dynamized by 
the unfolding processes of Hegel’s dialectical method” – in other words, distinctly not 
a Darwinian worldview. The “evolution” in Norgaard’s “coevolutionary 
environmental sociology” comes from the Spencerian tradition.  
 A somewhat different way of establishing Marxist roots is to continue the 
critique of capitalism, its major sociological contribution, by establishing the 
pollutants and waste generated by capitalist production as both an inherent property of 
the system and a factor (or the main factor) in its coming downfall. The second 
contradiction of capitalism is “to create the further barriers to capital accumulation, in 
effect ruining the very condition it needs in order to expand” (Dickens 2002). The 
fusion of “red” and “green” makes a powerful story.  
 World systems theory, although more “red” than “green” (Roberts and Grimes 
2002), has been adapted or enriched by environmental sociologists to explain a 
country’s environmental performance via its place in the world system and to predict 
the effects of environmental policies. Roberts and Grimes identify five contributions 
that world systems theory makes to environmental sociology: (1) identifies important 
trends such as commodification, proletarianization, globalization, expanding states, 
and growing corporate power; (2) provides insights on the cycles of crisis and 
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restructuring in global capitalism; (3) focuses on the key actors: states, capital, and 
labor (or civil society); (4) examines exploitation, such as that found in “free” trade 
between unequals; and (5) attempts to find the causes of conflicts, such as land tenure. 
On the weakness side, Roberts and Grimes cite tendencies to overemphasize 
economics and oversimplify the diversity of nations; and to pay not enough attention 
to culture, individual agency, and gender. 
 Also in the Marxist tradition, Wallerstein (1999) points out that capitalism 
works precisely because many of the resources exploited are free, such as land, 
sunshine and rain, trees, and minerals. There are three possible alternatives: (1) 
businesses can be required to pay all costs, with a resulting profits squeeze; (2) 
governments can pay, getting the wherewithal from business taxes or taxes on 
everybody else, resulting in a profits squeeze or tax revolts; or (3) societies can choose 
to do nothing, resulting in various eco-catastrophes. He theorizes that efforts to “price” 
the environment will fail because capitalism cannot succeed (i.e., make profits and 
continually grow) without vast quantities of free inputs from nature. However, he does 
not predict that his third option, eco-catastrophes, will occur; instead, “we are in the 
process of exit from this system [historical capitalism]” (Wallerstein 1999:10). 
 Schnaiberg’s (1980) phrase the “treadmill of production” is a Marxist-
grounded critique of capitalism from an environmental sociological viewpoint. 
Capitalism’s need for continual growth means that the cycle of growth and 
degradation as new demands lead to exceedance of the carrying capacity of the earth. 
Buttel (1997:46) characterizes the treadmill of production as “more a theory of the role 
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of the state than it is a theory of economic institutions per se.” That is, state support is 
what enables the treadmill of production to continue and to become transnational. 
 Although Marxian theory is most often thought of as providing foundations for 
environmental sociology, Weberian concepts are also used as a ground. Murphy 
(1994) titles his book Rationality and Nature: a Sociological Inquiry into a Changing 
Relationship. The intensification of rationality that Weber described, says Murphy, 
helps to explain both the ability of people to remold a “plastic” nature, and their need 
to control themselves and nature in thoroughly rationalized institutions that promote 
sustainable development. Intensified rationality is opposed by “rerationalization,” 
which “subordinates ecological goals to the anarchist goal of eliminating social 
hierarchies, and in the case of Enlightenment feminism, particularly the hierarchy of 
men over women,” and “derationalization,” which advances “an anti-anthropocentric 
view arguing for the intrinsic value of nature as a whole” (Murphy 1994:101-102).  
 Weber further provides a more complete explanation of environmental 
problems resulting from capitalism, says Murphy. While Marxism describes the cycle 
of accumulation of capital and production of goods, Weber describes the accounting 
and prediction capabilities of the capitalist system. Following Weber, the failure to 
account for the waste produced along with consumer goods means that the rationality 
of the system is deficient, leading to system blinders about environmental problems, 
resulting irrationalities, and a parasitic relationship between people and nature. A 
solution may be found in rejecting the “iron cage” metaphor and embracing the idea 
that the use of the environment as a sink for waste can be “thrown aside, like a light 
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cloak” (Murphy 1994:226) if humans use their reason to master themselves as well as 
mastering nature. 
 Related to the issue of the relationship between people and the environment is 
one of the major questions within sociology – realism vs. idealism, or positivism vs. 
social constructionism. Is the environment/nature under discussion an independent 
reality that can be objectively assessed as “degraded,” for instance? Buttel (1997), for 
example, says that “environmental sociology is in some sense a materialist critique of 
mainstream sociology” – that is, that social theory needs to account for real, physical 
resources and constraints in the environment. Sklair (1994:205), in describing her 
global sociology, says it is “self-consciously materialist (and thus anti-state centrist).” 
 Hannigan (1995) makes the argument for social constructionism of nature from 
a historical perspective and for all of sociology. Social constructionism, he says, 
challenged structural functionalism, which “assumed the existence of social problems 
(crime, divorce, mental illness) which were the products of readily identifiable, 
distinctive and visible objective conditions” (Hannigan 1995:32). He quotes Coleman 
and Creasy: “If thousands of people did not know they were being poisoned by 
radiation leaking from a nuclear power plant, wouldn’t radiation pollution still be a 
social problem?” (quoted in Hannigan 1995:39). Hannigan goes on to assert that 
environmental sociology has been largely responsible for the impetus toward a social 
constructionist perspective on the environment.  
 Closely entwined with this issue is the whole question of dualisms. Are 
dichotomies such as subject/object, man/nature, nature/culture (and, for that matter, 
man/woman, birth/death, time/infinity) our “natural,” “inborn” way of analyzing the 
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world, or modernist creations that have been powerful in areas like technology and 
medicine but that are ultimately not only unhelpful in attempts to understand and 
improve society but also simply and demonstrably wrong? 
 To return to specifically environmental issues, is humanity part of nature, a 
special part of nature, or separate from and superior to nature? What does each stance 
mean for attempts to study, understand, describe, and control both humans and nature?  
 If society is part of nature, people cannot control it, since a part cannot control 
the whole – but this, although logical, is contrary to people’s historical and current 
experience. But perhaps the dichotomies raise the wrong question. Pálsson (in 
press:5), discussing “Nature and Society in the Age of Postmodernism,” asserts that 
“Any distinction between inside and outside (and, by extension, between nature and 
society) seems beside the point. It seems reasonable to assume the humans are 
simultaneously part of nature and society and that modern policy on the environment 
should be based on that premise, and not on the idea that humanity, or some part of it, 
is suspended above nature.” 
 However, as she and others (e.g., Rosenau 1992) have pointed out, 
thoroughgoing postmodernism is sterile with regard to political (and other) choices. If 
we have no basis – or an infinite number of equally valid bases, which amounts to no 
basis – by which we can know what is happening to the environment and what to do 
about it, there is no way forward, only unfounded options, equally unfounded 
pessimism, and the domination of the strong. 
 Cronon does not attempt a philosophical resolution of these questions. He 
accepts the human ability both to change and to manufacture nature. He also affirms 
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(Cronon 1995:55), “And yet the rock remains, as do the trees and the birds, the wind 
and the sky. They are first and foremost themselves, despite the many meanings we 
discover in them.” Human artifice, the natural objectives and processes, and human-
assigned meanings are all real. 
 Eder (1996) takes up this issue but refuses to engage the question as 
formulated, instead discussing “nature” and “culture” as evolving in parallel but not 
necessarily in sync. Since the nineteenth century, “nature has come to be understood 
as a system of transformations, into which actions are integrated as physical events” 
(Eder 1996:45). When natural cycles (seasons, life and death, etc.) become separated 
from theories about nature, the task becomes threefold: a reconstruction of cognitive 
learning processes (everyday, professional, and theoretical knowledge), an 
examination of the moral learning processes, and an analysis of the connection 
between them. 
 The different relationships between people and the rest of nature have been 
historicized by environmental sociologists and other analysts. Generally, three 
“waves” are distinguished: conservationism, activism, and negotiation. 
 The first wave was a concern for conservation of natural spaces. This began in 
the nineteenth century. European foundations include the Romantic poets and 
philosophers who reacted to the Enlightenment project of domesticating nature by 
valorizing the wild spaces and relatively untrammeled scenes of nature as nourishing 
to the soul. American sources include Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry Thoreau, and 
George Perkins Marsh. When Theodore Roosevelt, as President of the United States, 
began setting aside wilderness areas as national parks, he became the first 
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“environmental president.” Subsequent analysts have characterized the beginnings of 
the U.S. national park system as an elitist movement to preserve the open and scenic 
spaces for the enjoyment of well-heeled outdoorsmen, hunters, and fishermen. 
Organizations such as the Izaak Walton League, the Sierra Club, the Wilderness 
Society, and the Audubon Society, along with leaders like John Muir and Aldo 
Leopold, are associated with the conservation movement in the United States. Yearley 
(1991) analyzes the British historical cases of the Royal Society for Nature 
Conservation, formed by elites whose goal was scientific study of protected sites, and 
the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, which began with the specific aim of 
stopping the slaughter of birds for fashion feathers. 
 The second wave of environmentalism, beginning with the 1962 publication of 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (Gore 1992, MacDonald 2003) or with Earth Day in 
1970 (Shabecoff 1993), was characterized by activists working to reduce or eliminate 
the pollutions of the nuclear age and industrialism. It is this activism that most closely 
resembles other so-called new social movements. Although a number of deadly 
incidents had been blamed on the effects of fossil fuel use – for example, the “killer 
fogs” in London (1948, 1952), a devastating oil spill in Santa Barbara (1969), and 
smog in Los Angeles and other cities – the requirements of economic progress had 
taken precedence over the need to curtail pollution until this time. Indeed, chemical 
companies attacked Carson personally as hysterical and extremist, and auto companies 
vigorously resisted a 1959 Los Angeles requirement for a blow-by valve to recycle 
crankcase emissions. 
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 But Carson’s book, other evidence that people could see and their strong 
reactions to it, and some political leadership in the unlikely form of U.S. President 
Richard Nixon, helped to bring environmental concerns to the fore. Banning the 
pesticide DDT and nuclear weapons, cleaning up the air and water, strictly controlling 
the use of toxic materials, limiting lumbering, halting the needless killing of animals 
such as whales, and holding industries accountable for polluting the environment were 
goals of activist organizations and individuals beginning in the 1960s. Tactics ranged 
from media campaigns to lawsuits to hugging trees, lying in front of bulldozers, and 
interfering with whaling vessels. Beginning in the 1960s, the Natural Resources 
Defense Council, the Environmental Defense Fund (1966), EarthFirst!, the League of 
Conservation Voters, Greenpeace and many others – local, national, and international 
– lobbied, demonstrated, sued firms and governments, and generally pushed hard to 
stop harmful practices and preserve environmental resources and places. “The ‘green’ 
organizations gradually built highly professional staffs of lawyers, lobbyists, 
scientists, economists, organizers, fund raisers, publicists, and political operatives to 
influence government decisions” (Shabecoff 1993:123). 
 The 1970s saw a plethora of environmental laws passed in the United States: 
the National Environmental Protection Act; the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA); and laws to regulate water pollution, coastal zone 
management, safe drinking water, toxic substances, resources conservation 
management, and clean air. President Nixon created the Council on Environmental 
Quality and the Environmental Protection Agency. The focus was on command-and-
control legislation, and the results of this approach often fell short of expectations. 
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Furthermore, land use was not addressed; land-use planning “is in its infancy at the 
local level, is rare on a regional scale, and remains politically anathema on the national 
level … The land continues to disappear” (Shabecoff 1993:167). In Britain and 
Europe, Green political parties formed, traditional political parties were anxious to be 
seen as “green,” and industrial firms set about developing at least the appearance of 
environmental concern (Yearley 1991). In so-called Third World countries, 
environmentalism became part of the struggle against the culture- and nature-
destroying aspects of industrialization. 
 The activist wave was succeeded by a so-called Third Wave, in which 
environmentalists attempt to work with the political process and with corporations to 
set up laws, regulations, and agreements that will be environment-friendly. According 
to Shabecoff (1993:257) for the case of the United States,  
the new group was in many ways more pragmatic and professional, more inclined to 
cooperate with existing political and economic forces to achieve its goals. The 
newcomers also recognized that more complex problems, such as global warming and 
well-organized opposition by powerful industry groups who no longer dismissed them 
as long-haired tree huggers, must be met with improved tools. The national 
organizations learned how to use and exchange mailing lists, conduct door-to-door 
canvassing efforts, and plan skillful advertising campaigns.  
Many conservation and activist organizations became Third-Wavers, devising 
schemes for market-based policies and negotiating directly with industry. 
Environmental organizations have become more numerous and more like their 
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opponents in style and tactics, although protests, direct action, and “witnessing” are 
still in evidence. 
 
Environmental Sociology and Global Climate Change 
 Several sociologists and anthropologists have focused their attention on 
climate change as a research topic. In general, sociological studies in the area of the 
environment have examined the societal aspects of specific problems in specific 
places, for example, Wynne’s (1989) study of the struggle between scientific evidence 
and local knowledge in the radiological contamination of English sheep farms after 
Chernobyl. However, the definition of climate change as both a “new” and a “global” 
problem invites attention from scholars interested in a postmodern world order and in 
global governance. Of the conjunction between environmentalism and the network 
society, Castells (1997:122) says, “there is a direct correspondence between the 
themes put forward by the environmental movement and the fundamental dimensions 
of the new social structure, the network society, emerging from the 1970s onward.” Of 
climate change in particular, Clark Miller and Paul Edwards (2001:3) sum up this 
view: “Climate change, we argue, can no longer be viewed as simply another in a 
laundry list of environmental issues; rather, it has become a key site in the global 
transformation of world order.”  And, as Yearley (1991) points out, once 
advertisements assume that consumers have knowledge of climate change and other 
global environmental issues, environmentalism has entered the mainstream. 
 Human Choice and Climate Change (Rayner and Malone 1998), a four-volume 
assessment of the social science relevant to climate change, includes major 
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contributions by sociologists. Jasanoff and Wynne (1998)3 describe how scientific 
findings emerged in a political context and how attempts to build a global climate 
science have only been partly successful. MacKellar et al. (1998) examine the 
relationship between population and climate change as an interplay among numbers of 
people, how they live, and what they consume. Shove et al. (1998) probe the 
institutional and infrastructural arrangements that are important determinants of 
energy use. Rip and Kemp (1998) assess Schumpertian and other views of 
technological change processes, which, if understood, could contribute to mitigation of 
and adaptation to climate change. 
 One line of research has been survey work connected with public awareness 
and knowledge of, and concern for climate change (and other environmental) issues 
(see Thompson and Rayner 1998 for a summary). Not all of this work is done by 
sociologists nor in the name of environmental sociology; but for convenience the 
survey work is discussed here. Consistent results from survey research include 
findings that concern for the environment is generally high, that people think more 
ought to be done to protect the environment – and that there is a great lack of 
knowledge about environmental problems generally and about climate change 
specifically. People confuse climate change with stratospheric ozone depletion and 
ascribe the “greenhouse effect” to causes as various as the NASA space program, 
automobile use, and electricity generated by nuclear power. 
                                                 
3 Strictly speaking, a legal scholar and a sociologist, respectively. 
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 People’s beliefs, as measured by surveys, are categorized differently by 
different researchers. Many use a knowledge-based approach, assuming that people 
will worry about things if they understand why those things are problematic. 
Correlations between demographic characteristics and environmental attitudes are 
used to theorize about the effects of age, gender, class, etc. on various concerns (e.g., 
Van Liere and Dunlap 1980). Others see concerns arising from ethical frameworks. 
Inglehart (1977, 1990), for instance, posits the concept of postmaterialistic values, 
including environmental concerns. Kempton (1991), Morgan et al. (1992) and 
Bostrom et al. (1994) use a “mental models” approach, i.e., that people will only use 
new information if they can fit it into preexisting ideas about how the world is. 
Thompson and Rayner (1998) use cultural theory to explain varying attitudes toward 
the environment; this study is discussed in greater detail below. 
 One way to characterize the approach of this study is as a search for 
commonalities among labeled phenomena. This is a mainstream sociological method, 
of course, as is applying a method that has been useful in some situations to others. 
One interesting example within environmental sociology is that of Barcena et al. 
(1997), who compare the features of ecologism and nationalism4 to explore the 
potential for “confluence” between the two. Thus, their attempt parallels my attempt to 
find bases for agreement; if efforts to address climate change could be joined to a 
                                                 
4 Nationalism is defined as “a movement directed towards and from political power” 
(Barcena et al. 1997:313), thus excluding cultural ethnic movements. 
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politically powerful force such as nationalism, the prospects for climate-friendly 
policy would look much brighter.  
 Once Barcena et al. account for nationalism’s concern with a specific territory 
against the possibility that ecologism could adhere to a universalistic or at least global 
discourse as well as trying to defend specific spaces, they find a number of features 
through which ecologism and nationalism could make common cause. Their specific 
examples focus on what they call ethnoecology, the incorporation or alliance of 
ecological concerns with those of ethnic groups or nationalities. Thus, in Estonia the 
nationalistic movement blames the “Russians” for the poor state of the environment 
and posits a better environment under a national government.  
 Ethnoecology is one of six discourses that define the relationship of ecologism 
to nationalism (Barcena et al. 1997:310). The other five include (1) econationalism, as 
when the ecology movement in Euskadi (the Basque Country) campaigned against a 
nuclear power station by associating support for it with an affirmation of Spanish rule; 
(2) old peripheral nationalism, denouncing ecological colonialism while perhaps 
conserving national spaces (Brazil, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Pakistan, China); (3) 
hegemonic nationalism, in which the rich nations promote shallow ecologism that runs 
a poor second to growth; (4) hegemonic globalism, “in which the global pseudo-
ecologist pose barely hides the ruthless voracity of all modernizing vanguards” 
(Barcena et al. 1997:312), and (5) ecoglobalism, in which transnational organizations 
such as Greenpeace work towards a “deep green” ecologism. 
 Middle spaces emerge among these six discourses as well. For example, the 
claim of American Indian Tribes to traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and to 
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sacred spaces could be classified as ethnoecology or old peripheral nationalism. In the 
first case, Native Americans blame American nations for environmental change and 
degradation as those of European stock settled in the Americas and conquered the 
native peoples. In the second case, since a number of Tribes have sovereign nation 
status (within limitations), the American nations can be thought of as attempting to 
continue the process of colonizing Native Americans by appropriating, degrading, or 
destroying their natural resources. 
 Thompson and Rayner (1998) use cultural theory, based in paradigmatic work 
by Mary Douglas, to classify three constructed diagnoses of the causes of climate 
change: that population, consumption, or failure to price natural resources is the 
problem that causes anthropogenic climate change. The policy prescriptions follow: 
reduce population growth, cut consumption, and properly value natural resources.  
These three diagnoses and prescriptions are aligned with hierarchical, egalitarian, and 
market institutions. Jaeger et al. (1993) have found that cultural explanations explain 
people’s commitment to action on climate change much better than either knowledge-
based explanations (i.e., how accurate people’s knowledge is) or sociodemographic 
explanations. 
 Environmental sociology, although more directly concerned with issues raised 
in the climate change debate, provides only limited assistance to the focus of the 
current study. The analyses of the HEP versus NEP, the Rational versus the Romantic, 
and real versus constructed Nature distinguish two types of worldviews discernable in 
the arguments, but not elements that might bridge the gulf between them. The survey 
literature, too, seems to focus on differences, often with a “knowledge deficiency” 
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model, the dubious assumption that if only scientists can really communicate 
information about the problem of potential climate change, people will respond in 
ways the experts will think appropriate. I am of course interested in identifying 
differences but more interested in finding bases for agreement, bases that do not 
require one set or another of the debaters to give up deeply held beliefs about the 
relationship of humans and the rest of nature. 
 Similarly, the Marxian and Weberian analyses of environmental problems have 
diagnostic power and provide good alternative descriptions of what’s-happening-now. 
However, understanding a problem does not necessarily lead straightforwardly to a 
solution or set of solutions. Investments in the current economic systems, beliefs and 
other cultural “glues,” and political arrangements generally support the current 
situation (though often in dynamic tension), not past simpler conditions or visions of 
far different futures based on new commitments. The focus of this study, in contrast, is 
the arguments currently made and the bases within the arguments (if any) for coming 
to agreement. 
 Studies such as Barcena et al., and Thompson and Rayner yield insights about 
such issues as the role of scientific knowledge in the climate change debate and the 
congruence between environmentalism and other social commitments. These and 
other individual studies will inform the work of this study. But the limits of these three 




CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
 In Chapter 1 I argued that considering climate change as a social issues 
requires a research approach that includes all the issues bound up in it – and, therefore, 
all the voices in the debate. In Chapter 2 I argued that three seemingly relevant 
subdisciplines of sociology contribute only partially to analysis of the climate change 
debate. In this chapter I lay out the research methodology used in this study. 
 To address the question of whether or not the potential exists for coming to 
agreement about climate change, I use both theoretical and empirical methods. I first 
review and extend theories about how people come to agreement, especially on issues 
of little immediate importance and at a global level. The general debate on 
globalization provides a framework that I also use to theorize about various 
dimensions of the climate change debate. Next, I analyze actual arguments in the 
climate change debate, examining the arguments made and their rhetorical features to 
discern potential bases for coming to agreement or at least moving closer to 
agreement. I thus evaluate empirical evidence from documents that belong to the 
debate. Separating and characterizing the elements of actual arguments helps in the 
theoretical sorting out process and may reveal patterns that indicate how agreements 
might be built across arguments. Finally, I perform a social network analysis to 
examine the links among rhetors, links formed by elements held in common. The 




Theoretical Analysis of the Climate Change Debate and its Arguments 
 Theory provides an account of the world that makes sense of what we can see 
and measure. It “embraces a set of interrelated definitions and relationships that 
organizes our concepts of and understanding of the empirical world in a systematic 
way” (Oxford Dictionary of Sociology). If we use this basic definition, theory is what 
makes science intelligible and useful. Newton’s observations of empirical data must 
be theorized before they become scientific “discoveries”; without Durkheim’s 
theories, all we have are statistical tables. Thus, science can be defined by the mutual 
dependence of theory, method, and empirical activity. Merton (1957), in a pair of 
chapters, demonstrates that theory and research are codependent; theory must always 
be tested, and empirical results will alter existing theories and suggest new ones to be 
tested.  
 Theorizing allows researchers to step back and gain perspective on the climate 
change debate. The climate change debate is interesting to theorists at least in part 
because often it does not seem to be about climate change at all (Rayner and Malone 
1998). Rather, climate change provides the ostensible subject for a wide range of 
debates about industrialization, development and inequality; what the “right” 
relationship is between human and nonhuman nature; the legitimacy of Western (or 
Northern) science; global governance and nation-state actors; and globalization. These 
topical areas provide context for the debate and theoretical approaches and 
frameworks with which to analyze the climate change arguments – at least to the 
extent that climate change is interpreted as another manifestation of a continuing issue. 
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Industrialization, Development, and Inequality 
 Who is to “blame” for anthropogenic climate change? The story has been told 
and retold of industrialized nations growing prosperous by exploiting the natural 
resources of colonies and poor nations while at the same time spoiling the 
environment and initiating an enhanced greenhouse effect that will differentially and 
adversely affect poor nations. When mechanisms are proposed to compensate poor 
nations, existing unequal arrangements inevitably become part of the subject. The 
development literature that deals with North-South inequality is therefore relevant to 
the debate; some allege that the climate change debate is a development debate and 
that power is the real topic. Many environmental sociologists would agree. 
 
The Relationship between Humans and Nature 
 Are people the stewards of nature or just another species, with no more 
inherent rights than any other? Is the Earth our Mother or a wealth of resources? Are 
those resources finite or essentially unbounded, i.e., do people have to be careful to 
engage in “sustainability” or not? These are sociocultural questions, to which possible 
answers have been formulated by sociological and cultural theorists in various parts of 
the world.  Catton and Dunlap (1980) argued for a “new environmental paradigm” in 
which human exemptionalism would be discarded in favor of a view of humans as part 
of nature and the natural world. C.S. Holling, an early ecologist, defined four views of 
nature (Holling 1986): (1) nature is benign and can recover from almost anything 
people can do; (2) nature is benign, but within limits—there are thresholds that, when 
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crossed, may trigger catastrophes; (3) nature is ephemeral, easily degraded and 
destroyed; and (4) nature is essentially unknowable and unpredictable. These views of 
nature were mapped onto Mary Douglas’ Cultural Theory (Thompson et al. 1990), 
thus characterizing the social and political tendencies of those who hold each view of 
nature. These are Northern constructs, of course; Southern (Buddhist and Hindi, for 
example) analyses are quite different.  
 
The Legitimacy of Northern/Western Science 
 Ulrich Beck notes that the global risks of contemporary society (of which 
climate change is certainly one) were defined and scoped by scientists from 
industrialized nations, using the tools and methodology that are credited with a 
principal role in the economic development of those nations. Furthermore, these same 
scientists are busily engaged in providing technological solutions to the problems they 
have defined. Obviously, a great deal of faith in the legitimacy of science is necessary 
to establish the “truth” about what is happening in the atmosphere and to attribute 
changes to human interventions. How did a scientific consensus come about (if it did), 
and what other kinds of knowledge may play roles in extending this consensus to the 
lifeworlds of ordinary people in both the North and South? It may be that the climate 
change debate is all about whether or not the hegemony of Western/Northern science 





Global Governance and Nation-State Actors 
 Global governance and agreements about common resources, such as the 
oceans and atmosphere, is a central issue in the climate change debate. The claims of a 
global good and global citizenship resonate powerfully with those who wish to get on 
with the process of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Nation-states, however, must 
both decide to sign on to and implement the terms of, say, the Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (or any of a dozen other environment-related conventions and 
treaties). So the struggle for national preeminence within the global system is certainly 
an issue, if not “the” issue in the climate change debate. Transnational social 
movement organizations attempt to mediate this struggle through holding up noble 
principles and resorting to political action (forming “green” parties, staging dramatic 
whale rescues, etc.). 
 
Parallels between Globalization and Climate Change 
 Theories about globalization processes and outcomes provide the widest scope 
and closest parallels to climate change issues. Globalization encompasses issues of 
development and inequality, the relationship between humans and nature (e.g., 
expressed as traditional vs. modern methods of food production), and the role of 
Western science and technology as a global force. Therefore, in the following chapter 
I focus on globalization theories. 
 I explore the various approaches that scholars have used to analyze both 
globalization and the global issue of climate change and ways that participants in the 
debate might come to agreement about the issue. These analyses have three principal 
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emphases: economic, political, or cultural (including scientific). However, in all cases 
so far analyzed theorists have been unable to advance an effective way or ways of 
moving toward an agreement. 
 
Content Analysis/Rhetorical Analysis Methodology 
 Theory about arguments in the climate change debate provides only a starting 
point for an analysis of potential bases for agreement. Theoretical analysis benefits 
from complementary empirical analysis, as Merton (1957) and others have pointed 
out. It is all very well to build and critique theories of how the (globalized and climate 
changing) world works, but at some point theory needs to account for the whole 
debate space without assumptions that a priori exclude certain types of arguments. To 
further explore the theoretical potential for agreement on the causes and remedies for 
climate change, I abstracted the elements of actual arguments people have made 
relevant to climate change. What may seem to be a positivist approach to an 
interpretive analysis is in practice a qualitative tool that preserves the context of each 
argument and allows comparison among all arguments. 
 This study assumes that, if there are bases for agreement about the existence 
of, sources of, and ways to address climate change, these bases will exist in the 
arguments made about climate change. One way of thinking about this is to picture a 
spectrum running from complete disagreement to complete agreement. At one end, 
rhetors have completely different and mutually unaccepted authorities, evidence, 
worldviews, and policy proposals. At the other end of the spectrum, rhetors have 
identical or at least mutually acceptable authorities, evidence, worldviews, and policy 
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proposals; everyone is “preaching to the choir.” All debates, including the climate 
change debate, exist somewhere between these two extremes. However, the 
complexities and uncertainties within the debate make it difficult to sort out what 
rhetors have in common or what they might find acceptable in other texts. 
 A content analytic approach provides a basic way of thinking about arguments 
used in the climate change debate. Content analysis uses systematic procedures to 
evaluate more even-handedly the content of communications. However, the present 
study seeks a structured way of comparing whole arguments instead of the more usual 
products of content analysis – quantitative analyses of how frequently certain items, 
symbols, or themes appear in texts (see Williamson et al. 1977). Furthermore, content 
analysis often is applied to study attitudes or beliefs of one group, either to understand 
a characteristic of that group (e.g., the ideology of business elites) or changes in the 
group over time or space (e.g., comparison of family magazine content in different 
cultures to show differences in families, a study of magazines advertisements to show 
a shift in national character over time). The content of arguments and the elucidation 
of differences among them are necessary steps but not this study’s eventual goal, 
which is to find potential bases for agreement among highly disparate groups, 
interests, and viewpoints.  
 I am interested to understand different arguments and standpoints, but I wished 
to avoid an analysis that uses any one argument or standpoint as a starting place. First, 
I was concerned to allow the arguments to emerge from actual debaters, not from any 
secondary or generalized knowledge about what those arguments are. Second, I 
wished to use an analytic framework that would be neutral as to content of the 
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arguments but would highlight non-content elements on which agreements might be 
built.  
 Since these are arguments, I use a framework derived from rhetorical 
(argumentation) theory. This framework avoids the political, economic, and cultural 
biases found in other analyses of the debate. First, I analyze selected documents to 
characterize the arguments themselves and identify rhetorical features of the 
arguments. I then use these analyses to identify argument “families” – coherent 
arguments made by several of the text writers. 
 
Rhetorical Argumentation 
 I use rhetorical concepts and approaches to analyze arguments made in the 
public debates about climate change. I designed an approach that preserves the 
integrity of each argument but analyzes the various arguments within a common 
framework in order to identify similarities, differences, and potential bases for 
agreement.  
 I use the Aristotelian definition of rhetoric: the art of public speaking to 
persuade (Aristotle Rhetoric). In the Aristotelian discussion, rhetoric is the counterpart 
to, or opposite of dialectic, which is the art of logical discussion. Both rhetoric and 
dialectic have to do with means only; the end is always the truth. In dialectic, the 
speaker instructs in knowledge; in rhetoric, the speaker persuades using 
demonstration. “Rhetoric is a combination of the science of logic and of the ethical 
branch of politics” (Aristotle Rhetoric, section xx 35).  
 60
 Aristotle specifies three modes of persuasion: (1) the personal character of the 
speaker (ethos) may carry conviction, (2) the hearers may be stirred up by emotions 
(pathos) and (3) the speech itself may prove the truth (logos). Furthermore, the rhetor 
argues using the enthymeme, a less formal variant of logic, which consists of a 
premise and a claim connected by a warrant.  Warrants are usually – but not always – 
claimed to be true. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971/1969) point out, the 
quasi-logical arguments in enthymemes are persuasive because they are like 
mathematical logic – including techniques such as contradiction, total/partial identity, 
transitivity, and whole-part connections – but without logic’s claims to absolute truth. 
 Aristotle has provided the model for rhetorical scholars and for the modern 
system of rhetorical education over the centuries. However, in the modern era, schools 
of thought based on the Aristotelian fundamentals have emphasized different aspects 
of his thinking. Klumpp (1993:48) describes “the two most vital strains of 
contemporary rhetorical study – dramatism and argumentation” – as developing 
separately from each other in the twentieth century. Kenneth Burke’s dramatistic 
theories, originally developed in critique of formalistic argumentation theory, include 
a categorization device he called the pentad. The pentad, which treats an argument as 
though it were a dramatic production (a play), includes five aspects of an argument: 
act, scene, agent, purpose, and agency. Analyses using the pentad and others of 
Burke’s theories, however, have had no influence on argumentation scholars, among 
whom Klumpp names Chaim Perelman, Stephan Toulmin, and Jürgen Habermas. 
Dramatism emphasizes dynamic metaphors (e.g., molten combinations of elements in 
a constant process of reconfiguration), whereas argumentation focuses on structure 
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and separate elements of the structure. Burkean analysis is highly contextual and 
literary; argumentative propositions tend to be more formal and analytical. 
Furthermore, using the pentad in a Burkean analysis makes comparison highly 
problematic, since each object of analysis tends to be seen as unique. 
 Certainly the study of argumentative forms without context and in isolation 
from each other is sterile. However, empty formalism is not the necessary end of 
argumentation study. Toulmin and Habermas have explored and constructed 
frameworks that refer to the Aristotelian modes of rhetoric in ways that elucidate the 
bases and contexts for argument and that can be used comparatively to evaluate the 
potential for agreement among diverse arguments. Toulmin et al.’s (1984; see also 
Toulmin 1958) informal logic separates premise, claim, and warrant in arguments and 
provides a structure that allows comparison. Similarities and differences among 
various arguments can be seen clearly and compared to each other. Analysis and 
comparison in a common framework constitute a powerful tool for understanding the 
whole context and understanding places where alliances may be formed. 
 Habermas’ ideas about “coming to agreement” draw strongly on the rhetorical 
tradition, among other sources. Habermas’ (1982,1983) theories about communicative 
action can provide a theoretical framework in which to examine the rhetorical issues in 
climate change debates and discourses. Habermas treats communication as speech acts 
oriented toward understanding, as Aristotle assumed rhetors are oriented toward the 
truth. Communicative action may serve to establish and renew interpersonal relations, 
to represent states and events, and to express the speaker’s experience (roughly 
equivalent to pathos, logos, and ethos). Speech acts thus make validity claims and can 
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be judged on the basis of whether they are morally correct, factually true, and 
subjectively sincere. These three bases seem to again draw an analytical distinction 
between scientific claims and other kinds of claims, but the distinction is not biased in 
either privileging or denigrating scientific claims. In fact, all communicative speech 
acts involve all these claims.  
 Thus, if a scientist shows data about the probability of risk from exposure, he 
or she is making a claim about the truth of the statements. Because the scientist knows 
that such statements can be contested, he or she frames the statements to be 
acceptable. It is in this sense that speech acts are oriented toward understanding. 
Similarly, if a citizen contests the scientist’s claim, there is a counter truth claim that 
the citizen is hoping will be accepted. The citizen may, in commenting on a proposed 
science-based decision, express outrage or a sense of betrayal. Again, the orientation is 
toward achieving understanding, in this instance understanding of the everyday 
meaning of a technical decision. All the claims involve not only truth but also moral 
correctness and sincerity. The scientist who strives for objectivity is also asserting the 
morality of the scientific findings and personal sincerity; the citizen may simply be 
more explicit about the last two types of claims. 
 “Coming to an understanding” is the goal of communicative action. This 
means that the participants strive to reach an agreement that recognizes the validity of 
what the speaker says. Furthermore, agreement to one type of claim (e.g., truth) 
implies agreement with the other two implicitly raised claims (e.g., morality and 
sincerity). 
 63
 The theory of communicative action paints a picture of the ideal speech act, 
where participants are competent listeners and speakers, working toward a rational 
consensus. The ideal speech act is often an implicit standard; for example, when 
people accuse each other of blocking behavior or making ad hominem attacks, they 
presuppose higher standards for communication than those they see in action. The 
ideal speech act thus provides both a standard for participants and a model to be used 
in comparing different rhetorical arguments, as I am proposing to do in this 
dissertation research. 
 “Coming to an understanding” is presumably the goal of arguments made 
about climate change policy. Each argument makes moral, factual, and sincerity 
claims that may be compared to gauge the similarities and differences, and thus the 
potential for agreement. 
 Richard Harvey Brown (1977) makes distinctions among the various 
metaphors used in sociology. The metaphors include social activity as exchange, 
dramaturgy, and discourse. Although, as Klumpp points out, both dramaturgy and 
discourse are rhetorical, this study falls into the category of discourse, that is, language 
constructing the world and scientific realities using the Aristotelian categories of 
rhetorical analysis. 
 Brown (1998) has extended his ideas further by a close analysis of the 
rhetorical strategies of science and how these can form the basis for a democratic 
science. In so doing, he contrasts rhetoric with positivism, asserting that “[a] main 
thrust of rhetorical criticism has been to relativize absolutist claims in philosophy, 
science, and social engineering and, thereby, to open space for alternate [sic] 
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discourses” (Brown 1998:188). Thus, Brown points to the insights a rhetorical 
approach offers into the nature of science and its relation to politics, a relation not 
necessarily based on the truth claims of scientists but on rhetorical arguments 
containing figures of speech (e.g., metaphors), and moral and sincerity claims. 
 Using rhetorical analysis in another way, social scientists such as Gross, Fuller, 
Knorr-Cetina, Pickering, Law, Bloor, and many others show that scientific problems, 
methods, and discoveries are socially constructed and describe how those 
constructions are built. With Brown, these scientists’ achievement brings scientific 
discourse out of its unassailable ivory tower and makes it available for comparison 
with other rhetorical discourse. Scientific argumentation can be evaluated alongside 
other arguments, not for “validity” but for the worldviews and values expressed and 
their likely effects upon listeners with different worldviews and values. The same 
impulse to democratic science that Brown describes is also an impulse toward 
admitting scientific rhetorical arguments into dialogue with nonscientific arguments. 
 Habermasian notions of coming to an understanding are again relevant here. 
Habermas has not only shown “how the rise of scientific expertise can drive a wedge 
between the efficient management of sociotechnical systems and the practices of 
everyday life” (Brown 1998:185), but also how people, using their everyday 
rationality, can create a public sphere, a space in which to critique the technical 
systems that control them (Habermas 1989). Although this theoretical construct 
remains “an unfinished project” (Brown and Goodman 2002), it points toward the 
rhetorical framework I have built. Science, in this view, provides one very coherent 
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rhetorical standpoint and takes its place among other, perhaps less explicitly coherent 
but extremely powerful standpoints. 
 
Applying Rhetorical Analysis to Arguments about Climate Change 
 To perform an empirical rhetorical analysis, I collected 100 documents in 
which authors made arguments, including actions that should be taken, about climate 
change. The earliest of these documents dates to 1992, the year that the international 
Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted at the Rio Earth Summit; the 
latest documents were published or disseminated in 2003. I used two strategies to 
collect documents. First, using my own knowledge of the debates and arguments, I 
collected documents from different disciplinary areas (economics, political science, 
sociology, geography, agricultural science, anthropology, etc.), and various 
problem/issue areas (those involved in emissions reduction, global agreements, 
fairness and equity, development, views of nature, economic efficiency, technological 
change, technology transfer, integrated assessment, scientific knowledge and decision-
making, etc.). Second, to extend my own knowledge and experience base, I used two 
additional tactics. I performed internet searches using different framings of the climate 
change issue, such as “climate change,” “global warming,” “climate change and 
mountains,” “climate change and food”, and so on; these yielded some very different 
results than simply looking in mainstream literatures like those assessed by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Internet searches enabled me to tap into 
“gray” literature (reports, newsletters, pamphlets, etc.). Finally, I explored areas that 
might not be primarily focused on climate change but might address it as part of a 
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larger issue (e.g., ecofeminism, deep ecology, and other global environmental issues 
like biodiversity and deforestation). These discourses often make general arguments 
relevant to all global environmental issues; however, a document had to include an 
argument about climate change specifically to be included in this set for analysis. I 
terminated my search when I saw only the same arguments over and over again, since 
the goal was to have the variety of arguments made about climate change represented 
in the document set. The set of documents cannot, however, be taken to represent the 
“shares” of space or attention given to the various arguments. 
 The focus of these documents is frequently on specific proposals, often 
referring to international policy agreements about climate change, both under the 
umbrella of the United Nations Framework on Climate Change and “side” agreements 
made by two or more countries. Sources included scientific journal articles and 
reports, environmental “activist” statements (environmental social movement groups), 
cultural/ethnic group statements (e.g., First Nations in Canada, deep ecologists, 
ecofeminists), negotiating positions and other policy-oriented statements (from 
industrialized and developing countries), and media articles or reports. 
 Representativeness of the sample is a problematic issue. Documents related to 
the climate change issue probably number in the tens of thousands, and there are no 
methods that can guarantee a representative random selection. Questions of whether or 
not to include a document were ultimately resolved by judgment, involving broad 
criteria related to the visibility/availability of the document or statement. My ten 
years’ experience in climate change research, particularly my experience in assessing 
the social science literature relevant to climate change, provided the contextual 
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knowledge used for evaluating candidate documents to include in the sample. One 
objective in the four-volume assessment, Human Choice and Climate Change (Rayner 
and Malone 1998), was to include as many viewpoints as possible. Moreover, the use 
of the internet to present and debate views and policy proposals on climate change is 
widespread. Nongovernmental organizations often use websites and email to keep in 
touch, plan activities, and present their viewpoints to policymakers. 
 The analytic process was designed to capture four primary dimensions of an 
argument: 
• The authority of the rhetor 
• The basis of the rhetorical claim(s) – i.e., what type of evidence is being used 
• The worldview of the rhetor 
• The action the rhetor desires the audience to take. 
The first three correspond to the Aristotelian ethos, logos, and pathos; the fourth 
reflects my belief that specific proposals can gain adherents by means of quite 
disparate arguments. The rationale for these choices is discussed more fully in Chapter 
5. 
 I performed a two-step analysis, following Shapiro and Markoff (1998). In the 
first step, I extracted information about each argument, using as far as possible the 
wording of the original document. In the second step, I categorized the information 
and developed codes to describe the different categories. As Shapiro and Markoff 
(1998:81-88) elucidate, such a two-step process reflects the “concrete” content of the 
actual documents well, while providing an empirical basis for developing an abstract 
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set of categories to be used for comparison. Preserving the original wording allows me 
(and readers of the study) to go back to the sources in reviewing the analysis. 
 In this first step of the analysis, I filled out a template table containing 
information about the document, including the four rhetorical dimensions, noting the 
exact wording of the relevant text for each cell of the table. Since it is probable that 
secondary and tertiary arguments, lines of evidence, and worldviews could provide a 
basis for agreement, I included them in my document/presentation analysis. Similarly, 
since it is possible for people to agree on specific actions without agreeing on the 
reasons for those actions, I included the proposed actions in the analysis. Table 3.1 
shows the template; Appendix A contains the document analyses using the template.  
 
Table 3.1. Template for Document Content Analysis 
Document #: Citation  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 






























 I expected that the documents could be sorted into clusters based on this first-
step analysis. I tested several classificatory schemes to find a “best fit” between the 
documents and the scheme. One candidate was cultural theory (Mary Douglas’ grid-
group 2x2 matrix, expanded by Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky to include views of 
nature); perhaps the documents could be sorted into the four cells of the matrix. 
Another candidate classificatory scheme was the types of discourse identified by 
Habermas (instrumental, expressive, communicative). However, neither of these 
schemes was a good fit for the data. In general, theoretical classificatory schemes were 
simply too theoretical; that is, the abstract categories were too far removed from the 
actual contents of the documents to make classification either easy or reliable. Each 
scheme required a great deal of interpretation; few authors can be located in only one 
box of the grid-group matrix or use only one type of discourse to make their points. 
Classifications based on the four primary elements were confusing and overlapping. In 
the event, I used a common-sense approach of classifying the arguments and elements 
by their content. 
 After the first-step analysis, I sorted the documents into “families” of 
arguments. A “family” is defined as a coherent argument made about climate change 
and recommending at least one response. Eleven families emerged from the analysis, 
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that is, coherent arguments about the hypothesis that human activities contribute (or do 
not contribute) to climate change, the degree of threat that results from possible 
climate change, the basis for acting in response to the threat, and the specific actions 
that are necessary. Six of the families may be considered together as ecological 
modernization arguments or separately as arguments emphasizing different 
modernization strategies. Descriptions of the families are included in Chapter 5. 
 At the end of the second step of the empirical analysis, each document had 
been analyzed and sorted into a family, the families were described, and elements in 
common identified.  
 
Social Network Analysis Methodology 
 In the third step of the empirical study, I performed a social network analysis 
to examine elements that may be regarded as links among participants in the climate 
change debate. If elements such as worldview or a specific proposal for action are 
shared by rhetors, these shared elements may be the bases for agreement. Shared 
elements based on rhetorical features of the arguments are treated in this analysis as 
network ties. I developed stable categories and a coding scheme for each value of each 
dimension in each document. I analyzed the set of documents by identifying the 
families to which they belonged and by characterizing the four rhetorical elements of 
each document; I also assigned an identifying number and included the year the 
document was issued (see Table 6.1 in Chapter 6). For the authority of the rhetor, I 
used two sub-elements: the personal authority of the rhetor and the type of 
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organization associated with the rhetor in the document (contributing to the rhetor’s 
authority). I analyzed the four rhetorical elements together and separately. 
 Social network analysis emphasizes the importance of relations within social 
systems, rather than focusing on the importance of attributes or traditional structures. 
The links among the nodes of the network yield important insights about what is going 
on within the network. Ties can be of two sorts: self-described ties, such as “I am 
friends with” or “I get advice from”; or so-called event ties, such as mutual 
memberships in corporate boards or marriages among families. 
 Examples of the second sort of ties among people include studies of both 
academic and business networks – and, in this study, networks of rhetors in the 
climate change debate. In each of these spheres, the existence of network ties has 
important implications for the opportunities and constraints of individuals, as well as 
the behavior of the network as a whole. 
 In the academic realm, Merton’s Citation Index has been used to link 
researchers through their citations of each other. Caplow and McGee (1958) first 
advanced a tripartite model of the U.S. university system (with “major league,” “minor 
league,” and “bush league” universities), then developed a “prestige system” theory to 
explain the recruitment and hiring activities of academic departments. The prestige-
gaining and -losing activities result in increased mobility for professors at major-
league universities and decreased mobility for professors at lower status universities. 
 Burt (1978) studies an elite network of sociologists who were considered 
expert in methodology and mathematics. One of his findings was that 26 of the 59 
members of this elite network graduated from elite institutions, such as Columbia, 
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University of Chicago, University of Michigan, Harvard, and University of California 
at Berkeley. Burt then went on to show that “There is a tendency for experts trained in 
the top five universities to be employed in those universities and a tendency for 
experts trained in the second level of universities to be employed at the same level” 
(Burt 1978:109-110). 
 All major academic departments seek to maintain and improve their status in 
the hierarchy of academic departments. Despite the competitive nature of this 
relationship, there is little apparent strife among academic departments. Mintz and 
Schwartz (1985), and Mizruchi (1992) have noticed similar patterns of corporate 
behavior since the beginning of the twentieth century. Firms such as the Big Three 
automakers no longer seek to put each other out of business through cutthroat business 
practices. Rather, firms seek to be powerful by establishing centrality within networks 
of corporate firms. When a firm achieves this centrality, it has many ties to other firms 
within the network. Some of these ties are formed through interlocking directorates. 
 For this study I used the rhetorical elements of arguments as potential links 
between rhetors. For example, rhetors who are scientists are networked with all other 
scientists by training and practice, however much they disagree in other respects. 
Rhetors who argue that natural resources are finite and that humans are nearing the 
limits to growth have that point of view in common. Rhetors who advocate immediate 
reductions of greenhouse gas emissions are linked by their common proposal. I detail 
these and other links in Chapter 6. 
 I used the social network analysis software Ucinet (pronounced YOU-SEE-
EYE-NET) (Borgatti et al. 2002) to explore the network ties formed by four major 
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elements in the arguments: the authority of the rhetor (as characterized by both 
personal and organizational identities), the type of evidence used, the worldview 
expressed, and the actions proposed. I then performed separate analyses on each of 
these elements, as well as an analysis of all four together. 
 For each analysis, I began with an affiliation matrix (rows of rhetors by 
columns of different values of the element(s) studied). I multiplied the matrix by its 
transpose to get a square matrix indicating the ties of each rhetor to the others formed 
by common types of the element(s). For example, if two rhetors are both scientists, the 
square matrix will show a tie between them; if two rhetors have nothing in common 
vis a vis their personal or organizational identities, the matrix will show no tie. 
 Having created a network matrix, I then used Ucinet to calculate the density of 
the network and dichotomized the cells of the network by specifying that any value 
greater than the average density plus one standard deviation would become a 1; any 
value equal to or below the average density plus one standard deviation would become 
a 0. 
 The third step was to use Ucinet’s CONCOR to partition the network data by 
splitting blocks based upon the CONvergence of iterated CORrelations (CONCOR). 
Details of the procedure can be found in Borgatti et al. (2002). CONCOR produces 
blocks of rhetors linked through the various elements analyzed. 
 This approach is consonant with Ragin’s diversity analysis and application of 
fuzzy sets to social science (2000, 1987). Ragin views causality as configurational. In 
contrast to the usual quantitative, variable-by-variable approach of regression analysis, 
causality often involves complex configurations of variables, in varying combinations.  
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For example, race riots in the United States may be linked to different causal variables 
in the North (where the economic gap between whites and blacks played a major role) 
and the South (where lack of black representation in the political sphere played a 
major role). Performing analysis on one of these variables over both North and South 
would generate equivocal results (Ragin 2000:51-52). Furthermore, Ragin advocates 
analysis that allows partial membership in sets to define fuzzy sets. Instead of crisp 
sets, where a person is either all in or all out of the set, persons may be anywhere on a 
continuum from zero to one. Moreover, the configuration of partial memberships has 
greater explanatory power than any individual membership or memberships 
considered sequentially. 
 In my study, instead of the demographic or worldview characteristics that have 
been posited as causes of people’s attitudes toward the environment, several different 
configurations of variables may be involved. Furthermore, people’s “membership” in 
the “set” of environmentalists may be partial and changing, indicating that a fuzzy-set 




 The final step in this study is to suggest ways in which potential linkages 
among rhetors can provide the bases for coming to agreement – or at least closer to 
agreement – on if and how to address global climate change. The literatures on global 
change generally and climate change specifically suggest ways in which a global 
consensus could be built. Generally, these theories describe either the eventual 
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domination of/consensus around one discourse or the ways in which plural ideas 
achieve the goals of reducing emissions and adapting to climate change. 
 One category of theories holds out the possibility for one kind of discourse or 
another becoming universalized; that is, everyone would eventually agree on actions 
to take to address climate change. There are two major schools of thought:  
• Certainly the technoscientific community believes that new technologies are 
the most promising ways to address climate change; that is, instrumental 
science, which has allowed humans to gain some measure of control over 
Nature, can help us extend that control so that we can refrain from doing more 
harm. This community, which presumes economic and technological 
development is a goal of less industrialized countries, offers concepts such as 
technology transfer, leapfrogging, clean coal, hydrogen fuel, and so on, to rally 
all countries in a we-can-do-it spirit. Strategies under the umbrella of 
“ecological modernization” fit this category. 
• Just as certainly, anti-scientific and anti-modern voices assert that only by a 
“return” to a non-technological relationship with Nature can humankind 
address a host of environmental problems, including climate change. These 
voices include deep ecologists, ecofeminists, and “traditional” peoples. More 
moderate versions of the same impulse are found in the slogans “live lightly on 
the land” and “use it—use it up,” and in organizations whose goals are to 
reduce the consumption of manufactured products and to produce for one’s 
own consumption (rather than mass produce). Organic food with no additives, 
“natural” remedies and alternative medicine, and clothing/housing materials 
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without artificial chemicals are proposed in general; in reference to climate 
change, renewable energy and energy efficiency are two major strategies that 
are advocated. 
 The second general category of theories assumes that no one point of view will 
become hegemonic or universally accepted, and that pluralism will result in actions of 
all kinds, at all levels. The only agreement, then, would be that climate change should 
be addressed. Many groups will mitigate (i.e., reduce greenhouse gas emissions) and 
adapt in various ways. Others will retreat to “sustainable” communities, reducing both 
their consumption and fertility rates. Partial agreements can be built, and have been 
described: 
• Epistemic communities (e.g., Haas). 
• Postindustrial/postmaterial values that transcend narrow interests and values 
(e.g., Inglehart). 
• Pluralisms, emphasizing local knowledge to solve local problems (e.g., 
Wynne). 
• Alliances based on common ground (e.g., Thompson, Hodgkin and Watkins). 
• Incremental agreements (learn-by-doing) (e.g., Dowlatabadi, Edmonds). 
 The purpose of analyzing documents and presentations within the global 
climate change debate is to discern whether these demonstrate the basis (or several 
bases) for agreement about policies and other actions to address climate change. By 
looking at various elements of the documents and presentations, I should be able to see 
whether different discourses are cut off from each other, whether they overlap, 
whether some voices can disagree in some (most) elements but agree in others, and so 
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on. If, for example, certain clusters of elements were tightly correlated with each other 
and not at all with other clusters, there would be little basis for agreement; people 
would simply be talking past each other and emphasizing their disagreements. 
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CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO HOT TOPICS:  
GLOBALIZATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE5 
 
 Considering climate change and globalization together as a research topic can 
illuminate the structures and processes of both. Globalization and climate change 
theories can be categorized as economic, political, and cultural on one dimension, and 
on another dimension as emphasizing the conflicts between the global and 
national/local levels, the dominance of the global, or the hybrids and pastiches created 
by mixing the global and local. Climate change, as an issue that creates and is created 
by a global sense of the world, is bound up in both its analysis and its policy proposals 
with the same issues that confront globalization theorists.  
 Globalization theorists address many of the issues that are bound up in the 
climate change debate: inequality; development; global governance; the global 
environment; and the globalization of Western systems, including science. The 
proliferation of theories and analyses in globalization and climate change reflects the 
emerging nature of both areas of social scientific thought. Activities and “flows” are 
changing too rapidly to be satisfactorily categorized and mapped. Moreover, there are 
no clear advantages to one form of action, since all phenomena are multifaceted, with 
bundled positive, neutral, and negative characteristics.  
                                                 
5 A version of this chapter has been published in Social Thought and Research 
(Malone 2003). 
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 However, the very explosion of ideas and proposals reflects the energy and 
willingness to seek future directions that will bring increased well-being for both 
humans and the environment. The fragmentation that accompanies globalization both 
tends to undermine agreement-seeking processes and to provide a proliferation of 
potential points of attachment. Older forms of negotiation, with their neo-realist 
assumptions, will likely become increasingly unproductive. 
 In separate literatures, globalization theorists invoke climate change as part of 
a vague and black-boxed globalized environment, and climate change analysts both 
blame globalization for environmental problems and attempt to mobilize support for 
environmental causes through appeals to global citizenship and responsibility. 
Although globalization has enabled climate change to become a point of debate and 
climate change has contributed to the definition of globalization, neither contains the 
other. Climate change has strong ties to the cultural aspects and issues of globalization 
(especially in the domain of science), but more local economic and political issues 
play large roles in the debates about the sources, consequences, and possible policies 
of climate change. The concepts relevant to globalization often gain definition from 
the ways they are revealed in more concrete problem spaces, and climate change, as a 
global problem par excellence, reveals the shape and mechanisms of globalization as 
well as defining potential responses. 
 This chapter examines the links and distinctions between global climate 
change and globalization in their economic, political, and cultural dimensions. 
Considering climate change and globalization together as a research topic can 
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illuminate the structures and processes of both, and perhaps suggest pathways toward 
agreement about global issues.  
 The chapter first discusses and maps current globalization theories, then 
theories about climate change. For each topic, theories fall largely (but not purely) into 
economic, political, and cultural categories. Within each of these categories, a theory 
may characterize conflict between globalism and nationalism/localism, a domination 
of global over national or local institutions, or the formation of global-national-local 
hybrids or pastiches. These theory maps will allow me to draw some tentative 
conclusions about the relationship between globalization and climate change, and the 
implications for coming to agreement about addressing climate change. 
 
Approaches to Theorizing Globalization 
 Two widely cited definitions of globalization are those of Robertson and 
Giddens. Giddens (1990:64) defines globalization as “the intensification of worldwide 
social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are 
shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.” Robertson’s definition 
includes both the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of 
the world as a whole, and focuses on globalization as a “massive, two-fold process 
involving the interpenetration of the universalization of particularism and the 
particularization of universalism” (Robertson 1992:100). Robertson criticizes Giddens 
for thinking of globalization as a consequence of modernity and asserts that, in 
contrast, globalization is a general condition that facilitated modernity. However, both 
definitions of globalization refer to connections at a distance and the relationship of 
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things at difference scales. Both the structure and process of globalization are viewed 
in different spheres of the social. 
 Two ways to classify approaches to globalization form a 3x3 matrix (Table 
4.1). (I will later use this same matrix to categorize views on climate change.) The first 
classification is that of the social sphere: economics, politics, and culture. The second 
classification characterizes the relationship of globalization to nationalism or localism: 
the national and local resist the global, the global dominates the local, or global and 
local coexist as hybrids or pastiches. Table 4.1 shows examples of the intersections of 
these two classification schemes. I will discuss the two dimensions generally, then in 
more detail, organizing my discussion according to the intersections under each 
column heading, while recognizing that no example is purely in one category in either 
axis. 
 






























Western goods sold 







Theorists approach globalization as a process and a product within the broad spheres 
of social life: economic, political, and cultural. The economic approach focuses on the 
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increasingly global nature of capitalism, with multinational companies, international 
markets, and a transnational financial system. A second, politically oriented strain of 
globalization theory examines its relationship to nationalism, using globalization to 
illuminate the changing role and power of the nation-state, particularly since the end 
of the Cold War. A third approach examines the broad cultural implications of 
globalization. None of these approaches is exclusive, of course, but typically one 
dimension is seen as dominant, if not determinative. 
 A second way to categorize globalization theories is on the basis of whether 
they emphasize differences between globalization and something else (global versus 
local, or global versus national) or the interpenetration of global and local or national 
elements. The emphasis on differences tends to draw boundaries and describe 
conflicts, while the emphasis on interpenetration tends to describe ways in which 
either the global swamps the local or elements from global/national/local become 
compounds or mixtures. 
 
Globalization of the Economic System 
 Economics dominates many discussions of globalization. Most globalization 
theorists focus on global economic forms and organizations (e.g., multinational firms) 
as replacing national and local economic activities, and the diversity of markets and 
goods that result from the introduction of global products and forms to localities. 
Nations and locales may resist global economic flows (e.g., by nationalizing foreign 
businesses or forbidding American fast food restaurants) or come to be dominated by 
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them (e.g., as multinationals seek new markets and countries seek economic 
development). 
 Countries may resist or be unable to participate in economic globalization 
forces. Economic development theorists explore the factors involved in managing the 
process, along with the reasons for persistent non- or under-development. Easterly’s 
(1999) recent analysis of the resistance of countries to World-Bank-style development 
demonstrates the error of targeted, single strategies for development, such as 
investments in machines, education, population control programs, and simple 
provision of foreign aid. He focuses on countries that show no positive results after 
decades of foreign investment – countries that have resisted development. Such 
countries, he says, lack incentives such as good governments and economic 
institutions would be able to provide; and, he points out, just plain luck also plays an 
important role in economic development. 
 Theorists such as Piore and Sable (1984), Wallerstein (1974, 1983), and 
Harvey (1990)6 focus on globalization as associated with capitalism. Capitalism’s 
growth orientation, exploitation of labor, and technological and organizational 
dynamism lead to overaccumulation. Increasingly, this overaccumulation is managed 
by absorption through temporal or spatial displacement. Temporal displacement 
comprises exploring future uses and speeding turnover of goods, while spatial 
displacement involves finding new geographic or other spaces for production and 
                                                 
6 Harvey’s main argument is cultural, but he includes a relevant discussion of the 
globalization of the economic system. 
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consumption. Managing overaccumulation in these ways results in a trend away from 
Fordist production to what Piore and Sabel call flexible specialization, meaning 
decentralized technologies that can produce a range of products for different 
customers (e.g., specialty steels). Piore and Sabel contrast the hegemonic Fordist 
system to flexible specialization and speculate that the latter may come to be 
dominant. Both, however, are global systems. Harvey sees an increasingly diverse mix 
of global economic systems, reflecting expanded market coordination, changing 
composition in the workforce, an “extraordinary efflorescence and transformation in 
financial markets” (Harvey 1990:194), and a weakened but still powerful state. The 
concept of “flexibilization” makes the same point, but with an emphasis on consequent 
insecurities of workers, who become temporary or part-time employees (see Beck et 
al. 1994, Beck 1999). 
 In Wallerstein’s analysis of the economic world system, national and local 
contribute to the global because they are part of it. Since Wallerstein’s basic viewpoint 
is of a global system, globalization is his starting point; the results are his focus. He 
sees the global economic system as having reached a crisis, brought upon by the 
internal contradictions of capitalist civilization: dilemmas of accumulation, political 
legitimation, and the geocultural agenda (Wallerstein 1983). He foresees “explosions 
in all directions,” economic/political/cultural disorder followed by a reordering of 
some type—perhaps neo-feudalism, democratic fascism, or decentralized and 
egalitarian world order.  
 The third type of economic globalization theory sees the advent of global 
goods at local markets (Abu-Lughod 1997). Equally, global “bads” such as global 
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environmental problems (Yearley 1996) and global risks produced by industrialization 
(Giddens 1991, Beck 1992, Sachs 2000) arrive at all national and local places. For 
example, localities experience the threat of nuclear fallout, sea level rise, air pollution, 
and industrial runoff—all products of the global industrial system – although the 
localities themselves may not have produced nuclear bombs nor emitted vast 
quantities of greenhouse gases nor initiated industrial plants. 
 
Political Globalization 
 Globalization is often seen politically in opposition to nationalism. To the 
extent that the modern nation-state has close ties to the economic system, the political 
and economic are intertwined, but governance can be examined as at least a semi-
autonomous category. Some analysts celebrate the triumphs of the local in the face of 
globalization (e.g., Abu-Lughod 1997, Watson 1997) or warn of the dangers of new 
ethnic localisms (e.g., Barber 1995, Kaplan 1994). Many theorists describe dominance 
of globalization processes or, at least, major accommodations of national and local 
political institutions. 
 Hybrids and pastiches of political institutions also exist, part global, part 
national. Focusing on the conflict between the state and global governance 
organizations, Mann (1993) sees the nation-state as actually strengthening its role on 
the international scene. As international bodies such as the United Nations and the 
European Union attempt to coordinate various national interests, the national actors 
have important powers to change or veto proposed actions. Moreover, local ethnic 
forces (Barber 1995, Appadurai 1996) can assert themselves and be real (irrational and 
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terroristic) dangers to the world order. The protests at World Trade Organization 
(WTO) meetings are an example, as are the terrorist attacks on the United States in 
September 2001. 
 Meyer (1999) points to the domination of globalized forms of the nation-state. 
Modern states are isomorphic, have the same organizations, and “are constituted and 
constructed as ultimately similar actors under exogenous universalistic and 
rationalized cultural models” (Meyer 1999:137). Similarly, Thomas and Meyer (1984) 
see the dominant global system as constructing isomorphic systems such as education 
for citizenship, citizens with rights to improved welfare, the family as part of the 
political order, and the political roles of scientists and professionals as agents and 
legitimators of the state. 
 Also emphasizing the theme of global domination in the political dimension, 
Hobsbaum (1990) sees globalization’s emphasis on competition as undermining the 
ability of states, particularly Western liberal democracies, to protect and provide for 
the welfare of their citizens. More and more, elites are choosing to opt out of their 
nationally based solidarities with poor and disadvantaged in their own nations, joining 
their counterparts in global and more affluent groups, resulting in “global rich” and 
“global poor.” Globalization is not the only threat to state protective power 
(fragmentation of states is another), but it is perhaps the most serious. Supranational 
economic forces (e.g., McDonaldization) and institutions (e.g., banks) operate with 
little reference to the state, and electronic communications have rendered state 
boundaries irrelevant (see also Appadurai 1996). The role of the state in redistributing 
wealth among its citizens has been greatly weakened, with nothing to take its place. 
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Galtung (1997:190) takes this argument further, saying that a globalized world will 
hold “larger domains for structures and cultural meanings” that “imply thinner scopes 
and more reliance on least common denominators. … Here are no Greeks, no Jews; no 
women, no men: we are all one in Coca-Cola.” 
 Agreeing, Stuart Hall (1997) proclaims that the new globalization is American. 
The manifestations of globalization are world organization, global environmental 
problems, and world markets. However, with the decline of nations and nationalism, 
“one can see a regression to a very defensive and highly dangerous form of national 
identity which is driven by a very aggressive form of racism” (Hall 1997:26). That is, 
globalization has created its own reactionary forces (Wallerstein 1999). 
 Appadurai (1996) exemplifies the view of global culture as a melding of 
formerly localized processes, now globalized. He describes a global system that is 
constituted, not by nations any longer, but by five elements that flow into and around 
each other: groups of people (ethnoscapes), technology (technoscapes), capital 
(financescapes), communications (mediascapes) and images (ideoscapes). He sees 
globalization as “a deeply historical, uneven, and even localizing process” that “does 
not necessarily or even frequently imply homogenization or Americanization” 
(Appadurai 1996:17). 
 
Globalization of Culture 
 Lash (Beck et al. 1994) asserts that culture, formerly a less important 
dimension of society than politics and economics, is becoming more important in two 
ways. First, the cultural is becoming a central focus of the global debate. Second, 
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institutions of every stripe are becoming more cultural, as companies strive to become 
seen as patrons of the arts and governments support certain lifestyles. Thus, culture, 
variously defined as aesthetics, popular films/food/fashion/etc., and customary 
lifestyles and stages, is an important dimension of globalization theory. 
 There are, as for economics and politics, three ways to relate global culture to 
local cultures. First, global and local cultures may compete in specific places; 
separatist ethnic groups resisting “tourism” is one good example (see Friedman 1990 
on the Hawaiian Ainu). Second, globalization may mean that all culture becomes 
global, a melding of local cultures. This implies cultural imperialism, American 
culture being the most frequent nominee (Ritzer and Malone 2000). In another form of 
global domination, global culture may mean the organization or structure of many 
cultures, so that the content differs but the commodification processes and systems 
remain similar for each culture; one manifestation of this theoretical perspective is the 
“culture follows structure” argument. Third, global culture may simply be one 
additional culture, to be examined alongside national and local cultures, with no 
particular hierarchy involved; one can pick and choose from global, national, and local 
products (and identities). 
 Robertson (1995) asserts the persistence of resistance to globalization by 
summarizing the arguments against cultural imperialism, citing four counter-factors: 
(1) “global” messages are notoriously subject to differing hearings and interpretations 
in various localities; (2) global organizations are tailoring their messages and products 
to different locales; (3) national symbolic resources are increasingly available to 
international markets; and (4) cultural flows from developing countries to 
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industrialized countries are copious. Ritzer (2000) details resistance to American 
cultural imperialism in the form of the Slow Food movement, protests against opening 
new McDonald’s restaurants, and so on. 
 Anthony Smith (1990) argues that the current model of cultural imperialisms is 
eclectic, unity in diversity; we can expect a standard production-and-consumption 
system with watered-down “folk” content from many national and local cultures. 
Ritzer and Malone (2000) elaborate on the standard production-and-consumption 
system, part economics and part culture, that the United States exports in the forms of 
McDonaldization, credit cards, Disney Worlds, “eatertainment” establishments, and 
shopping malls. Hall (1997), in consonance with this analysis, declares that the 
international language is English, and American culture is everywhere. 
 Robertson (1992, 1995) sketches the outlines of a global world that is highly 
diverse yet highly conscious of its holistic character. Robertson (1992:100) stresses 
the simultaneity of the global and local. Modern transportation and communication 
enable people everywhere to see places around the world as easily as places next door 
to them—and to experience different cultures, environments and conditions (even—or 
maybe especially—war and famine) via print and electronic media. The McLuhan 
phrase “global village” captures this sense of the world as a small place where most 
people are aware of their neighbors. Under globalization, says Robertson, people 
realize that the world holds more “others,” who are experienced as highly diverse yet 
virtually present. 
 Hannerz (1990, 1997) argues that world culture “is marked by an organization 
of diversity rather than by a replication of uniformity” (Hannerz 1990:237). Late 
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Western capitalism “exports culture to peripheral countries.” Global homogenization 
may happen by gradual saturation, although local cultures will reshape Western 
culture to their own needs. The cross-national network of social relationships is the 
organizing impulse that connects diverse local cultures. “Cosmopolitans,” people who 
take on roles in many cultures (unlike the “locals” who want to stay at home wherever 
they go), help to provide coherence to the world culture.  
 Abu-Lughod (1997), in response to Hannerz, rejects a simplistic core-to-
periphery analysis. On the one hand, developing countries contribute more equally to 
global hybrids, such as in the melding of Western rock music and Bedouin “dancing 
horse” patterns (cf. Garcia Canclini 1995 and Pieterse 1995). On the other hand, 
developed niches occur in many places around the globe, for example, Tunis, with its 
Gucci and couture sweatshops and its modern Census office. Watson (1997) details 
the ways in which local and national cultures domesticate the McDonald’s restaurants 
that arrive in various East Asian cities. 
 Seeing global and more local cultures as pastiches, Featherstone (1990:2) 
speaks of global culture “in terms of the diversity, variety and richness of popular and 
local discourses, codes and practices which resist and play-back systemicity and 
order.” Far from giving us a universally homogenous culture, globalization defines a 
space in which the world’s cultures rub elbows and generate new meanings and 
understandings. Featherstone and Lash (1995:2) delineate a world in which 
“international social, political and cultural (for example, the media) organizations are 
standing alongside and beginning to replace their national counterparts.” They see 
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every culture in the mix, so that it is possible to discuss Americanization, 
Europeanization, Japanization—and even Brazilianization.  
 
Contributions of Theorists to Understanding Globalization 
 Globalization theorists have explored a wide range of possible social relations 
resulting from contemporary processes and products of globalization (including the 
possibility that globalization is not unique in history nor so pervasive as is usually 
thought; see Hirst 1997 and Henwood 1999).  
 The economic analyses allow us to see (and perhaps counter) the implications 
of a global economy, including the disadvantages to workers of flexible specialization 
(e.g., uncertain, intermittent work; greater mechanization), the inequalities of global 
trade, and the continuing domination of core economies.  
 Politically, as nation-states continue to be established, they use the established 
state forms whether or not their history and culture allow these forms to be successful; 
furthermore, poor and new states struggle for (or against) the “benefits” of economic 
development. The politically oriented insights of globalization theory help us to 
understand these processes and (hopefully) to see ways to improve global well-being. 
Also, globalization theories add to explanations of global social movements such as 
those concerned with the environment, feminism, and implications of “free” world 
trade; in order to be successful, such social movements must espouse valid 
transnational (global) principles yet relate them to what’s happening in each locale.  
 In the cultural dimension, globalization theories provide descriptions and 
insights about how the process of identity formation is changing. Hannerz’ (1990) 
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characterization of “cosmopolitans” and “locals” is one example; these ideal types of 
identity are polar responses to globalization. Friedman’s dichotomous types (1990) 
include les sapeurs in the People’s Republic of Congo, who combine Paris fashions 
with local status, and the Hawaiian Ainu, who exemplify cultural separatism. Another 
view is that of Robertson (1992), who analyzes how people constitute their identities 
by connecting to global-level groups on the basis of, e.g., gender, profession, interest 
in humankind (perhaps in social movements), or economic group. A third possibility is 
Stuart Hall’s vision of individual identities being formed out of bits and pieces of 
national and ethnic cultures in a kind of bricolage. A relatively pessimistic view is 
taken by Castells (1997: 365), who sees the “dissolution of shared identities” and the 
rise of nonsocial identities in “basic instincts, power drives, self-centered strategic 
calculations” and power-hungry remnants of state structures. The future of resistance 
identities, such as the women’s movement, religious groups, and environmental 
movements, is uncertain.  
 
Approaches to Theorizing Climate Change 
 Global climate change, or “global warming,” as it is sometimes termed,7 is 
simultaneously an exemplar of globalization and a type of universalization that 
                                                 
7 Most physical scientists who perform climate change research think “global 
warming” a reductionist term, since climate change includes a multitude of possible 
changes, up to and including increased frequency and intensity of storms, species 
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transcends globalization. It may be the result of capitalism/consumerism (an economic 
dimension), modernity (a political/governance dimension), or science itself (a cultural 
dimension). 
 The scientific narrative about climate change usually begins with Svente 
Arrhenius, a Swedish chemist who at the turn of the twentieth century hypothesized 
that increasing levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere would cause Earth’s climate 
to become warmer. But it was not until after World War II that general and specific 
factors enabled scientists to investigate the link between carbon dioxide (and other 
radiatively active gases) and changes in Earth’s climate. The scientific factors include 
improved and expanded measurements, and advances in computational power. During 
the postwar period, countries were actively seeking international scientific 
cooperation, which resulted in a global network of atmospheric observing and 
measurement stations under the newly formed World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO). In 1958, the International Geophysical Year, David Keeling began measuring 
the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere over Mauna Loa; this record clearly 
showed rising levels. Meanwhile, computer models of the climate system were being 
developed, first of the atmosphere, then the ocean. By the 1970s the US Department of 
Energy and other agencies were sponsoring climate model runs of increased 
atmospheric carbon dioxide. The 1980s and 1990s showed increasing levels of 
research, at both national and international scales. The central scientific organization 
                                                                                                                                            
dislocation, sea level rise, and the disruption of the Atlantic Ocean’s “conveyor belt,” 
the Gulf Stream. 
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in this area, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was formed in 
1988 under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme and the 
WMO. 
 But these scientific activities unfolded in a historical context of globalization. 
After World War II, the United Nations was organized and the Bretton Woods system 
of international finance came into being. After the beginning of the Cold War, the 
United States sought national security through international scientific and political 
cooperation. The stage was thus set for political, economic, and cultural globalization 
(led, in the “free world,” by the United States) and for scientific investigations of 
climate change (and other “global” problems). 
 Most discussions of globalization that include the environment as a topic 
include climate change in a list of global environmental changes, such as the ozone 
layer, biodiversity, sustainable development, pollution and overfishing in the oceans, 
and acid rain. Although he acknowledges and maps the diversity of environmental 
organizational types, Castells (1997) treats these problems and their associated groups 
together as “the Environmental Movement” and points to its influence on governance, 
corporations, and individual identities as environmentalists. Further, the environmental 
movement is a prime example of the network society, with “a direct correspondence 
between the themes put forward by the environmental movement and the fundamental 
dimensions of the new social structure, the network society” (Castells 1997:122). 
These themes include a love-hate attitude toward science and technology, which are 
simultaneously the source of many environmental problems and the source of 
information about them; control over space and an emphasis on locality; control over 
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time in a “glacial time” perspective; and a view of the global unity of species and 
matter as a whole. 
 However, Miller and Edwards (2001:3) argue that climate change “can no 
longer be viewed as simply another in a laundry list of environmental issues; rather, it 
has become a key site in the global transformation of world order.” The new regimes 
and institutions constructed around the issue of climate change are extensive, reaching 
from science to policy to grassroots movements and raising hotly debated questions 
about whose knowledge is used and who speaks for Nature. 
 Climate change too can be analyzed in the three-by-three matrix used in the 
discussion of globalization (see Table 4.2).  
 
Table 4.2. Dimensions of Climate Change  
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Economic Globalization and Climate Change 
 In the economic dimension, climate change and other environmental issues 
raise questions about the values of the capitalist production system and its tendency to 
favor here-and-now benefits over delayed but more uncertain benefits (the so-called 
high discount rate). The capitalist system is global, and the logic and operating 
principles of this global system swamp any local, traditional economies it may come 
in contact with. Free trade, universal access to markets, and economic efficiency are 
the explicit pathways to Western/Northern-style prosperity and well-being. 
Furthermore, capitalist enterprises produce both goods and environmental degradation. 
The world cannot have the good life without the bad environment.  
 Finally, the production of environmental bads is a direct function of the 
capitalist need to use “free” resources in order to accumulate capital (Saurin 1996, 
Wallerstein 1999). Efforts to “value” the environment (e.g., the “polluter pays 
principle”) are steadfastly resisted or, when resistance is futile, such costs are passed 
on to consumers. Or, as Beck (1999) notes, the polluter pays a fine and continues to 
pollute. Wallerstein (1999) opines that the need of capitalist enterprises for free natural 
resources is so great that environmental economics is contributing to the fall of 
capitalism. Governments are buying time by such strategies as shipping wastes to a 
politically weaker South and constraining growth in newly industrializing countries. 
But eventually there are only three options: (1) force businesses to pay all costs, 
resulting in drastically reduced profits; (2) make governments pay, resulting in large 
tax increases and probably a profit squeeze from reduced consumption; or (3) do 
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nothing and face various ecocatastrophes. In this discussion, it is difficult to separate 
climate change from other environmental issues, especially those considered “global.”  
 Tied to issues of economic globalization is the concept of sustainable 
development, which includes climate as one feature of the world that should not be 
degraded for future generations. Redclift (2000) articulates three views of the links 
between economic growth and sustainability.  
• They may be more or less compatible, recognizing the need for international 
regulations protecting endangered species and ecosystems.  
• They may be totally incompatible; as Daly (1992:200) says, “sustainable 
growth is an oxymoron.”  
• Their compatibility may depend on how we define such crucial variables as 
“wealth,” “the needs of future generations,” and “economic efficiency”; 
certainly we need to switch priorities and put sustainability first.  
 All three views recognize that unchecked economic globalization will continue 
to exacerbate (if it does not cause) problems such as climate change, indoor pollution, 
household and industrial wastes, water availability, poor air quality, and extinction of 
species. However, only the second view holds that economic growth is the cause of 
many global problems. According to this view, we cannot manage our way out of 
climate change (and other global environmental problems); we must dismantle the 
capitalist system and re-become just another of Nature’s species in a world of multiple 
mutual dependencies. The first and third views retain capitalist institutions and 
processes. The first view leaves economic change in the driver’s seat; either climate 
change regulations are add-ons or – in the view of economists such as Ausabel (1990) 
 98
– the fact that people are accumulating wealth and technoscientific knowledge will 
allow them to mitigate or adapt to whatever climatic changes may come. The third 
view is more aggressive about tinkering with the present system, putting sustainability 
ahead of profit as the primary criterion for making choices. This reorientation may be 
accomplished through ecological economic principles, which are based on the writings 
of Mancur Olson, Kenneth Boulding, and others; environmental goods such as clean 
air, water supplies, forests, scenery, and biodiversity must enter the market system and 
be valued so they are not degraded. Alternatives to the calculation of gross domestic 
products include the net national product (NNP), which subtracts depreciation costs 
from nonrenewable resources (Solow 1991); the new economic welfare (NEW) 
approach, which subtracts items such as the unmet cost of pollution and the 
disamenities of urbanization (Tobin and Nordhaus 1972); and the Genuine Progress 
Report, which discounts the cost of products that result from environmental 
degradation (Cobb, Halstead and Rowe 1995). (See Yohe and Cantor 1998 for other 
examples.) 
 
Political Globalization and Climate Change 
 Global political issues under the label of “modernity” have been held up as the 
all-purpose cause of climate change. In the political dimension, the global and national 
are almost conflated. Indeed, the global modern has also created the nation-state; 
nation-states are constituted and organized according to a global template (Meyer 
1999), which includes an environmental ministry or agency. Modernity substitutes 
centralized technocratic governance and institutional engineering for traditional 
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systems of all kinds. Specific governing principles accompany this replacement: 
utilitarianism, free markets as productive of the highest human welfare, and rational 
actors. This is the political system that reinforces globalization and allows unchecked 
greenhouse gas emissions, especially from energy production and land-use change, 
two primary mechanisms of modernization. 
 The governance accompaniment to “sustainable development,” which focuses 
on changing the present system, is ecological modernization. In this view, a great 
mistake of modernity was to define the environment (Nature) as external to human 
societies and their production/consumption systems. The “human exemptionalist 
paradigm” (HEP), which expresses the assumption of most social theorists up to the 
1980s that humans are exempt from natural constraints, needed to be replaced with a 
“new environmental paradigm” (NEP) that encompassed humans and their natural 
environment together (see Catton and Dunlap 1978, 1980). One reaction to this insight 
is “de-modernization theory” (Spaargaren 2000), an aspiration to a green society of 
small communities that live in harmony with nature and the natural climate. Another is 
ecological modernization, which seeks to update modernization by including the 
environment (including clean air and water) along with other factors of production and 
the costs of environmental damage along with other costs of production. This is 
ecological economics, but it has strong implications for modern governance. In 
essence, we can repair this mistake of modernity by enlarging modernity to include the 
management of environmental resources as well as societies. Ecological 
modernization posits the potential for controlled, sustainable growth that can yield 
both economic prosperity and no environmental damage, as expressed in the slogans 
 100
“win-wins,” “win-win-wins” (the “triple bottom line”), and “pollution prevention 
pays.” In climate change, ecological modernization is the theory that underpins 
proposed policies like emissions trading schemes and tax breaks for renewable energy 
industries and technologies. 
 The formation and organization of the modern nation-state have overturned the 
culture and customs of native peoples, many of whom may have lived sustainably on 
their land. That is, modernization upsets the balance and causes environmental 
degradation of all kinds, including greenhouse gas emissions. Scott (1998) details the 
modernist horrors of villagization in Tanzania and Russia as well as of modernist 
cities such as Brasilia. Davis (2001) provides an example of this view, with the added 
force of colonialism. He analyzes the devastating results of bringing India and China 
into world markets in the nineteenth century; the forcible breakdown of various 
traditional systems resulted in massive starvation and death when severe droughts 
occurred.  
 Specific climate change examples focus on the inequalities of the world-
system, now intensified by climate change. Industrialized countries are responsible for 
the historic emissions that are the cause of the steep rise in atmospheric greenhouse 
gases. But the resulting climate change impacts will largely be felt in the tropics, 
where most of the poor and non-industrialized countries lie (see, for example, Agarwal 
and Narain 1991). Here the global modern swamps the national/local, with negative 
results for the environment and the already-poor. Boehmer-Christiansen (2003) shows 
that a proposed global transition to “green” fuels and technologies in order to mitigate 
climate change will similarly and disproportionately disadvantage poor groups and 
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nations. Sachs (2000), in discussing the prospects for sustainability, notes that 
economic and political globalization, with an “openness” that few poor nations can 
exploit, fosters a new colonization of Nature; as poor countries fall into debt, they are 
forced to sell the products of “free” natural resources. O’Brien and Leichenko (2000) 
dub this situation the “double exposure” of the poor to economic globalization and to 
climate change. 
 Inequality is an issue both among nations and within nations. Although an 
issue of economic well-being, the focus on much of the inequality literature is on the 
role of governance. The Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) 
articulates the recognition that more industrialized countries and less industrialized 
countries are indeed highly unequal in almost every way and that these inequalities 
place the latter at a disadvantage with regard to climate change impacts.8 Inequality 
within less industrialized countries is, in contrast to assumed between-nation 
assumption of the FCCC, also exacerbates vulnerability to climate change. In-country 
inequality contributes to vulnerability principally by failing to provide for the 
maintenance of marginal populations. 
                                                 
8 The exceptions to this view include sometimes-romanticized descriptions of 
contented peasants living in harmony with Nature and the peaceful solidarity of 
peasant communities. 
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 Analysts have typically used income data as an indicator of inequality. If the 
society is highly proletarianized9—that is, if the wages workers receive for their 
services constitute their principal incomes—income inequality measures may be good 
proxies. However, in semi-proletarianized regions, especially predominantly 
subsistence agricultural and pastoral areas, income inequality misses essential 
elements of well-being. A US income of a certain level, for instance, may be a good 
proxy for adequate shelter and food, access to health care, and accident and health 
insurance. But levels of income data in many Latin American, African, and East Asian 
countries may not be good proxies for any of these; people may have low incomes but 
plenty of food and adequate shelter, or they may have relatively high incomes but also 
crushing debt and taxes, indicating acute vulnerability. For less industrialized 
countries, questions about inequality go far beyond income data. As Kiester (2000) 
points out, wealth distributions may indicate striking inequality, even in a highly 
industrialized society like the United States. Asset or consumption measures (Macro 
International 2001, World Bank 2001, LIS 2001) may be better indicators in societies 
where wages are often only one way to ensure well-being.  
 In agricultural or pastoral areas that do not participate significantly in cash 
markets, comparative measures should take account of a broader range of access to 
resources. Such an analysis follows Sen’s (1981, 2000) conception of poverty: as a 
deprivation of basic capabilities rather than as low income. Resources here might 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Wallerstein (1983) for a discussion of the implications of proletarianization 
of societies. 
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include reciprocal relationships between elites and peasants, landownership or tenure 
rights, access to common resources such as forests and water, livestock and seeds, 
food reserves, and friendship or kinship networks that engage in work exchanges and 
other mutual help. For peasant families, a principal asset is the health of the primary 
worker(s). The fact that such a complex of resources and rights may be hard to 
measure does not make them less important, only more challenging. 
 One important element of inequality in developing countries is land tenure, 
broadly conceived as rights to land and the fruits of that land. If people have access to 
resources that will allow them to “live the lives that they would like to live” (Sen 
2000), then analyses of vulnerability to climate change will become more meaningful 
than its current manifestations, which look suspiciously like measures of how 
industrialized and globalized a country is. 
 Another facet of the political dimension is that social and political theorists 
have taken the nation-state to be both the unit of analysis and the unit of governance in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Vogler and Imber 1996). “Realist” views of the 
anarchy in the international sphere assume that no global authority will gain 
legitimacy in governing environmental matters. International relations (IR) theory, 
having been dominated by (neo)realism, views all global environmental changes, 
including climate change, as items on the international agenda – and secondary items 
at best, after the perennial items of war, security and national self-interest (Saurin 
1996). International institutionalists, such as Paterson (1996) add extra-governmental 
institutions to the mix, while retaining the focus on political processes.  
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 With regard to the environment, countries have achieved international 
agreements codified in treaties and conventions, but implementation has fallen far 
short of what is envisioned in, for example, the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (1992). Redclift (2000) calls this a crisis of authority, since 
organizations such as the United Nations lack the legitimacy necessary for 
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement. Furthermore, international agreements 
depend upon individual nation-states to implement the terms of the agreement. 
However, the nation-state may in fact be too small to effectively meet global 
environmental challenges and too big to implement appropriate policies at local 
levels.10 Saurin (1996), among others, noting that global is not a synonym for 
international, calls for new institutions capable of dealing with the ordering processes 
involved in the scale, spread, complexity, and dynamics of global environmental 
changes. 
 
Cultural (Scientific) Globalization and Climate Change 
 Science is the principal cultural element involved in climate change issues. 
Science is associated with larger issues of knowledge production and use. And, 
indeed, relegating science to the cultural realm, along with fashion, film, and fast food, 
runs the danger of minimizing its close interrelationships with both the capitalist 
                                                 
10 This idea is attributed by Mol (2000) to Lash and Urry, but attributed by Saurin 
(1996) to Raymond Williams. 
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system and modern governance.11 Beck (1992[1986]) uses the concept of the risk 
society to integrate the three dimensions I have separated into analytic categories. 
Risks are the “wholesale product of industrialization”; they are revealed by scientific 
investigation, which also promises their resolution; and they prompt a “reorganization 
of power and authority” in the attempted political management of both politicized 
nature and society (Beck 1992[1986]:21 and 24). 
 Nevertheless, science plays a special role in global climate change related to 
the problem itself and to the nature of scientific knowledge and its uses. Science has 
constructed the problem and constructed it as a global problem with at least some 
human causes in the emissions of so-called greenhouse gases. As a scientific issue, 
climate change was “discovered” by advances in scientific understanding and 
methodology, and computational capacity, as outlined earlier.  
 Of course, these scientific methods and conclusions are the subject of intense 
debate. Perhaps the measurement of greenhouse gases does not represent the global 
atmosphere; there is uncertainty about emissions of greenhouse gases, particularly 
from land-use changes; the models, because they are global models, cannot be verified 
and may neglect important processes; and the current warming trend may be unrelated 
to human activities and more dependent upon sunspot cycles, for example (see 
Edwards 2001, Norton and Suppe 2001). The issues of “globalizing science” in 
                                                 
11 In this analytic scheme, fashion, film, and fast food are relegated to the economic 
sphere as the products of capitalism. 
 106
general relate to generalizing from localized experiments or data; Jasanoff and Wynne 
(1998) provide an account of the processes of globalizing climate change science. 
 Global climate change is global in its very nature, unlike earlier problems with 
far-ranging relevance. Pasteur’s work, for example, had global relevance, because 
wherever contagious disease is present his constructs can be applied. But Pasteur did 
not need to collect data on a global system like the climate system but rather to 
replicate his relatively small-scale experiments and hygienic practices at multiple 
locations. In contrast, the global climate system must be considered as a whole. 
Storms in the Pacific Ocean drive much of the weather that much of the world 
experiences. Emissions of carbon dioxide go into the stocks of the whole atmosphere.  
 Science is indispensable in discussions about global climate change. “The 
debate over environmental change is in large part a battle in the social construction of 
knowledge and meaning which is fought out in a global arena” (Saurin 1996:81). 
Indeed, scientific research has made it possible for people to think of the globe as a 
symbol of a common humanity. The picture of the Earth from space (the “big blue 
marble”) has evoked descriptions of its fragility, its limited resources, and human 
dependence. Associated images of Spaceship Earth and Gaia (the sense of the whole 
Earth as a living being) join earlier images of Mother Earth with powerful, global 
messages to “protect” the Earth and “Love your Mother.” These are global images, 
cultural constructions that provide the appropriate settings for global climate change 
discussions. 
 But global climate change has more localized and differentiated sources and 
impacts as well. Rich industrialized nations are largely responsible for increasing 
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concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, especially when historical 
contributions are accounted for; these same nations are likely to experience only 
mildly negative impacts from climate change, at least over the course of the next 
century. Poorer but industrializing nations (such as India and China) are contributing a 
smaller but increasing share of global emissions; these nations, however, are likely to 
experience more severe consequences of climate change. Given this lumpiness, 
questions arise about whose knowledge counts and how any knowledge will be used. 
Prescriptions from industrialized nations, such as advice to less industrialized nations 
on “clean development” and technology-dependent “solutions,” are likely to face 
skepticism. Calls for development assistance without the strings of capitalist 
institutions may well fall on deaf ears. The current state of negotiations on climate 
change exhibit many features that a neorealist would recognize, with self-interests 
dictating outcomes rather than a game-theoretic recognition that cooperation may 
bring advantages for all. 
 
Globalization and Climate Change: More Heat than Light? 
 What is the relationship between globalization and climate change? Economic, 
political, and cultural globalization is deeply implicated as the causes of climate 
change and our knowledge about it. In each dimension, analysts have suggested both 
“more” and “less” to meet the challenges of climate change. Milton (1996) suggests 
that “the global environmental debate encapsulates the tension between ‘globaling’ 
and ‘deglobalizing’ tendencies identified by Robertson” – that is, we should either 
promote globalization as the best way of protecting the environment or dismantle the 
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global economy and allow localities to control their own resources. In the economic 
sphere, capitalism may either be expanded to account for the input costs of and 
damages to the environment, or be superseded by another economic system. In the 
political sphere, modernist governance needs to extend itself to manage the 
environment along with social systems or retreat to locally sustainable governments. 
In the cultural sphere, science needs to specify methods to mitigate and to adapt to 
more fully characterized climate changes, or to lose its hubris and make space for local 
knowledges and for moral and ethical approaches to the issues raised by global climate 
change. 
 Climate change, as perhaps the limit case of globalization gone wrong, 
provides a site where economic, political, and cultural/scientific issues can be debated. 
Climate change globalizes the environment by specifying the connections among what 
happens in specific places and the whole climate system. Nongovernmental 
organizations and institutions have gone a certain distance toward including multiple 
knowledges and North/South viewpoints. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, although dominated by industrialized-nation scientists, has come to 
conclusions not in the interests of their nations. The United Nations Environment 
Program and Development Program have had some modest success in providing 
assistance to poor nations who are not well adapted to current climate variability and 
who face further problems under long-term climate change. Still, there is little 
indication that industrialized nations are preparing to overhaul their systems of 
producing energy and goods, and little indication of systematic planning for 
adaptations that will be necessary. 
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 The focus of this research study is global climate change as a site from which 
to analyze the possibilities for coming to agreement. In this broadly conceptualized 
research area, cultural approaches within globalization theories that link global and 
local views of desirable human and human/Nature relationships are the most 
promising. How identities are formed from global, national, and local elements, and 
how effective collective institutions (like epistemic communities [Haas 1992]) are 
constructed—these are crucial questions in determining the possibilities for globally 
shared values as the basis for policy and action. The political and economic realities of 
globalization are established constraints and possibilities, but social action is located 
in the abilities of social movement organizations and individual actors to see clearly 
and take advantage of various points of attachment. This is a view that can draw from 
and extend the theoretical insights of Robertson (1992, 1995, 2001). Another fruitful 
avenue is indicated by Castells, who sees social movements as having two main 
agencies: prophets (both “good” and “bad”) and “a networking, decentered form of 
organization and intervention” (Castells 1997:362) that actually distributes cultural 
codes in the globalized informational society. 
 The proliferation of theories and analyses in both globalization and climate 
change reflects the emerging nature of both areas of social scientific thought. 
Activities and “flows” are changing too rapidly to be satisfactorily categorized and 
mapped. Moreover, there are no clear advantages to one form of action, since all 
phenomena are multifaceted, with bundled positive, neutral, and negative 
characteristics. For example, global policy on climate change could benefit all nations 
on average but leave specific groups mired in poverty and at risk of climate change 
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impacts. However, local initiatives, while empowering stakeholders and taking 
advantage of local knowledge, may be limited in resources and subject to 
countervailing activities elsewhere (as when forests are spared in one place but cut 
down in another). Nongovernmental organizations can work across national 
boundaries on sustainable development programs but be undermined by local and 
national governments. “Green” communities reduce their emissions of greenhouse 
gases and serve as models for other communities; they may also be marginalized and 
powerless to effect change in larger political spheres.  
 If this is an incoherent assemblage of activities, it is also a vibrant and 
plurivocal one. Climate change forums have provided venues for many voices to be 
heard on a global stage, and climate change concerns have galvanized scientific 
research, policy debate, and local action. Sonnenfeld and Mol (2002) point to 
innovations in the form of supranational environmental institutions, market-based 
environmental regulatory instruments, and the rise of engagement from a global civil 
society. Guston (2001) analyzes boundary organizations in environmental policy and 
science, including three climate change studies.  
 Still, there are important contradictions to be sorted out. An overwhelming 
majority of people wants a less degraded environment, and seemingly at the same time 
everyone wants more goods and energy to improve the world’s standard of living.12 
Governments pay lip service to improving or protecting the environment, but “the 
                                                 
12 Wallerstein (1999:5) suggests that “a lot of them simply segregate the two demands 
in their minds.” 
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unpalatable implications” (Held et al. 1999:410) of many environmental policies mean 
that few effective ones have been enacted and implemented. International institutions 
or nongovernmental organizations may be more matched to the scale and complexity 
of climate change, but they do not have the power “to force compromises, extract 
significant concessions from participants or take independent action” (Held et al. 
1999:411). 
 Although it is tempting to resign oneself to expect the reproduction of existing 
power structures in the debate about climate change, history contains examples of 
large social changes against the expectations of the powerful; social revolutions that 
resulted in democratic governments constitutes an obvious example. Perhaps future 
large-scale changes in the economics, politics, and culture related to climate change 
will become objects of widespread social scientific study, as globalization is now. 
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CHAPTER 5: RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS MADE 
IN THE GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE 
 
 The possibility that human activities have become so large in scale that they 
are affecting the global climate system has become a matter of extensive debate, and it 
is this debate and the arguments made in it that are the focus of this empirical study. 
Intentional human attempts to affect the weather have a long history, of course; people 
have prayed or danced or sacrificed or performed other rituals to persuade the gods to 
send rain, fair weather, or whatever conditions would facilitate human endeavors. 
What is different in the present situation is that a scientific basis exists to believe that 
humans, without intending to, may be affecting the climate and that climate change 
may have negative consequences. The debate, then, is over whether human emissions 
of so-called greenhouse gases are affecting the climate and, if so, what people should 
do to address the potential for climate change. 
 The first task that a person who makes an argument faces is that of convincing 
the audience that there is something requiring their attention. If scientists have 
discovered the truth about anthropogenic climate change, then the rhetorical situation 
contains the exigence that Bitzer (1968) discusses: something arising from outside 
themselves and suddenly confronting people, like the exigence that arises in military 
battles or political situations such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. But, as Vatz (1973) 
argues, any seeming externality, like the Civil War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, is 
itself constructed by rhetors who argue that the evidence presents a problem that 
people should take notice of and do something about. The evidence of climate change 
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(rising carbon dioxide concentrations, emissions of greenhouse gases, etc.) became 
support for a scientific argument about how climate is or may be affected by emissions 
of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases to the atmosphere. Thus, scientific 
rhetors were the first to construct the exigence of the current rhetorical situation. This 
is an especially important element in the rhetorical situation of potential climate 
change, because, unlike battlefields or photos of missile silos, the evidence of climate 
change is a highly artificial construct. The evidence that carbon dioxide concentrations 
in the atmosphere are rising comes from complex scientific instrument measurements, 
represented by a graphic curve familiar to climate scientists but not empirically 
verifiable by a nonscientist, as an oil spill or smog is. Projections of climate change 
are presented as graphs, charts, and other visualizations of computerized simulations. 
 The scientific basis for potential climate change caused by humans has many 
people worried, but many others remain unconvinced. That is, some accept the 
exigence as exigence and argue for (and against) particular actions to respond to the 
threat; for those who do not accept the exigence of the situation, the framing of the 
problem continues in scholarly and political (rhetorical) debates.  
 Within the ranks of those who believe human-caused climate change is a 
problem, research attention in recent years has begun to focus on the processes 
involved in constructing climate change as a social-environmental “problem,” creating 
evidence of it, and attempting to develop solutions at the global level. After the initial 
agreement (the Framework Convention on Climate Change came into force in 1994), 
progress has been slow at best, and the Framework Convention is seemingly at an 
impasse. The number of policy proposals is legion, but even the modest emissions 
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reductions agreed to in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol will likely not be implemented and 
the protocol itself has not come into force. Argumentative fissures have appeared, not 
only in the arguments associated with so-called “developed” versus “developing” 
countries, but also within these groups of countries. 
 
Rhetorical Analytic Approaches to Comparative Analysis 
 Given the seeming inability of people to come to agreement about what (if 
anything) to do about the prospect of climate change, should the world’s societies 
continue to try to find a path forward? In order to answer this question, we should 
examine the arguments people are making. A rhetorical analysis of the arguments in 
the debate should shed some light on the potential for agreement. If there are bases for 
agreement, they should exist in the arguments themselves – in the definition of the 
situation, or in one or more of the premises, or in proposals made. Even conceding the 
well-known phenomenon that people do not always say what they mean or believe, 
opponents in the debate will ferret out hidden motivations and arguments, so research 
that examines a wide range of arguments should be able to capture most of the “real” 
arguments. Perhaps differences in the characteristics of the speakers or perceived 
biases form the bases for disagreement, rather than the content of the premises or 
conclusions. Furthermore, a closer look at the arguments in the debate may yield 
insights about how to build on areas of agreement and gain adherence to one or more 
proposals for action. 
 Rhetorical analysis is a tool well suited to examining what is going on in the 
climate change debate. Rhetoric, the art of persuasive speaking and writing, 
 115
characterizes the dimensions of the various arguments and the means people use to 
make their arguments as forceful as possible. The Aristotelian categories of ethos, 
pathos, and logos ground the analysis in the essential elements of a speech act: the 
character of the speaker (ethos), the appeal to the emotions of the audience (pathos), 
and the claims of the matter itself (logos). Who is the speaker and why should others 
listen to him or her? How does the subject connect with the values the audience holds 
dear? And why is the subject important? Each person who constructs an argument 
must wrestle with each of these three dimensions. And each speaker in a debate 
constructs an argument based on a worldview that is presumably shared among 
speaker and hearers; otherwise, the argument would be unconvincing or, indeed, 
unintelligible.  
 Modern rhetorical theories and tools are numerous and varied. Criteria for 
judging their usefulness for a comparative examination of arguments center around 
their ability to apply analytic categories to elements of each argument, yet preserve the 
content of the argument. Another important criterion is that the theories and tools be as 
evenhanded as possible, i.e., they should have little or no inherent bias toward either 
scientific discourse (as stated at the beginning of this chapter, an important element in 
the exigence and in the debate) or nonscientific discourses such as traditional 
knowledge and narratives. The overall objective is to use the tools of rhetorical 
analysis in a structured and consistent way in order to draw some conclusions about 
the distinctions and commonalities among the arguments. 
 In this effort to analyze arguments in the climate change debate, a brief 
examination of some of the major figures of modern rhetorical theory is in order, 
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perhaps to draw from them eclectically or from one or more materially, and perhaps to 
use their insights as sources to design a schema suitable to the question being 
investigated. With the question in mind, I discuss and evaluate the dramatism of 
Kenneth Burke, speech act theory as propounded by J.L. Austin and extended by 
Jürgen Habermas, and the “New Rhetoric” of Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-
Tyteca. 
 Burke’s dramatistic approach has been used extensively in rhetorical analysis. 
The use of Burkean analysis provides rich insights into single texts or types of texts. 
Burke himself provides rich critiques of texts such as Mein Kampf (Burke 1989). The 
pentad (act, scene, agent, purpose, and agency) and the “ratios” between pentadic 
elements (the relationships between the elements of the pentad as used in literature or 
rhetoric, e.g., the act-scene ratio) reveal the (in)coherence of an argument (Burke 
1989, Ling 1989). For example, if an audience does not believe that a certain agent 
would perform a specified act (“he just wouldn’t do that”), the argument that rests on a 
posited ratio between the two will be unconvincing. Similarly, if the rhetor carefully 
chooses the boundaries of a scene, he or she can limit the possibilities for action 
within the scene (“in this case, she couldn’t have done anything else than what she 
did”). 
 However, the Burkean approach does not lend itself to the question of bases 
for agreement in many arguments about climate change. First, Burke himself reveals 
his own bias against “scientific” or “behavioristic” language. Dramatism is in fact 
defined in contradistinction to behaviorism, and a scientific approach (language as 
definition) is contrasted to a dramatistic approach (language as act). Although one 
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could use a dramatistic approach to debunk scientific claims to objectivity and 
authoritative definition, this analysis of arguments about climate change acknowledges 
the claims of all rhetors to the truths they construct. It is not concerned with reducing 
all arguments to the same terms (no matter if the rhetors would agree or not), nor do I 
wish to draw a heavy, dichotomous line between scientific and nonscientific 
discourses. 
 Moreover, as Klumpp (1993) points out, using the pentad as a rigorous analytic 
framework tends to result in sterile, formulaic analyses. Attempts to transform the 
Burkean pentad into a set of argumentative propositions, says Klumpp, destroys its 
contextualist assumptions and produces results to be “shuddered at.” Using the pentad 
in a Burkean analysis also makes comparison highly problematic; each object of 
analysis tends to be seen as unique. Moreover, many of the arguments made in the 
climate change debate are not complete in the way that, for example, Mein Kampf is 
(see Burke 1989); attempts to discern the five elements of the pentad plus the ten 
ratios would necessitate extensive and inferential analysis. 
 Another major figure in modern rhetorical analysis is J.L. Austin (1962), who 
showed that all statements are also acts – hence the term “speech act theory.” That is, 
a speaker is always seeking to have an effect by making statements. One way in which 
speech act theory bore fruit was in Jürgen Habermas’ (1984, 1987) theories about the 
ideal speech situation, in which Habermas treats communication as speech acts 
oriented toward understanding, as Aristotle assumed rhetors are oriented toward the 
truth. Communicative action may serve to establish and renew interpersonal relations, 
to represent states and events, and to express the speaker’s experience (roughly 
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equivalent to Aristotelian pathos, logos, and ethos). Speech acts thus make validity 
claims and can be judged on the basis of whether they are morally correct, factually 
true, and subjectively sincere. Thus, if a scientist shows data about the probability of 
risk from exposure to a toxic chemical, he or she is making a claim about the truth of 
the statements. Because the scientist knows that such statements can be contested, he 
or she frames the statements to be acceptable to the audience. Similarly, if a citizen 
contests the scientist’s claim, there is a counter truth claim that the citizen is hoping 
will be accepted. It is in this sense that speech acts are oriented toward understanding, 
which presumably will lead to agreement about contested issues and resulting actions. 
 To the rational arguments that Habermas focuses on, Wells (1996:123-124) 
adds Lacan’s term “drive” in formulating an intersubjective rhetoric to use in 
analyzing discourses of modernity: 
If Habermas tells the happy story of communicative action as a practice of 
reason, capable of sustaining more and more intense differentiation, available 
for reflecting on a broader and broader social terrain, Lacan tells the sad story 
of action as necessarily implicated in error, necessarily unsuccessful, bringing 
us into a relation with the other marked by domination and frustration (123-
124). 
Wells’ analyses of “rational” discourses such as the MOVE Commission report in 
Philadelphia and articles in an issue of Science magazine on cosmology show how 
they are “suffused with desire,” but her Lacanian analysis of a student outburst does 
not demonstrate its rationality, merely opposes it to a university and professorial 
rationality that in the end cannot cope with the outburst. Thus, her approach reveals 
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itself as a way to expose the nonrational elements of modernist discourse in opposition 
to rational elements – again, against the purpose of a comparative analysis of 
arguments in the climate change debate. That is, I am pursuing bases for agreement, 
not the dichotomous presentation of rational versus nonrational (which tends to 
reinforce explanations of disagreement, not bases for agreement), nor the by-now-
conventional revelation that each has properties of the other. 
 Habermas, with little or none of the anti-scientific bias of Burke and Wells, has 
a broader concept of rationality than technical or scientific discourse. In his separation 
of the system and the lifeworld, rational discourse belongs to both. And in what he 
calls the public sphere (Habermas, 1989[1969]), citizens, using their lifeworld 
rationality, come together to critique the system. The lifeworld includes practical, 
everyday concerns about how to make a living, how to conduct family life, and how to 
improve the functioning of civil society. Thus, Habermas provides a general way to 
talk about how rhetors and arguments interact without privileging one type of 
discourse over another. 
 Bitzer and Vatz, and Austin and Habermas, thus provide some rough, 
classificatory tools with which to begin this analysis, but the issue of comparability of 
arguments remains. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971[1969]:190) provide a 
principal concept that allows examination of the differences and commonalities among 
arguments. They classify arguments by whether they are characterized by processes of 
association or dissociation. Association processes “bring separate elements together 
and allow us to establish a unity among them, which aims either at organizing them or 
at evaluating them, positively or negatively, by means of one another.” Dissociation 
 120
includes “techniques of separation which have the purpose of dissociating, separating, 
disuniting elements which are regarded as forming a whole or at least a unified group 
within some system of thought.” This primary level of classification allows us to 
notice, at the level of the whole argument, what elements are being associated or 
dissociated in arguments about climate change, without specifying elements that 
belong to types of discourse. 
 Other aspects of the Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca treatise promise to further 
facilitate the comparative analysis. I will touch on three in particular: the concept of 
the universal audience, the penetrating discussion of data (which ties in with the 
classical stases; see below), and the emphasis on probable arguments and the degree of 
adherence to an argument. 
 The first is the concept of the universal audience, which consists of “the whole 
of mankind, or at least, of all normal, adult persons” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
1971[1969]:30) who, if they understand the reasons given in the argument, would 
have to accept the conclusions. “For each speaker, at each moment, there exists an 
audience transcending all others, which cannot easily be forced within the bounds of a 
particular audience.” More than in most debates, the rhetors in the climate change 
debate address the universal audience – sometimes grandly specified as humankind or 
all travelers on Spaceship Earth, sometimes the implied audience for scientific 
“discoveries” (i.e., everyone should be convinced by scientific arguments and 
evidence). This concept accords well with Habermas’ ideal speech situation, which 
includes all competent parties to the argument and within which all rhetors are 
oriented toward “coming to agreement.” 
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 The second aspect that is helpful is the discussion of data. One kind of data 
“consists of the agreements available to the speaker as supports for his argument” 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971[1969]:115). The selection of the facts of the 
case is thus supremely important in the efficacy of the argument; choices reveal both 
what the rhetor thinks will be most convincing and what may be counted on as 
agreements. When a rhetor selects certain data, he or she gives them presence in the 
argument. Moreover, the interpretation of facts is important, especially in 
distinguishing different arguments that use the same agreed-on facts. In climate 
change, for instance, many rhetors agree that concentrations of greenhouse gases are 
rising, but there are many interpretations of these data. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
discuss some of the ways that multiple interpretations can be generated. People do not 
understand data in the same ways, interpretations may invoke different levels (e.g., the 
same act could be “interpreted as a symbol, a means, a precedent, a step in a direction” 
[Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971(1969):121]), or ambiguity may be present in the 
data. 
 The third aspect is the recognition that there are degrees of adherence to 
arguments and degrees of probability that rhetors assign to the arguments. Establishing 
proof or truth is not the goal but rather “to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence 
to the theses presented for its assent. What is characteristic of the adherence of minds 
is its variable intensity” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971[1969]:4). In the climate 
change arena, most of the arguments about taking action concern a future in which the 
uncertainties are very large – some say they amount to indeterminacy. Therefore, 
uniform agreement cannot be expected. Indeed, this study is at least partially an 
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investigation into whether there exist partial adherences, based on one or multiple 
network ties. 
 Toulmin (1958) also accounts for the variable degrees of adherence to 
arguments. He looks at the logic of discourse as not amenable to the rules of formal 
logic and builds a diagram of an argument with the elements of claim, data, warrant 
(with backing), modal qualifier, and rebuttal. In terms of informal logic, the qualifier 
expresses the degree of certainty or probability of the argument. Laying out an 
argument using Toulmin’s schema should show clearly where rhetors agree and 
disagree and about what elements. However, the schema is restricted to micro-
arguments, not the macro-argument level of this analysis. 
 Similarly, the elaborate schema Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca present is not 
suited for the high-level analysis I wish to pursue. I will use their distinction between 
association and dissociation, and examine the arguments in two broad categories 
suggested by Jeanne Fahnestock and Marie Secor (1983): arguments from definition 
(categorical propositions) and arguments from cause-and-effect (agency). Both kinds 
of arguments are used in proposals, which constitute my document sample. 
 
A Methodology for Comparative Analysis of Arguments 
 I have used a rhetorical approach to analyze the arguments in 100 documents 
and public statements explicitly directed to global environmental debates. (See 
Appendix 2 for a list of the documents.) The focus is principally on documents related 
to specific proposals for political, economic, and social changes to address issues 
raised in the global climate change debate. Sources include scientific journal articles 
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and reports, environmental “activist” statements (environmental social movement 
groups), cultural/ethnic group statements (e.g., First Nations in Canada, deep 
ecologists, ecofeminists), negotiating positions and other policy-oriented statements 
(from industrialized and developing countries), and media articles or reports. 
 The purpose of analyzing documents and presentations within the global 
climate change debate is to discern whether these demonstrate a basis (or several 
bases) for agreement about policies and other actions to address climate change. By 
looking at various elements of the documents and presentations, I should be able to see 
whether different discourses are cut off from each other, whether they overlap, 
whether some voices can disagree in some (most) elements but agree in others, and so 
on. If, for example, certain clusters of elements are tightly correlated with each other 
and not at all with other clusters, there would be little basis for agreement; people 
would simply be talking past each other and emphasizing their disagreements. 
 Earlier attempts, including at least one in-depth analysis, have been made to 
classify the arguments made in the climate change debate. Earlier studies attempted to 
attribute people’s views of nature, the value of the environment, and climate change 
specifically to demographic characteristics (see, for example, Dunlap 1991). Jaeger et 
al. (1993) showed that demographic characteristics were poor predictors of attitudes 
toward the environment and that cultural beliefs were much more explanatory.  
 Cultural explanations have included several theories. Based on Maslow’s 
hierarchy of needs, Douglas et al. (1998) discuss the theory that people who have 
primary needs for food and shelter met then can seek to satisfy more aesthetic and 
altruistic needs, such as a good environment. Inglehart (1990) posits the emergence of 
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“postmaterial values” in a globalized world; these values include environmental 
protection. 
 Thompson and Rayner (1998), building on cultural theory (Thompson, Ellis 
and Wildavsky 1990), identify four “myths of nature” that guide people’s arguments 
about the problem and proposed solutions. Nature can be thought of as benign (able to 
renew itself no matter what humans do to it), perverse/tolerant (robust, but with the 
possibility that thresholds may be breached and that that irrecoverable damage may 
result), ephemeral (delicately balanced, easily capable of collapse), or capricious 
(essentially unknowable and unpredictable). Except for the last (which does not allow 
for policy to address climate change), Thompson and Rayner associate these myths of 
nature with institutional voices in the climate change debate.  
• Those who think of nature as benign also tend to think of climate change as 
resulting from a failure to account for the value of natural resources in market 
transactions; the solution to this problem is to be found within the market, by 
removing price distortions, privatizing resources, or having the government set 
markets for them.  
• Those who think of nature as perverse/tolerant also tend to diagnose the 
climate change problem as one of exploding population, which perforce places 
pressure on natural resources; the solution lies in family planning, the 
availability of technologies that help limit fertility, and in associated education, 
especially for women. 
• Those who think of nature as ephemeral also tend to argue that the cause of 
climate change is rampant industrialism and consumerism, which places 
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inordinate demands on natural resources, especially for energy, and allows 
capitalists to expropriate resources from (for example) farmers; the remedy is 
to be found in frugality and equality. 
 
 This analysis privileges cultural beliefs about nature, but theoretically this is 
only one source of attitudes about climate change. People’s political interests, 
economic situation, group and national status, and many other factors could play roles. 
Examining what people have actually said should allow space for other factors and 
their relative importance. 
 I limited my analysis to 100 documents published or released between 1992 
(the year that the Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted at the Rio 
Summit) and 2003. Each document has a clear (or clearly implied) policy prescription; 
i.e., research documents that only report results and perhaps outline further research 
that is needed were not selected. Discourse on other global environmental issues (e.g., 
biodiversity, acid rain, the ozone layer, deforestation, overfishing) was used as 
additional evidence and illustrations. Documents were publicly available, but I 
especially sought out documents from the “gray” literature (newsletters, advocacy 
briefs, etc.); I expected that many or most of the documents from less industrialized 
countries were of this type, since the trappings of peer-reviewed journals are less 
common there. Additional details about selection of the documents can be found in 
Chapter 3. 
 I reviewed these documents, categorized the argument itself and four primary 
rhetorical dimensions: 
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• Who is making the statement and what group or groups are associated with the 
rhetor? How is this person or group influential (positive and negative)? 
(Aristotelian ethos) 
• What are the bases of the rhetorical claim(s) – i.e., what type of evidence is 
being used? (Aristotelian logos) 
• What is the worldview of the rhetor, especially as it relates to the viewpoint 
expressed about the relationship between people and the rest of nature? 
(Aristotelian ethos) 
• What are the actions the rhetor is proposing? 
 Since it is probable that secondary and tertiary arguments, lines of evidence, 
and worldviews could provide a basis for agreement, I included them in my document 
analysis. Similarly, since it is possible for people to agree on specific actions without 
agreeing on the reasons for those actions, I included any proposed actions in the 
analysis. As a first step, I filled out the template depicted in Table 5.1 for each 
document. 
 
Table 5.1. Example of Template for First-Order Document/Presentation Analysis 
Document #: Citation  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 






























 In the second step, I clustered the arguments themselves into “families” that 
were similar in their claims and evidence. This allows a more detailed comparative 
analysis – the next level of analysis beyond the information in Table 5.1 for each 
individual argument. Again, the goal was comparative analysis of arguments to 
discern bases for potential agreement on actions that could or should be taken to 
address climate change. 
 In the third step, I evaluated and compared selected arguments using three 
tools: the high-level classifications of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, the two basic 
argument types identified by Fahnestock and Secor, and the classification of 
arguments into their stases (a classical rhetorical tool). The stases provide a useful way 
to classify arguments because they provide a structure to sequentially and 
hierarchically order the matters that, one by one, have to be agreed on. Fahnestock and 
Secor (1985:217) have modified the classical stases “to fit contemporary 
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argumentative practices.” Each of the stases gives us a vantage point from which to 
view the relationships among the families of arguments about climate change. 
• First, people must agree that something happened – a matter of fact or 
conjecture. For the purposes of the study, the question is usually framed as 
establishing either or both that the concentration of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere has been rising and/or the global mean temperature has risen over 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
• Second, people must agree about how to define the fact(s). In practical terms, 
arguing about definitions can send the argument back to the first stasis. For 
example, in this case, some rhetors define the phenomena established in the 
first stasis as climate change. Others accept the “facts” of rising concentrations 
and mean temperature and yet disagree that these facts can be defined as the 
beginning of long-term climate change. 
• Third, people need to agree about the causes of the phenomena that are the 
subject of the argument. This is a stasis inserted by Fahnestock and Secor to 
account for the contemporary emphasis on causal inquiry in the social, 
political, and natural sciences. In the case of climate change, this is often a 
sticking point. People may agree that atmospheric concentrations and global 
mean temperature are rising, and that this may be defined as climate change. 
But can climate change be attributed to human emissions of so-called 
greenhouse gases? 
• Fourth, people need to agree about the quality or value of the phenomena. Is it 
bad or good, serious or trivial? In this stasis, other facts and definitions may be 
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brought in; in an example used by Fahnestock and Secor, an argument about 
treatment with placebos will often involve a definition of the right relationship 
between doctor and patient. In the case of climate change, the argument at this 
stage relates to the seriousness of the situation, which may relate to the views 
of nature discussed above. If a person thinks nature is essentially fragile, he or 
she will likely believe that human interference in the climate system is a very 
serious matter indeed. 
• Fifth and last, people need to agree that they must take action. In ancient legal 
use, this stasis was associated with reaching a verdict and passing sentence, but 
of course action can take many forms. The call to action depends on what 
Fahnestock and Secor (1985:222) call a “warrant of jurisdiction, an assumption 
that the audience addressed is indeed the appropriate, effectual audience to 
take action – that they have the right to take it, the time and occasion to take it, 
the means to take it, in short the power to take it.” In the climate change 
debate, the calls to action are various and aimed at sometimes diverse universal 
audiences. 
 We have already seen that the basic concepts of Bitzer (1968) and Vatz (1973) 
help to array the arguments along the stases. If exigence can be awakened, a rhetor 
will find it easier to get to the final stasis, a call to action. Rhetors may feel the 
exigence of the situation, but they must be sure to construct or reinforce a sense of 
exigence in the audience. This sense of exigence is important in this study because it is 
one of the cleavages among rhetors in the climate change debate. 
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 The three specifically rhetorical tools help to characterize the arguments as 
arguments and to provide a basis for comparison. For example, a “deep ecologist” 
might argue that humanity’s true nature has been violated in industrialization, thus 
associating the true nature of people with a kind of primitive lifestyle. Moreover, the 
deep ecologist would likely be arguing at the third or fourth stases, since the major 
points have to do with the cause of the problem (the human embrace of 
industrialization) and its seriousness (violation of humanity’s true nature). In contrast, 
a scientist might argue that it is human destiny to control nature and reap the benefit of 
natural resources, thus associating the true nature of people with techno-scientific 
decision-making. The scientist is likely arguing at the fifth stasis, focusing on the ways 
humans can manage nature and industry better. The elements being associated or 
dissociated within the arguments provide insights into potential bases for agreement 
among rhetors. Both can be seen as arguments about definition (of the true nature of 
human beings) or causes (a relationship gone wrong in the past or simple mistakes that 
can be corrected in the future), so it is important to examine the evidence for the 
categories. 
 I expected that comparing the families of arguments would reveal sets of 
elements that are closely correlated in each family. For example, a set of correlated 
elements could consist of the following: 
• noted scientist as the source of the document or presentation 
• quantitative data as evidence (measurement, equations, etc.) 
• a worldview that posits humans as controllers of Nature and Nature as highly 
resilient to human interference 
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• proposals to reduce carbon dioxide emissions using a carbon tax. 
If all of these elements are strongly associated with each other and not at all with 
alternative elements, this analysis would indicate that scientific voices in the debate 
talk to each other but not to nonscientific audiences, despite ubiquitous calls for 
scientific communication. However, if scientists typically appeal to the authority of 
the Framework Convention on Climate Change (perhaps as a secondary argument), 
this gesture to the authority of international law gives them something in common 
with environmentalist groups, who make the same appeal. 
 I expected that the most interesting and potentially fruitful correlations would 
be at the margins of the analysis, e.g., two secondary types of arguments that are 
widely shared across the boundaries of science, social solidarity, and politics/policy. 
 I grouped the documents into “families of arguments.” There are at least 11 
coherent arguments about the hypothesis that human activities contribute to climate 
change, the degree of threat that results from possible climate change, the basis for 
acting in response to the threat, and the specific actions that are necessary. I have 
termed these families of arguments “No Problem!,” “Climate Change Could Be Good 
for You,” “Science Provides Knowledge about Climate Change,” “More 
Modernization Is the Cure” (five different families), “Inequality Is the Problem,” and 
“Rift with Nature.”  
 Table 5.2 shows the distribution of families within the 100 documents, as well 
as a brief overview of the analysis using the three rhetorical tools (the stases, 
association/ dissociation, and definition/cause and effect). Note that the “shares” of 
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arguments in this set of documents cannot be taken to represent the importance or 
proportional presence of different arguments in the actual debate. 
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 I next briefly discuss each family and analyze example arguments. Grouping 
into families and characterizing the families rhetorically helps to map the debate 
space.  
 
Family #1: No Problem! 
One family of arguments denies the exigence that others construct. Many of these 
rhetors claim that climate change is an easily falsified hypothesis. Or they claim that 
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climate change is possible but the science is very uncertain. Or the claim is that 
climate change may be happening, but the causes are unrelated to any human 
activities. Their arguments are located at the first stasis, and they hold that nothing we 
can call human-induced climate change has been demonstrated. Of the 100 documents, 
3 are clearly in this family. 
 Scientist-rhetors in this family express skepticism that climate change is a 
plausible scientific argument – or, if they allow that climate change is possible, they 
dispute its anthropogenic causes. Thus, people need not be concerned about reducing 
emissions of greenhouse gases. The scientific evidence can be countered by other 
scientific evidence; for example, the historical record may be said to demonstrate that 
carbon dioxide concentrations fluctuate without correlation to temperature, so the 
correlation of the past two centuries does not indicate a causal relationship. Cosmic 
rays cause climate warming, not greenhouse gases. The climate models are too crude 
for us to place any faith in their projections/predictions. Or scientists are simply 
engaging in what one U.S. senator called “junk science” and only concerned to keep 
the research dollars coming by continuing to investigate the “threat” of climate 
change. 
 The science itself may not be contested, but the degree of uncertainty, say 
some, is such that we are unjustified in taking any mitigating actions – especially if 
these actions are costly. 
 A representative example of the scientifically based “no problem!” argument is 
the paper by Richard Lindzen (no date), a professor at MIT (see Table 5.3). Lindzen 
rhetorically associates himself with the debate within the scientific community and 
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dissociates the scientific debate from the political activities that brought climate 
change to the attention of governments. He stakes out his ground by saying, “as a 
scientist, I can find no substantive basis for the warming scenarios being popularly 
described.” On the dissociative side, he characterizes the politics as “a global warming 
circus” based on a “crude idea” (not even a theory) that fits in with other political 
agendas, such as the push to reduce oil imports from the Middle East. This is an 
argument from definition: climate change is a scientific problem, not a political one. 
His conclusion: climate change does not exist. 
 
Table 5.3 First-Step Analysis of Lindzen Argument 
#46: Lindzen, Richard S. n.d. (downloaded March 2003). Global Warming: The 
Origin and Nature of the Alleged Scientific Consensus. Cato Institute, Washington, 
DC. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Lindzen is a prominent skeptic, well respected as a scientist (MIT) but also 





Type of argument     
Primary: “as a scientist, I can find no substantive basis for the warming scenarios 
being popularly described.” 
Secondary: “Moreover, according to many studies I have read by economists, 
agronomists, and hydrologists, there would be little difficulty adapting to such 
warming if it were to occur.” 
Tertiary: “present hysteria formally began in the summer of 1988” with a hot summer 
and James Hansen’s meaningless statement, and quickly became a “global warming 
circus” – scientific debate OK, politicization dreadful – warming does fit with other 
agendas, such as ee, reduced oil from the MidEast, dissatisfaction with 
industrialization, international competition, enhanced revenue from C taxes, and 
enhanced power 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
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Primary: “Such was also the conclusion of the recent National Research Council’s 
report of adapting to global change. Many aspects of the catastrophic scenario have 
already been largely discounted by the scientific community.” 
Secondary: examines the arguments: agrees that CO2 in the atmosphere has been 
increasing, but says an inaccurate model was used to predict a doubling of 
preindustrial levels by 2030 – “The simple picture of the greenhouse mechanism is 
seriously oversimplified.” – water vapor and clouds account for most of the effect, 
convection must be taken into account, models cannot duplicate the motions of the 
atmosphere, feedbacks are highly uncertain and not understood – predictions are 
exaggerated 
Tertiary: history of the political process; Al Gore, environmental advocacy groups, 
Claudine Schneider (“scientists may disagree, but we can hear Mother Earth, and she 
is crying”), refusal of Science to print Lindzen’s critique, various actors, Michael 
Openheimer/EDF, Greenpeace, etc. 
Notes: puts “greenhouse theory” in quotes, refers to “popular presentation” and “crude 
idea” of this theory 
Worldview/view of 
nature 
    
Primary: “improved technology and increased societal wealth are what allow society 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Allow science to take its course, admitting the flaws of the models – get 
politics out of the picture. 
Secondary: Focus on the control of societal instability 
 
Family #2: Climate Change May Be Good for You 
Rhetors in this family claim that climate change (if it happens) may be “good for you,” 
and in any case would be so slow that people can adapt. In all of these cases, the 
proposal is the same: do nothing. There is no exigence because matters will take care 
of themselves and will likely entail more positive than negative changes. This family 
or arguments is located at the second stasis; most acknowledge that long-term changes 
in the climate are apparent; however, they argue that these changes should not be 
defined as a “problem” to be addressed. Or the argument may be at the fourth stasis, 
accepting the evidence of climate change and even of human causes – but, still, they 
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say, the situation is not a problem. Climate change may be good for people. Of the 100 
documents, 8 are in this family. 
 Many of the rhetors who deny exigence express faith that people will be able 
to adjust as manifestations of climate change become apparent. Therefore, it is unwise 
to take speculative and (probably) expensive actions now, when we really don’t know, 
first, if climate change will occur; second, what the impacts will be; and, third, what 
climate change will mean for each region and locality. 
 A representative example of this argument is the article by Ausubel (2001; see 
Table 5.4), in which he provides a long list of beneficial adaptations that people have 
made to climate. Ausubel’s argument is an associative one – adapting to a changing 
climate is an old problem, with a long history of successful adaptations. In contrast to 
analysts who carefully document the uniqueness of the current climate change 
problem (the anthropogenic causes, the likely magnitude, the long timescale), Ausubel 
attempts to “normalize” the problem by briefly describing past adaptations and then 
listing a long catalogue of ways we have come to adapt to our current climate in 
ingenious ways: cisterns and dams, tractors, new crop cultivars, information 
technologies, tide tables, irrigation scheduling, weather forecasts, agricultural credit 
banks, national parks, green political parties, flood insurance, food preservatives, light 
bulbs, and refrigeration/air conditioning. In fact, we have adapted so well that our 
industries, transportation, and daily lives are becoming more and more impervious to 
climate considerations. Surely we can extend our ingenuity to adapt as changes 
happen.  
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 Again, this is an argument from definition: climate change is a familiar and 
age-old problem and, because we have seen it before, we have many ways to deal with 
it. However, Ausubel is at the fourth stasis. He accepts the evidence and the definition 
of the evidence as at least the possibility of climate change. He elides the third stasis 
by not engaging the issue of whether or not humans have caused climate change. At 
the fourth stasis, his argument is that climate change is not a “problem” at all, much 
less a serious problem calling for action. 
 
Table 5.4 First-Step Analysis of Ausubel Argument 
#3: Ausubel, Jesse H. 2001. Some ways to lessen worries about climate. The 
Electricity Journal (January-February), 24-33. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Ausubel is “director of the Program for the Human Environment at The 
Rockefeller University, New York. He was one of the main organizers of the first 
United Nations World Climate Conference, held in Geneva in 1979.” 
Secondary: 
Tertiary: 
Notes: “This article is adapted from the keynote address to the Business Roundtable’s 
National Summit on Technology and Climate Change,” August 31, 2000. 
Type of argument     
Primary: It is likely that human emissions of GHGs will change the climate but we do 
not know how and probably cannot know. “But gambling with the climate does not 
strike me as a good bet.” 
Secondary: “Societies are always trying to climate-proof themselves” (25) and many 
successful adaptations exist. 
Tertiary: Technological change is a continuing process that demonstrates our 
adaptability, potential to design offsets, and engage in prevention strategies such as the 
Zero-Emission Power Plant (ZEPP). 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Graphics showing technological cycles and improvements (recording media, 
RAM, transportation modes, and power plant size), with accompanying text 
Secondary: long lists of ways we adapt to climate, e.g., “from antifreeze, air 







    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “So, I say, let us prepare, just in case. Purchase some insurance. … Publish 
and private entities should research and invest in all three” forms of climate insurance: 
adaptation, offsets, and prevention (25).  
Secondary: “We should choose long-term solutions for emissions compatible with the 
evolution of the energy system. This means shift to methane, focus offsets on the 
carbon in methane, prepare the hydrogen economy, and anticipate the nuclear 




Family #3: Science Provides Knowledge about Climate Change 
 This family of explicitly scientific arguments typically takes climate change as 
a starting datum, which the audience will agree is a fact. The questions to be 
investigated within this basic agreement concern the degree of change and its possible 
impacts. Nine of the documents examined are in this family; probably this is an 
undersampled category because many scientific studies stop short of making explicit 
policy recommendations. Most come to the familiar conclusion, “More research is 
needed.” Scientists who perform core sampling to reconstruct past concentrations of 
greenhouse gases or who describe the atmospheric chemistry of greenhouse gas decay 
in the atmosphere leave it to others to use their findings in a constructed, policy-
relevant argument. 
 Because not even all scientists can be counted upon to take the same view of 
climate change, scientific rhetors provide sometimes lengthy introductions to their 
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journal articles, framing the climate change issue as one of both science (with 
citations) and policy (with reference to the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change). These introductions legitimate the scientific inquiry that is being reported; 
they define, in part, the scope of the investigation (i.e., some aspect of climate 
change). In such scientific arguments, the potential for climate change is an 
assumption, not a term of the argument. Researchers then define, within the climate 
change problem space, the issues and questions relevant to the research they are 
reporting. Next come the description of the methodology (including, typically, a 
computer-based model), results and findings. The final section suggests policy 
implications and further research. 
 So far I have described an example of the standard genre of scientific articles. 
Although the structure and style of the scientific article is one source of its authority, 
with the identity of the author(s) and the reputation of the journal adding to that 
authority, the content of the argument itself and the evidence should carry the bulk of 
the responsibility for convincing the audience, since science is based on evidence. 
 A representative example of this argument is an article by scientists from the 
Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (Darwin et al. 
1996; see Table 5.5). These researchers are “ecological economists” who used a 
computer-based model (the Future Agricultural Resources Model, or FARM) to make 
projections of changes in land use and land cover using different scenarios of climate 
and social change. Computer-based modeling is a mainstream method for science-
based projections of climate, socioeconomic conditions, energy use and greenhouse 
gas emissions, and so on. A large proportion of the article (12 of 24 pages) is spent 
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explaining the architecture of the model, its data sources (three tables and a map), and 
the modeled relationships. 
 The authors chose to model land use and land cover because these constitute an 
“integrating concept,” which brings together primary productivity, the principal source 
for human food and fiber, and competition among humans and other species for food. 
Thus, the scientists intend that an examination of land use and land cover will yield 
results worth knowing about how both human economy and ecology will respond to 
climate change. However, the results of the modeled scenarios are ambivalent – 
“whether the correlation with a particular economic variable [and forest depletion in 
Southeast Asia] is positive or negative depends on the global change scenario” 
(Darwin et al. 1996:180). The best they can do for a recommendation is to say that 
climate change (along with population growth and deregulation of agricultural trade) 
will likely have “adverse effects on the health and integrity of tropical forest 
ecosystems” but that improvements in models are needed before scientists can make 
definitive statements. 
 This argument contains several notable elements. First, the ethos is 
unmistakably scientific; typically the venue is a specialized and technical journal, 
there are multiple authors, all from a research organization in a government agency. 
Thus, they associate climate change with other scientific problems: it is open to 
empirical examination, mathematical manipulation, and hypothesis testing. They 
assert that “interactions between economic and ecological phenomena are complex” 
(Darvin et al. 1996:180) but treat these interactions as knowable, and more knowable 
as models of them are developed. Second, the authors analytically distinguish between 
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climate change and socioeconomic conditions. In their model, the two are dissociated, 
presumably so that the independent effect of climate change can be studied. The effect 
of this strategy, however, is that the alleged human causes of climate change disappear 
into the background. Thus, this framing of the issue as a scientific problem dissociated 
from social causes and uncertain social effects is quite different from the close 
association of climate change and social dimensions that is found in other arguments.  
 The argument is principally an argument from definition (climate change is a 
scientific problem), but cause and effect are explored by means of the FARM model. 
If climate changes like this and socioeconomic conditions change like that, then the 
impacts will be harmful (or benign). This very carefully hedged type of cause-and-
effect argument is very typical of scientific studies of climate change – and the type of 
argument that leaves ample ambiguous space for political proposals. Darwin et al.’s 
argument is situated at the third stasis; they are inquiring into how climate change (as 
a cause) will affect land use and land cover (as results). 
 
Table 5.5 First-Step Analysis of Darwin et al. Argument 
#19: Darwin, Roy, Marinow Tsigas, Janm Lewandrowski and Anton Raneses 1996. 
Land use and cover in ecological economics. Ecological Economics 17, 157-181. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    






Type of argument     
Primary: Land use/cover is a “integrating concept”: (1) “the main resource governing 
primary productivity can be defined in terms of land” (157); (2) “land remains the 
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primary source of the energy and mass that compose our food and fiber” (158); (3) 
“the most important interaction between humans and other biological communities is 
the competition for land.” (158) 
Secondary: 
Tertiary: 
Notes: “A basic premise of ecological economics is that the world economy is 
embedded in and dependent upon Earth’s ecosystem. This dependency is captured by 
the concept of ‘throughput’ (Boulding, 1966) or ‘entropic flow’ (Georgescu-Roegen, 
1971) – the one-way flow of energy and mass through an economy that begins with 
resources and ends with waste.” (157) 
Type of evidence     
Primary: “We present a model that integrates economic-ecological activities with land 
use and cover.” (157) – the Future Agricultural Resources Model (FARM), developed 
at USDA “to evaluate impacts of global climate change on the world’s agricultural 




Notes: full-page flowchart of the model, 3 tables and a map re land class endowments 
Worldview/view of 
nature 
    
Primary: “interactions between economic and ecological phenomena are complex” 
(180) – “Whether the correlation with a particular economic variable [and forest 





Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “Results from our scenarios [of global climate change, population growth, 
and deregulation of agricultural trade] indicate that such changes are likely to have 
adverse effects on the health and integrity of tropical forest ecosystems.” (180) 
Secondary: “Improved throughput analyses require better tracking of resource stocks 
(soil, water, forests, fossil fuels, etc.) coupled with waste emission coefficients for 
various economic sectors. Methods for simulating inter- and intraregional labor 
migration, investment in human and physical capital, and technological change are 
needed to conduct dynamic analyses.” (180) 
Tertiary: 
 
Families #4-9: More Modernization Is the Cure 
 By far the largest number of arguments has in common the underlying 
assumption that climate change is a serious, possibly catastrophic problem that is at 
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least partially caused by humans and that humans can mitigate with the strategies of 
modernity: technological change, economic accounting, and rational negotiations. 
These rhetors have moved to the final stasis – the call to action – indicating agreement 
on all the previous stases, i.e., something has happened, that “something” is climate 
change, it is caused by human activities, and it is a serious problem. Considered as one 
family, this group is the largest, with 48 of 100 texts in this category. However, the 
group can be further disaggregated by the foci of their arguments. Families #4-9 share 
their underlying assumptions about the need for and efficacy of human managerial 
actions, but they differ in their arguments about where and in what ways the actions 
should be undertaken. 
 Agreement along all the stases should indicate a fairly high level of agreement 
overall, but this is not necessarily the case. I will analyze several examples of different 
approaches to and proposals for action. Among scientists the different approaches are 
recognizably disciplinary; that is, political scientists focus on the roles of international 
agreements and domestic policies, economists focus on the role of markets in 
preserving natural resources and preventing pollution, and engineers focus on the role 
of technological change. Among policymakers and environmentally concerned 
advocates, these lines become blurred; mixed solutions, involving a range of actions 
from lifestyle changes to renewable energy development to environmental cleanup, 
come as a palette of recommendations. 
 One group treats the political process as the essential element of action on 
climate change; this is Family #4 (8 members). These rhetors advocate the 
development and implementation of effective treaties, conventions, protocols, and 
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other policy mechanisms. Many political analysts, such as Benedick, cite the Montreal 
Protocol, under which ozone-depleting substances were phased out and which has 
been widely regarded as a successful international agreement. 
 A good example of a more-modernization argument that focuses on political 
processes is a Worldwatch press release called “Global War on Global Warming Heats 
Up” (2002; see Table 5.6), a review of Reading the Weathervane: Climate Policy from 
Rio to Johannesburg.13 The document asserts that in the decade after the UNFCCC 
was adopted, “the scientific case for action continued to strengthen,” but most policies 
“have been too weak, only partially implemented, or discontinued” and “the existence 
of ‘perverse practices’ – including subsidies for fossil fuel production and 
consumption… has been a major impediment to climate policymaking.” Here the 
blame for the failure to reduce emissions is laid squarely on the failure of governments 
to make and implement effective policies – not, for example, on population growth or 
excessive consumption. The actions proposed are similarly political: bring the Kyoto 
Protocol into force, forget about “voluntary” commitments (they don’t work), and 
focus on reducing emissions in the transportation sector. 
 Worldwatch thus also makes one argument from definition: climate change is a 
political problem, solvable by political means. However, the press release also argues 
                                                 
13 “Rio” refers to the 1992 international conference at which the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change was adopted. “Johannesburg” refers to the 2002 
international conference on sustainable development that prompted many “10 years 
after” analyses. 
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that the causes of climate change also can be found in governance, for example, 
“perverse practices” like subsidies that encourage continued fossil fuel use. 
 
Table 5.6. First-Step Analysis of Worldwatch Argument 
#97: Worldwatch Institute. 2002. Global War on Global Warming Heats Up. Press 
Release. http://www.worldwatch.org/press/news/2002/08/01  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Worldwatch Institute is a well-known environmentalist group that produces 
an annual State of the World report. In the press release, it describes itself as “a 
Washington, D.C.-based research organization.” 
Secondary: 
Tertiary: 
Notes: This is a review of Reading the Weathervane: Climate Policy from Rio to 
Johannesburg by Seth Dunn. 
 
Type of argument     
Primary: “The scientific case for action continued to strengthen” 1990-2001 but most 
policies “have been too weak, only partially implemented, or discontinued”; 
governments have “failed to develop ‘diversified portfolios’ of policies”; and “the 
existence of ‘perverse practices’—including subsidies for fossil fuel production and 
consumption … has been a major impediment to climate policymaking.” Emissions 
have generally risen since 1990 (e.g., EU, Japan, US, Australia, Canada), except in 
Germany (-17.1%), the UK (-4.1%), and Russia (-30.5%). 
Secondary: India, China and Brazil are not “rogue emitters” but have been slowing 
emissions growth, China because of lower coal use and energy efficiency 
Tertiary: Lowering emissions will not be costly, as conventional model results 
indicate. 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: stats about emissions, energy intensity, etc. 





    




Action(s) proposed     
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Primary: Bring the Kyoto Protocol into force 
Secondary: Leave the era of voluntary commitments behind 
Tertiary: Deal with the transportation sector 
Notes 
 
 Other rhetors – here gathered in Family #5 (10 members) – focus on the 
reform of the energy system as the key to forestalling climate change. The technology-
focused arguments can be gathered under the term “ecological modernization.” This is 
the idea that humans have the ingenuity to alter their own technologies so they will be 
environmentally harmless. For example, renewable forms of energy – solar, wind, 
geothermal, hydro – can be developed that will meet people’s needs without causing 
environmental damage. This argument is often coupled with arguments for sustainable 
development, defined as meeting the needs of people without harming the future 
environment (World Commission 1987). 
 A good example of a more-modernization argument that focuses on 
technological change in the energy system is the speech in which John Browne, the 
CEO of British Petroleum (BP) (or, as the corporation now styles itself, “Beyond 
Petroleum”), announced that his corporation had decided to take climate change 
seriously and initiate some planning and mitigation actions (Browne 1997; see Table 
5.7). Industrial firms, especially in the energy industry, generally have been opponents 
of taking action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, since they often see such actions 
as costly for them – developing new technologies, perhaps retiring capital stock before 
the end of its useful life, and perhaps bearing the costs of carbon taxes. But Browne 
and BP “broke ranks” with the rest of the energy industry. His argument associates BP 
and its employees with the rest of society: “The passing of some of the old divisions 
 147
reminds us we are all citizens of one world, and we must take shared responsibility for 
its future, and for its sustainable development.” Browne says that people who work at 
BP have these convictions, as do consumers. He uses the metaphor of a journey, with 
the need for partnerships and accommodations to the interests of all who are on the 
journey. 
 Browne then catalogues the actions BP has taken and intends to take. The 
multinational corporation has reduced oil discharges to the North Sea, invested $100 
million to eliminate volatile organic compounds, reduced flaring at its operations in 
Norway, become a partner in a project to conserve 1.5 million hectares of forests in 
Bolivia, and invested in solar power. He announces BP’s plan to have an in-house 
emissions trading system to reduce emissions and fund research. In the long term, BP 
will work toward sustainability, “simultaneously being profitable and responding to 
the reality and the concerns of the world in which you operate.” In other words, 
industry can change; modernization can combat climate change. Climate change is a 
technical problem that, like other problems we encounter along life’s journey, can be 
faced and solved. Stated thus, this definition of climate change as a problem is fairly 
close to the definition of climate change as a scientific problem. In both cases, the 
problem can be investigated and solutions can be found. (In his optimism Browne is 
like Ausubel, described in Family 2; unlike Ausubel, Browne is rolling up his sleeves 
and getting to work on a list of specific actions – and he doesn’t think climate change 




Table 5.7. First-Step Analysis of Browne Argument 
#47: Browne, John 1997. Climate change speech. Given at Stanford University. 
Available at http://icc370.igc.org/bp.htm  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    





Type of argument     
Primary: “The passing of some of the old divisions reminds us we are all citizens of 
one world, and we must take shared responsibility for its future, and for its sustainable 
development.” – people who work at BP have these convictions, so do consumers 
Secondary: “The time to consider the policy dimensions of climate change is not when 
the link between greenhouse gases and climate change is conclusively proven – but 
when the possibility cannot be discounted and is taken seriously by the society of 
which we are part. We in BP have reached that point.” 
Tertiary: 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: the science is uncertain, but scientists and others take the possibility seriously 
(i.e., we are all in this together) – metaphor of a journey, with partnerships and 
accommodations to the interests of all who are on the journey 
Secondary: factual evidence – CO2 like a small weight that overbalances, and only a 
small fraction comes from transport, and only a fraction of that from BP (~95 Mt) 
Tertiary: catalogue of actions that show BP is proactive: reduced oil discharges to the 
North Sea, investing $100M to eliminate VOCs, reduced flaring in Norway; example 









Action(s) proposed     
Primary: First, do the low-hanging fruit: control own emissions, fund research, 
initiatives for JI, develop alternative fuels, contribute to public policy debate 
Secondary: strive toward sustainability, “simultaneously being profitable and 





 Broadening from concerns about the energy system to consider all forms of 
mitigation (reductions of greenhouse gas emissions and development of carbon sinks) 
are the arguments that constitute Family #6 (10 members). Climate mitigation 
arguments posit emissions reductions as the way to “solve” the climate “problem,” 
whether those reductions come from reforming the energy system, changing industrial 
processes such as aluminum smelting and cement manufacture, controlling methane 
emissions from agricultural operations and landfills, creating carbon sinks through 
forest growth and management, or other proposed controls.  
 However, the rhetors in Family #7 (4 members) argue that countries, 
businesses, and individuals must plan adaptation strategies for changes in the climate 
that are underway and “in the pipeline” from current and projected emissions. For 
example, if a likely impact of climate change is a different precipitation pattern, then 
farmers and policymakers ought to be planning for alternative crops, varieties, and 
management strategies. Between its Second Assessment in 1996 and the Third 
Assessment in 2001, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change expanded the 
focus of its impacts working group to include adaptation, vulnerability, and 
sustainable development (see Document #48, Summary for Policymakers, 2001). 
 Family #8 (5 members) comprises economists and others who argue that there 
are economically viable and efficient ways to reduce emissions and take other actions 
to address climate change. Ecological economists may hold this view and couple it 
with arguments promoting the concept of sustainable development. It was a mistake to 
treat natural resources as “free” goods, as is done in classical economics, they say; but 
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once we can figure out good ways to price water, parkland, biodiversity, and other 
natural goods, the market will (help) take care of the environment.  
 A good example of a more-modernization argument from an economic 
perspective is a report by Jae Edmonds and Michael J. Scott (1999), International 
Emissions Trading and Global Climate Change (see Table 5.8). This report was 
commissioned and issued by the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, which aims 
to provide scientifically based information about climate change to an informed but 
“lay” audience. Edmonds and Scott examine the question of how costly it would be to 
reduce emissions enough to stabilize the climate. They take a century-scale view, 
reasoning that the total amount of greenhouse gases emitted matters, but when they are 
emitted matters less. Therefore, gases may be emitted later in the century, when it is 
cheaper to do so. Similarly, reductions should be taken where it is least expensive to 
do so (usually in countries with little capital stock that might become useless). 
Therefore, emissions trading (i.e., allowing some countries to “buy” emissions 
reductions elsewhere instead of reducing domestic emissions) should reduce the cost 
of a climate mitigation program (although Edmonds and Scott point out that actual 
savings depend on the design of the program). Thus, their recommendations are to 
allow emissions trading in any scheme to reduce emissions worldwide and to ensure 
that the program is designed to maximize savings. 
 This argument defines climate change narrowly as a problem of cost 
calculation. It is an argument that assumes that its readers agree that climate change is 
a problem and a human-caused problem. It therefore focuses on determining a least-
cost pathway to mitigation. And, although this is strictly an economic analysis, many 
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of the climate change arguments take as at least their ostensible subject whether or not 
it is too costly for the world to deal with a problem that is so uncertain and so far off. 
This report’s contribution to that sub-debate is to show both that costs can be reduced 
and that the overall cost of mitigation is very small relative to the likely economic 
product of the world over the twenty-first century. 
 
Table 5.8. First-Step Analysis of Edmonds and Scott Argument 
#15: Edmonds, Jae and Michael J. Scott et al. 1999. International Emissions Trading 
and Global Climate Change. Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Washington, 
DC. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Jae Edmonds was one of the first modelers of emissions and energy related 
to global climate change and an early integrated assessment modeler. 




Type of argument     
Primary: Because emissions mitigation addresses a century-scale problem, costs must 
be low if action is to be undertaken (i.e., there is no immediate benefit resulting from 
costs). 
Secondary: Theory favors trading to lower costs, but actual costs depend on the design 
of the program. 
Tertiary: 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: discussion of the principles of trade 





    




Action(s) proposed     
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Primary: Allow emissions trading in any scheme to reduce emissions. 
Secondary: “Programs must be carefully designed to assure that the potential gains 
from trade are realized.” (iv) Actual costs likely to be lower because “models do not 
include the various measurement, verification, trading, and enforcement costs that 




 In Family #9 (10 members) are rhetors who call for broad-based actions, both 
mitigation and adaptation. These rhetors make little or no distinction among mitigation 
and adaptation activities but only seek to propose doable actions that often provide 
“co-benefits” in, for example, smog reduction, traffic congestion, and water 
availability. The California National Assessment Report (2002), for instance, proposes 
an emphasis on “multiple benefits” and “no regrets” strategies, such as energy 
efficiency, waste reduction, better cost signals to consumers about the use of 
resources, floodplain management, public education, limits on the footprint of 
development, management of stormwater runoff to let water percolate into the soil, 
careful coastal land use planning, and so on. 
 Theoretically, it is too facile to simply fuse Families #4-9 into a single family 
of arguments that share the conviction that thoroughly modern people can fix their 
thoroughly modern problems. Hence, I have grouped the families that share this 
conviction but separated them into families, recognizing their real, sometimes 
vehement, disagreements with each other. For example, the Worldwatch assertion that 
voluntary commitments do not work is a realization that most corporations will not 
undertake emissions-reducing activities unless required to do so (in contrast to 
Browne’s argument about BP). Edmonds and Scott also recognize that there is no cost 
incentive for corporations or governments to address climate change. However, 
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Browne, using inclusive pronouns, asserts that corporations, after all, are made up of 
people; and that these people-run corporations will realize that it is in their own 
interests to undertake emissions-reducing activities. 
 This brief description of some of the arguments made at the last stasis – the 
call to action – shows that the common agreement among rhetors that something can 
be done may be undermined or even negated by disagreements about what should be 
done. 
 
Family #10: Inequality Is the Problem 
 Another family of arguments constructs climate change as one in a long list of 
manifestations of the inequality of countries and people – the rich and powerful versus 
the poor and powerless.  Over the course of centuries, a world system of nations has 
evolved that has preserved and increased inequality through various types of 
colonialization. In Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1974, 1983) terms, the core countries 
retain power over countries on the periphery through terms of trade, control of 
technology, and so on. Within the climate change debate, this is typically thought of as 
the argument of the so-called South or the developing countries. Of the 100 texts, 17 
are members of this family. However, the authorship of the documents is split about 
equally between Southern and Northern authors. These arguments move back to the 
middle stases, being concerned with the root cause of climate change (third stasis) and 
the meaning or value of the issue (fourth stasis). 
 An example of this argument is a text from the Indian Centre for Science and 
the Environment (see Table 5.9). The authors, Agarwal and Narain (1996), argue that 
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rich countries are attempting to associate the political processes surrounding global 
warming with other political processes. Global warming, they say, is just one more 
issue on the agenda of rich countries who wish to preserve the present inequality. A 
pattern has been set up: an issue of supposedly common concern arises, and rich 
counties, whose colonialism/imperialism has caused the problem, impose the 
“solution” on poor nations, at the cost of the latter. Ahmed and Ahmed (2000:95) put 
this point more strongly: “With the assault on the nature perpetrated largely by the 
now developed countries while increasing their wealth, and more recently by the 
developing countries seeking to improve their economic conditions, the climatic 
balance has been seriously destabilized.” 
 In this case, proposals espoused by rich countries, under the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, provide for emissions to be reduced based on a 
fraction of annual emissions. That is, the present status quo, the current levels of 
emissions, would be accepted as the starting basis for any mitigation action. Agarwal 
and Narain, speaking from the perspective of a developing country, argue that the two 
– the present unequal status of countries and global warming – should be dissociated, 
and that global warming instead should be treated as a pollution problem (i.e., 
associated with other pollution regimes, rather than with the unequal world-system); 
the principal polluters would then be responsible for reducing pollution and paying for 
the damage. In this case, total emissions from the start of the Industrial Revolution 
would be considered and counted against the principal emitters; the starting point for 
any future mitigation would be emissions per capita (i.e., industrialized countries 
would be responsible for much greater mitigation than non-industrialized countries). 
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Table 5.9. First-Step Analysis of Agarwal and Narain Argument 
#1: Agarwal, Anil and Sunita Narain 1996. The atmospheric rights of all people on 
Earth: Why is it necessary to move towards the ‘ultimate objective’ of the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change? Centre for Science and the Environment, 
http://www.cseindia.org/html/cmp/cmp31.htm  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Agarwal and Narain are known for definitive statements of the developing 
country perspective on climate change (cf. Global Warming in an Unequal World) 
Secondary: the authority of CSE as a voice in the climate change issue, beginning 




Type of argument     
Primary: The world is unequal; rich countries have caused global warming (“historical 
emissions”) and should pay the true costs of their consumption (“polluter pays”) and 




Type of evidence     
Primary: historical recounting of events in negotiations; first, ozone, which “remains a 
weak treaty, then WRI vs. “Global Warming in an unequal world”’ CSE’s role in 
climate issues 
Secondary: facts about total emissions vs. per capita emissions 
Tertiary: 
Notes: what the developed countries say, but what we say 
Worldview/view of 
nature 
    
Primary: Economic orientation: atmosphere a global public good; rich countries who 
damage it should pay for the damage. 
Secondary: World system is unequal; environmental agreements perpetuate inequality. 
Tertiary: 
Notes: 
Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “rights-based approach in regulating climate change; treating the atmosphere 
as a limited common resource to be managed under an equity regime based on per 
capita entitlements (freezing the per capita entitlements on the basis of a population 
distribution index for a chosen year)” 
Secondary: “Surplus entitlements with less polluting countries can give way to an 
international emission trading regime. An international tax can be levied on countries 
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exceeding the limits imposed by their permissible entitlement allocation” (using the 





 The demographer Anthony J. McMichael’s (1993:7) argument rests on his 
identification of “the one underlying problem [which] is the entrenched inequality 
between rich and poor countries,” manifested in “(1) rapid, poverty-related, population 
growth and land degradation in poor countries, and (2) excessive consumption of 
energy and materials, with high production of wastes, in rich countries.” His proposed 
solutions differ, however, from those of Agarwal and Narain in being broader in scope 
– control population growth, reduce the use of fossil-fuel-based energy, and 
redistribute wealth to poor countries. 
 Agarwal and Narain’s argument is from definition: climate change is not an 
unequal-business-as-usual case, where the North can call the shots; climate change is a 
pollution problem, and the industrialized countries of the North are the polluters. 
However, a cause-and-effect claim plays a large part in the overall argument; 
industrialized countries are the cause of climate change and thus should pay necessary 
mitigation and adaptation costs. McMichael’s argument stresses the causal argument, 
laying the blame for climate change at the door of industrialized countries. 
 
Family #11: Rift with Nature 
 Another family of arguments focuses attention on climate change as just one 
symptom of people’s disturbed and dysfunctional relationship with the rest of nature. 
 157
Other symptoms include various types of pollution, overfishing and overhunting, loss 
of various kinds of natural systems and habits, and many technological “advances,” 
such as genetically modified organisms. A retreat from industrialization is in order. 
We must “live lightly on the land,” “respect Mother Earth,” and so on. We must 
consider ourselves just one species on the earth and respect the (equal) rights of other 
animals and plants to live and thrive. We should direct our efforts toward preserving 
the natural state of things. Often, these arguments are made for a broad range of 
environmental problems; climate change may or may not be on the list. I classified 15 
of the 100 documents analyzed in this study in this family. Again, these are arguments 
at the third and fourth stases (root causal analysis and value/meaning of the issue), 
which lead to calls for action quite different from those of the “more modernization” 
family. 
 An example of this argument is Donella Meadows’ (1997) depiction of Gaia’s 
reaction to the negotiations leading to the Kyoto Protocol (see Table 5.10). Gaia is the 
Earth as a whole organism that keeps life in balance (Lovelock, 1988). Meadows, an 
adjunct professor of environmental studies at Dartmouth College, argues that people 
have got it all wrong but may have a chance to fix it. She associates the natural 
harmony in Nature with the ethical life; she associates a human preoccupation with 
power and money with wrong-headedness that could spell catastrophe for them.  
 Speaking as Gaia, she says, “I may have made a mistake when I evolved that 
two-legged, large-brained life-form. … Deciding the composition of the atmosphere 
by counting up money ‘costs’ makes as much sense as deciding whether a plane will 
fly by the position of a football on a field. Wrong measure. Wrong field. Wrong 
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game.” At the end of the monologue, she says, “Maybe that won’t be necessary, 
though. … The big-brains do have the capacity to see beyond power and money, see 
into the future, understand the fundamentals of my laws, distinguish between symbols 
and reality. Some of them know how many kinds of energy they can harness that don’t 
put carbon back into the atmosphere. …But they’d better hurry. … I hope they do. I’m 
really quite fond of them.” 
 The argument makes a strong claim about what the appropriate role is for 
people as part of Nature and about the consequence (effect) of not using their big 
brains to see beyond power and money (cause). 
 
Table 5.10. First-Step Analysis of Meadows Argument 
#8: Meadows, Donella H. 1997. “Mother Gaia reflects on the global climate 
conference.” http://csf.colorado.edu/forums/ecofem/dec97/0009.html  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    






Type of argument     
Primary: “I may have made a mistake when I evolved that two-legged, large-brained 
life-form. … Deciding the composition of the atmosphere by counting up money 
‘costs’ makes as much sense as deciding whether a plane will fly by the position of a 




Type of evidence     







    
Primary: Nature is much larger and still in charge. Humans are arrogant if they think 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “If they don’t figure that out, I’m going to have to take a few million years 
and try to evolve a higher form of intelligence.” 
Secondary: “Maybe that won’t be necessary, though. … The big-brains do have the 
capacity to see beyond power and money, see into the future, understand the 
fundamentals of my laws, distinguish between symbols and reality. Some of them 
know how many kinds of energy they can harness that don’t put carbon back into the 





 Also in this family are “deep green” and ecofeminist arguments, often made in 
more general terms than climate change, but explicitly including it as an example of a 
seriously mis-conceived relationship with nature. 
 
Family Ties? 
 Each of these families of arguments has its own story to tell about climate 
change. Are there indications in the arguments themselves that the gaps between 
families can be bridged? Or has each tribe staked out a position from which there can 
be little communication, trade, or marriage? We can make a preliminary examination 
of commonalities among the families here, with a more in-depth study to come in the 
next chapter. 
 First, all the families – representing most of the national governments of the 
world, thousands of scientists, environmental organizations at every level, and 
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countless others – take the question of climate change seriously, and none rules the 
prospect completely out.  
 Second, all agree that vast uncertainties exist. Some claim that uncertainty is a 
reason to wait and see, others that uncertainty is a reason to act as quickly as possible. 
 Third, all agree that climate change is not a problem sui generis. 
Socioeconomic factors are involved in the industrialization that may be causing 
climate change, in the feasibility of reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, and in the 
potential for adaptation to climate change. Development (or lack thereof) is an issue; 
the credibility of science, especially scientific models, is another. Even the argument 
that climate change is not a problem of climate locates a problem in political issues. 
 Fourth, they all argue from definition, although some arguments also include 
cause-and-effect arguments. 
 These elements provide only a tenuous basis for coming to agreement. The 
voices in the debate agree that climate change is an issue worth serious discussion and 
that the definitions and the context matter in that discussion. When we look at most, 
instead of all, rhetors, we see more bases (not surprisingly). Although some have hard-
and-fast positions, most rhetors show their awareness of other arguments besides their 
own and the need to deal with, even accommodate those arguments. In more than half 
of the documents, the rhetors specifically refer to international processes (primarily 
the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change) and clearly consider these processes as having some authority – that 
is, the debate can be mediated by formal, organizational coordination and negotiation 
within the framework of international agreements. Most accept and use scientific 
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evidence. The debate thus continues with an expectation (or at least a hope) of coming 
to agreement through the process of argumentation. 
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CHAPTER 6: SOCIAL NETWORK TIES AMONG RHETORS IN THE 
CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE 
 
 Sorting the arguments about climate change into “families” helps to map the 
debate space and to identify some basic areas of agreement. However, a further 
analysis is needed to point to specific elements of specific arguments that rhetors share 
– both within and across family boundaries. 
 The rhetorical arguments made about climate change can be analyzed using 
social network analysis to examine the ties formed among rhetors through common 
elements in their arguments. Such ties can exist because rhetors have the same claims 
to authority (professional position or organizational affiliation), because they use the 
same kind of evidence, because they have similar worldviews, or because they 
advocate similar actions. An analysis using Ucinet software indicates that the ties 
linking rhetors most closely with their families are those of worldview; that is, 
families and worldviews are strongly correlated. However, the diversity of other 
rhetorical dimensions among those holding the same worldview indicates that many 
weaker ties may provide multiple bases to find common ground upon which to build 
agreements on actions to be taken in response to the prospect of climate change. 
 
Social Network Analysis Applied to Potential Bases for Agreement 
 This study assumes that, if there are bases for agreement about the existence 
of, sources of, and ways to address climate change, these bases will exist in the 
arguments made about climate change. One way of thinking about this is to picture a 
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spectrum running from complete disagreement to complete agreement. At one end, 
rhetors have completely different and mutually unaccepted authorities, evidence, 
worldviews, and policy proposals. At the other end of the spectrum, rhetors have 
identical or at least mutually acceptable authorities, evidence, worldviews, and policy 
proposals. All debates, including the climate change debate, exist somewhere between 
these two extremes, or they would not be debates. However, the complexities and 
uncertainties within the debate make it difficult to sort out what rhetors have in 
common or what they might find acceptable in other texts. 
 Separating and characterizing the elements of arguments helps in this sorting 
out process and may reveal patterns that indicate how agreements might be built 
within and across “families of arguments,” as discussed in Chapter 5. 
 At the end of the first step of my empirical analysis of 100 documents, each 
document had been analyzed and sorted into a family. In this third step of the analysis, 
I developed stable categories and a coding scheme for each value of each dimension. 
These categories, listed in Table 6.1 below, comprise the argument “family” the 
document belongs to, the personal authority of the rhetor and the type of organization 
associated with the rhetor in the document (used together to characterize the authority 
of the rhetor), the type of evidence presented, the worldview expressed, and proposed 
actions. I also assigned an identifying number and recorded the year the document was 
issued. 
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Document #  1-100 




 Climate change is not a problem FAM01 
 Climate change could be good for people FAM02 
 Science can solve the problem of climate change FAM03 
 Modernization – policy is the key FAM04 
 Modernization – reform the energy system FAM05 
 Modernization – focus on mitigation  FAM06 
 Modernization – focus on adaptation  FAM07 
 Modernization – economics can find efficient solutions  FAM08 
 Modernization – mitigation and adaptation are both 
important 
FAM09 
 Reduce inequality in order to deal with climate change FAM10 
 Worldviews must alter to “back to nature” or accord 
nature rights 
FAM11 




 Scientist AUSCI 
 Policymaker/government official AUSPOL 
 Representative of a nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) 
AUENV 
 Representative of a Trade Association/Business AUTRA 
 Academic AUACA 




 Research ORRES 
 Government ORGOV 
 NGO ORNGO 
 Trade Association ORIND 
 Business ORBSS 
 University ORUNI 
 Church ORCHU 




 Historical EVHIS 
 Scientific/literature citations and discussion EVSCT 
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 Rights-based EVRIT 
 Utilitarian/economic EVUTI 
 Case studies EVCAS 
 Anecdotes/personal testimony EVANE 
 Data-based/models EVDAT 
 Theory EVTHE 
 Experts’ opinions EVEXP 
 Political analysis EVPAN 
 Metaphor EVMET 
 Pictures EVPIX 




 Economic WVECN 
 Moral/inequality WVMOR
 Ecocentric WVECO 
 Ecomodernism WVMOD
 Political WVPLY 
 Nature fragile/ unknowable/finite carrying capacity WVNAT 
 Social construction WVSCO 
 Nature robust WVROB 
 Religious/stewardship ethic WVREL 




 Reduce emissions/ fossil fuel use ACEMI 
 Polluter pays ACPAY 
 Contraction and convergence ACCNC 
 ICs first/DCs develop ACDIF 
 Better technology ACTEC 
 Implement Kyoto ACKYO 
 Emissions trading ACETR 
 Integrate cc with other policy ACINT 
 Prepare to adapt ACADA 
 Develop sinks ACSNK 
 Back to nature/ simple lifestyle ACBAC 
 Control pop growth ACPOP 
 Work toward equality ACEQU 
 Build sustainability ACSUS 
 Restore humans-nature balance ACRST 
 Assist most-affected people ACAFF 
 Educate ACEDU 
 Monitor impacts AC,PM 
 Work backward from scenarios ACSCE 
 Fund mitigation/ adaptation projects ACFND 
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 “no regrets” ACNRG 
 Do more research ACRCH 
 Use history to understand ACHST 
 Do nothing ACZER 
 Revise government incentives ACINC 
 Improve models ACMDL 
 Engage industry ACEGA 
 Act-learn-act ACALA 
 Cap per capita emissions ACPCE 
 Grow economies ACGRO 
 Continue international negotiations ACNEG 




Authority of the Rhetor and Organization Type 
 The credentials and standing of the rhetor and his or her organization are likely 
to influence the audience’s reception of the argument. As it is impossible to make an 
objective judgment about how respected a rhetor is, I have chosen to characterize the 
rhetors of the 100 documents by their professional positions: scientist, policymaker/ 
government official, member of an NGO (typically an organization in the 
environmental social movement), representative of a trade association, leader of a 
business, or faculty member at a college or university. Almost the same categories 
apply to the organization type, with the addition of “church” as a type of organization. 
(None of the rhetors was identified as a church professional.) 
 Audiences expect that the authority of the rhetor and organization will vary 
according to type. People normally credit scientists with understanding the technical 
bases for belief that anthropogenic activities are affecting the global climate; scientists 
also share professional backgrounds and the use of defined (i.e., scientific) methods. 
Policymakers and government officials have certain responsibilities for ensuring the 
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well-being of citizens. NGO members typically are actively working against the status 
quo on behalf of the environment and/or people who are the victims of its degradation. 
Trade organization and business people are seen as against anything that will reduce 
profits, such as installing extra equipment to prevent emissions of carbon dioxide. 
Universities and their faculty members are supposed to have a more disinterested view 
of things, on the one hand; but, on the other hand, they can be seen as impractical in 
their conclusions and proposals for action. Church officials may have built-in biases 
towards a stewardship ethic and against consumerist lifestyles; audiences may 
discount what they say by citing these biases. 
 Moreover, the type of rhetor and type of organization provide a way of linking 
rhetors in a sub-network, for example, on the basis of their scientific backgrounds or 
environmental advocacy or industry affiliation. Authority characteristics are thus 
proxies for social network ties. 
 
Type of Evidence 
 Rhetors use at least 12 types of evidence, listed in no particular order in Table 
6.1: historical evidence, scientific literature (as citations/references), rights-based 
arguments, utilitarianism or economic evidence, case studies, anecdotes/personal 
stories, data and computerized models, theory, expert testimony, political analysis, 
metaphor, and pictures. For each document, I distinguished up to three types of 
evidence, basing the categorizations on my judgment of what “carries” the argument. 
Many types of scientific writing are metaphorical, for example, but, if the rhetor 
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obviously intends the data to authorize his or her argument, the document evidence 
was categorized as “data and computerized models.” 
 Historical arguments are generally of two types. The rhetor may explain the 
history of views of nature and shifts in how nature is perceived, as Cronon (1995) 
does. Or the document may contain a history of the political response to climate 
change, perhaps beginning with the debates leading to the 1992 Rio Summit and the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, then retailing the subsequent Conferences 
of the Parties and the politics of these negotiations. 
 If a rhetor uses scientific literature-based evidence, the attempt is, as Latour 
(1987) says, to gather the authorities that exist to attest to the truth of what is being 
said. In its simplest form, this can be statements that begin, “Scientists agree that…” 
Its more complex forms use technical citation methods to array studies that provide 
backing for the current argument, as when a scientific article’s first sentence contains 
dozens of citations. This latter use of scientific evidence places the current rhetor in 
the company of supposedly learned people, to be considered one of the company. 
 Rights-based and utilitarian/economic arguments are often seen as opposed. 
The former type insists on every individual’s rights to, among other things, clean air 
and stable climate. Rights-based arguments are often opposed on principle to 
averaging and the perpetuation of inequality; thus, rhetors from the global “South” 
often use rights-based arguments. Utilitarian arguments attempt to provide the most 
clean air and stable climate to most people – to maximize the greatest good to the 
greatest number – while recognizing that there will be winners and losers (and that 
winners will need to compensate losers). Averages, normal curves, and the use of 
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existing unequal institutions are the stock-in-trade of economist utilitarians, who are 
often identified with rhetors from the global “North.” 
 Case studies are commonly used in rights-based arguments, but can be used in 
other arguments as well. Cases are typically analyzed at a country or sub-national 
level – for example, a case study of how six developing countries have slowed the 
growth of emissions in their countries. Case studies differ from personal or anecdotal 
evidence in that the former is more rigorously and self-consciously scientific, where 
the latter is manifestly a retelling of one person’s experience; case studies can be used 
to develop theory that may be applied to other cases; anecdotes try to capture a “truth” 
about climate change or to persuade an audience who will be moved to sympathize 
with the plight, for example, of a Bangladeshi who must choose to save only one of 
two children in a flood. 
 Data and computerized models are more likely to be used in utilitarian or cost-
benefit arguments. They provide sources of evidence about rising concentrations of 
greenhouse gases and their effects on climate. So it is not surprising to find elaborate 
data tables and models used extensively in arguments about climate change, with 
regard not only to the physics and chemistry of climate change but also to emissions-
producing human activities and international negotiations about the issue. 
 Sometimes an argument is pure theory – about relationships between humans 
and nonhuman nature, about modernization and its effects, about globalization and 
climate change, about ecofeminist attitudes toward environmental damage, and so on. 
Social theorists, although typically making much broader arguments, may include 
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climate change as an example of a global problem that demonstrates the theoretical 
argument. 
 Rhetors may call upon experts to give testimony about climate change, as 
experts do about other issues. A few arguments consist largely of a string of 
quotations, direct and indirect, from people in positions of authority. 
 Political analysis can be the principal evidence for an argument, as when neo-
institutionalists argue that climate change is a unique problem for policymakers, 
necessitating different institutions than the ones the world has. 
 Explicitly metaphorical arguments can speak directly to certain audiences. One 
example in this set of documents is the use of the Gaia metaphor (Gaia being the 
principle of self-regulation in the Earth system; see Lovelock 1988). One document 
pictures Gaia as a woman talking about where humans have gone wrong and what 
they might be able to do to avoid extinction. 
 Only one document in this set primarily uses pictures to make an argument 
about how climate is changing around the globe. However, other documents include 




 A rhetor’s worldview, especially related to the relationship between humans 
and non-human nature, may constitute the main argument, or it may remain largely 
implicit in the argument. Jaeger et al. (1993) found that the worldview, or cultural 
type, of a person was a better predictor of the person’s views on environmental issues 
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than the demographic characteristics often linked to environmental views. Thompson 
and Rayner (1998) link the cultural types defined by Mary Douglas (1982) to views of 
nature. 
 This set of documents exhibits nine worldviews: (1) economic, the view that 
nature is a storehouse of scarce resources that must be accounted for; (2) moral, the 
view that people have (but do not enjoy) equal rights to use natural resources; (3) 
ecocentric, the view that plants, animals, and indeed geographical features have the 
same rights to exist and be healthy that humans have; (4) ecomodern, the view that 
people can improve their efficient uses of natural resources; (5) political, the view that 
changes in nature are the direct result of political actions, and that therefore politics 
should be the primary focus on environmentalist efforts; (6) cautious, respectful, or 
alarmist because nature is fragile, unknowable, or of an unknown finite “carrying 
capacity”; (7) constructivist, the view that social ideas of nature determine our 
treatment of and response to nature; (8) confident that nature is robust and will survive 
anything that humans can do to it; and (9) religious, the view that people have been 
designated as “stewards” of natural resources and thus should use them cautiously and 
with care for their health. 
 
Proposed Actions 
 Within this set of documents are 31 proposed actions, sometimes espoused 
singly, sometimes in combination with others. They are listed in a very abbreviated 
form in the Table 6.1; below they are listed in a more comprehensible fashion. 
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1. All countries (and other entities) should reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, 
particularly from fossil fuel use, but also from activities involving methane, 
nitrous oxide, and other greenhouse gases. 
2. Those who have polluted the atmosphere with greenhouse gases should pay for 
remediation, by compensating those who will be negatively affected by climate 
change, investing in ways to reduce emissions, or both. 
3. “Contraction and convergence” is the term used to describe a strategy of 
focusing on reducing global emission permits while establishing a universally 
applied individual emissions allowance, and working to have industrialized 
and non-industrialized countries converge on that allowance. 
4. Industrialized countries should reduce emissions immediately, but non-
industrialized countries should be allowed to develop economically first. 
5. Zero- or low-emitting technologies should be developed, especially in the areas 
of power generation. 
6. The Kyoto Protocol should be implemented. 
7. An emissions trading system should be implemented, to reduce the cost of 
mitigation. 
8. Climate change policies should be integrated with other policies, e.g., in 
improving human well-being. 
9. Countries and individuals should prepare to adapt to climate change. 
10. “Carbon sinks” should be developed to capture and store carbon rather than 
releasing it to the atmosphere. 
11. People should return to a simpler lifestyle in order not to affect the climate. 
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12. Controlling population growth will control climate change. 
13. Equality among nations will allow us to deal with climate change. 
14. We should build sustainable systems (i.e., join climate change and 
sustainability issues). 
15. The balance between humans and nature should be restored. 
16. The most-affected people should be assisted. 
17. People should be educated about the causes and impacts of climate change. 
18. The impacts of climate change should be monitored. 
19. We should create desirable scenarios of the future and work towards them. 
20. Both mitigation and adaptation projects should be supported/funded. 
21. We should focus on “no regrets” activities, i.e., those that would be good-to-do 
even if climate does not change. 
22. Scientists should do more research to understand the causes and impacts of 
climate change. 
23. We can understand the prospects of climate change by examining how climate 
has changed in the past and societal responses to the changes. 
24. We should do nothing – climate change is not a problem. 
25. Government incentives should be revised to reward, e.g., actions to improve 
energy efficiency. 
26. Scientists should improve their models of climate change, impacts, etc. 
27. Industry should be engaged in the effort to reduce emissions. 
28. Because much is uncertain, we should use an act-learn-act approach. 
29. We should cap per-capita emissions. 
 174
30. We should grow the world’s economies; rich economies can mitigate or adapt 
to climate change, as well as other types of change. 
31. The international negotiations should continue. 
 
Results of the Categorization 
 The analysis produced a database that often includes several values for each 
element; no predetermined limit was set. For example, if a document has two authors, 
one may be a university scientist, one a government policymaker. At different points 
in a document, different types of evidence may be used (up to four types), different 
worldviews may be expressed (up to three), and multiple proposals may be made (up 
to five) at as many as four levels. On the other hand, some values were missing. A 
document retrieved from a website, for example, may not give an author’s bona fides 
or the organization that supports him or her. If I use the maximum number of types in 
each dimension, there are 16 possible ties for each document/rhetor. However, the 
range of actual values for any document is 4-11. The values for each document are 
given in Table 6.2, which is sorted by argument family. 
 
 
Table 6.2. Arguments Sorted by Family with Coded Rhetorical Features 
DocNum DocName FAM AU OR EV WV AC1 AC2 AC3 AC4 AC5 Y  
DC022 CALDER FAM01 AUACA ORUNI EVSCT WVROB ACZER 0 0 0 0 Y1998
DC030 SINGER FAM01 AUSCI ORUNI EVDAT WVROB ACZER ACMDL 0 0 0 Y2000
DC046 LINDZE FAM01 AUSCI ORUNI EVSCT WVPLY ACTEC ACRCH ACZER 0 0 Y2003
DC003 AUSUBE FAM02 AUACA ORUNI 
EVANE 
EVDAT WVMOD ACTEC ACFND 0 0 0 Y2001
DC023 IDSOCD FAM02 0 ORNGO EVSCT WVROB ACZER 0 0 0 0 Y2002
DC034 APIPOS FAM02 AUTRA ORIND EVDAT WVECN ACTEC ACRCH ACINC 0 0 Y1997
DC059 CASTEC FAM02 AUSCI ORNGO
EVSCT 
EVCAS WVMOD ACADA ACSUS ACRCH 0 1 Y1992
DC073 USDOST FAM02 0 ORGOV EVDAT WVROB ACTEC ACSUS ACRCH 0 1 Y2003
DC074 COONCH FAM02 AUACA ORNGO EVPAN WVECN ACTEC ACRCH 0 0 0 Y2002
DC081 GLOBAL FAM02 AUTRA ORIND EVDAT WVECN ACTEC ACZER 0 0 0 Y1997
DC087 WHATAB FAM02 0 ORNGO
EVANE 
EVDAT WVROB ACZER 0 0 0 0 0 
DC009 MARTEN FAM03 AUSCI ORRES EVDAT WVECO ACSUS ACRCH 0 0 1 Y1994
DC019 DARWIN FAM03 AUSCI ORGOV EVDAT WVECO ACMON ACMDL 0 0 0 Y1996
DC038 COHENS FAM03 AUSCI ORGOV EVSCT WVMOD ACEDU ACMON ACNRG 0 0 Y1993
DC039 ECIMOV FAM03 AUSCI ORUNI EVDAT 
WVMOD 
WVNAT ACSUS ACNEG 0 0 1 Y2002
DC041 VANASS FAM03 AUSCI ORRES EVDAT WVSCO ACMDL 0 0 0 0 Y2002
DC053 PARKSN FAM03 0 0 EVEXP WVMOD ACMON ACRCH 0 0 0 Y2002
DC054 TAUBES FAM03 0 ORRES 
EVCAS 
EVEXP WVECO ACRCH 0 0 0 0 Y1997
DC085 SLADEH FAM03 AUPOL ORGOV EVHIS WVPLY ACINT ACSUS ACNRG ACRCH 1 Y2000
DC086 ASHFOR FAM03 AUSCI ORNGO EVDAT WVECN ACEDU ACMON ACRCH 0 0 Y2001




WVPLY ACTEC ACNEG 0 0 0 Y2001
DC005 GOULDE FAM04 AUACA ORUNI 
EVUTI 
EVDAT WVMOD ACALA ACNEG 0 0 0 Y2002
DC013 EDWARD FAM04 AUSCI ORUNI 
EVHIS 
EVDAT WVSCO ACMDL ACALA 0 0 0 Y1996
DC020 ATHANA FAM04 AUENV ORNGO EVSCT 
WVPLY 
WVNAT ACTEC ACINT 0 0 0 Y2003
DC060 SANDAL FAM04 AUSCI ORNGO EVSCT WVPLY ACKYO 0 0 0 0 Y2001
 
 
ORUNI EVPAN WVSCO 
DC075 ROBINS FAM04 AUTRA ORGOV EVEXP WVPLY ACKYO 0 0 0 0 Y2002
DC079 BLANCH FAM04 0 ORNGO
EVRIT 
EVDAT WVPLY ACEMI ACCNC ACDIF ACETR 0 Y2001
DC097 WORLDW FAM04 AUENV ORNGO
EVHIS 
EVDAT WVMOD ACEMI ACKYO 0 0 0 Y2002




ORIND EVDAT WVMOD ACEDU ACNRG 0 0 0 Y1999
DC024 HOFFER FAM05 AUSCI ORRES 
EVSCT 
EVDAT WVMOD ACTEC ACRCH ACNEG 0 0 Y2002
DC026 KAWASH FAM05 AUSCI ORGOV EVPAN WVECO ACNRG 0 0 0 0 Y2000
DC065 PORRIT FAM05 AUENV ORNGO EVDAT WVMOD ACEMI ACKYO 0 0 0 Y2003
DC068 WORLDE FAM05 
AUSCI 
AUENV ORNGO EVPAN 
WVECN 
WVPLY ACEMI ACTEC ACETR ACEQU ACSUS Y1998
DC082 GEFUND FAM05 0 ORGOV 
EVCAS 
EVDAT WVMOD ACEMI ACTEC 0 0 0 0 
DC089 KIRBYA FAM05 AUENV ORRES 
EVDAT 
EVPIX WVMOD ACTEC 0 0 0 0 Y1999
DC095 GERMAN FAM05 0 ORNGO EVSCT WVNAT ACEMI ACTEC ACSUS ACFND ACRCH Y2003
DC096 DOEFEN FAM05 0 ORGOV 
EVSCT 
EVPAN WVMOD ACTEC 0 0 0 0 Y1999
DC100 AMORYL FAM05 AUENV ORNGO
EVDAT 
EVTHE WVMOD ACTEC 0 0 0 0 Y1999
DC007 MEYERS FAM06 AUSCI 0 EVDAT 
WVMOD 
WVNAT ACPOP ACPCE 0 0 0 Y2002




WVNAT ACNRG 0 0 0 0 Y1998
DC047 BROWNE FAM06 AUTRA ORIND 
EVCAS 
EVDAT 
EVMET WVMOD ACEMI ACSUS ACNRG ACRCH 1 Y1997





WVPLY ACTEC ACINT ACSUS ACRCH 1 Y2001
DC069 BURNET FAM06 AUSCI ORNGO EVSCT WVNAT ACEDU ACGRO 0 0 0 Y2002




ORUNI EVDAT WVNAT ACEMI 0 0 0 0 Y1999




DC091 CLEANW FAM06 0 ORNGO
EVDAT 
EVPAN WVECO ACEMI ACRST 0 0 0 Y2003
DC093 SOCIET FAM06 0 ORCHU EVTHE WVREL ACEMI ACTEC 0 0 0 Y1998
DC098 HANSEN FAM06 AUSCI ORRES 
EVSCT 
EVDAT WVMOD ACEMI ACTEC 0 0 0 Y2000
DC014 ROSENZ FAM07 AUSCI ORGOV EVDAT 
WVMOD 
WVNAT ACADA ACALA 0 0 0 Y1995
DC032 STAKHI FAM07 AUSCI ORGOV EVSCT WVMOD ACTEC ACINT 0 0 0 Y1998
DC048 IPCTHR FAM07 AUSCI ORNGO
EVSCT 
EVDAT WVMOD ACADA ACMON ACRCH ACMDL 0 Y2001
DC067 UKCLIM FAM07 AUSCI ORGOV EVPAN WVMOD ACNRG ACALA 0 0 0 Y2003
DC015 EDMOND FAM08 AUSCI ORNGO
EVUTI 
EVDAT WVECN ACETR 0 0 1 0 Y1999
DC027 TOMANM FAM08 AUSCI 0 EVUTI WVECN ACEMI ACADA ACNEG 0 0 Y2001
DC028 INOVES FAM08 AUTRA ORIND 
EVDAT 
EVPAN WVMOD ACETR ACRCH ACINC 1 0 Y2002
DC051 LINDEN FAM08 0 0 
EVANE 
EVDAT WVNAT ACEGA 0 0 0 0 Y2003
DC062 SHACKE FAM08 AUSCI ORGOV EVSCT WVMOD ACEQU ACNRG 0 0 0 Y2003






EVANE WVMOD ACADA ACSUS ACNRG 0 1 Y2002
DC029 PREPAR FAM09 AUSCI ORGOV EVDAT WVMOD ACINT ACEDU ACINC ACMDL 0 Y2000






WVMOD ACEMI ACADA 0 0 0 Y2001
DC045 WWFCCP FAM09 0 ORNGO
EVSCT 
EVDAT WVNAT ACEMI ACKYO ACADA ACEDU ACEGA Y2003
DC057 HAYESD FAM09 AUENV ORNGO EVDAT WVNAT ACEMI ACTEC ACINC 0 0 Y2000
DC076 DESSAI FAM09 AUENV ORNGO
EVHIS 
EVSCT 
EVDAT WVSCO ACEMI ACADA ACEQU 0 0 Y2002





EVPIX WVNAT ACEMI ACBAC ACSUS 0 1 Y2003
DC084 SHOVEE FAM09 AUSCI ORUNI 
EVDAT 
EVTHE WVSCO ACSCE 0 0 0 0 Y1996




DC099 WISCON FAM09 0 ORGOV 
EVSCT 
EVANE WVNAT ACEMI ACSNK 0 0 0 0 




WVMOR ACPAY ACPCE 0 0 0 Y1996
DC004 RAYNER FAM10 AUSCI ORRES 
EVANE 
EVMET WVSCO ACINT ACAFF 0 0 0 Y1998
DC006 JAMIES FAM10 AUACA ORUNI 
EVHIS 
EVPAN WVMOR ACEQU ACPCE 0 0 0 Y2001
DC011 AHMEDQ FAM10 AUENV ORNGO EVDAT 
WVECO 
WVNAT ACINT ACEQU 0 0 0 Y2000
DC016 GREENW FAM10 AUENV ORNGO EVCAS WVMOD ACAFF 0 0 0 0 Y2001




EVMET WVSCO ACEDU ACRCH 0 0 0 Y2001




EVCAS WVMOR ACEQU ACHST 0 0 0 Y1996
DC031 BOEHME FAM10 AUSCI 0 EVPAN WVPLY ACNEG 0 0 0 0 Y1994
DC033 QUICKM FAM10 0 ORCHU EVRIT WVMOR ACBAC ACEQU ACPCE ACCNC 0 Y2003
DC036 SOKONA FAM10 AUSCI ORNGO EVSCT 
WVMOR 
WVPLY ACEMI ACEQU ACPCE ACNEG 0 Y2002
DC037 GYAWAL FAM10 AUSCI ORGOV 
EVDAT 
EVPAN WVNAT ACTEC ACMON ACRCH 0 0 Y1996




WVNAT ACADA ACEQU ACAFF ACEDU 0 Y2002
DC061 CHANDL FAM10 AUSCI ORNGO
EVDAT 
EVEXP WVECN ACEMI ACMON ACFND 0 0 Y1997






EVPAN WVNAT ACINT ACSUS ACRST 0 1 Y1994
DC066 MCMICH FAM10 AUSCI ORNGO
EVSCT 
EVDAT WVNAT ACEMI ACPOP ACEQU 0 0 Y1993
DC078 HUQSAL FAM10 AUSCI ORNGO EVPAN WVMOD ACADA ACNEG 0 0 0 Y2001
DC080 UNFAIR FAM10 AUPOL ORGOV EVRIT WVMOD ACDIF ACINT  0 0 Y1997




WVPLY ACAFF 0 0 0 0 Y2002
DC008 MEADOW FAM11 AUACA ORUNI EVMET WVECO ACRST 0 0 0 0 Y1997
 
 




WVNAT ACINT ACRST 0 0 0 Y1992
DC025 BERGER FAM11 AUSCI 0 
EVSCT 
EVMET WVNAT ACEMI ACINC 0 0 0 Y2000
DC035 NRDCOU FAM11 0 ORNGO
EVSCT 
EVDAT WVNAT ACEMI ACNEG 0 0 0 Y2002




WVREL ACBAC ACRST 0 0 0 Y2002
DC050 MEYERA FAM11 AUACA 0 
EVSCT 
EVPAN WVNAT ACRST ACEDU ACNRG 0 0 Y1993
DC052 NWFEDE FAM11 0 ORNGO EVSCT WVECO ACEMI ACINC 0 0 0 Y2000
DC055 SUZUKI FAM11 AUSCI ORNGO EVSCT WVNAT ACEMI ACKYO 0 0 0 Y2002
DC056 FOEINT FAM11 0 ORNGO
EVSCT 
EVANE WVNAT ACKYO ACEQU ACPCE 0 0 Y2000
DC058 ADHIKA FAM11 0 ORNGO
EVDAT 
EVEXP WVMOD ACFND 0 0 0 0 Y2002
DC064 PLUMWO FAM11 AUACA ORUNI EVANE WVSCO ACEQU ACRST 0 0 0 Y1993




WVSCO ACEQU ACNEG 0 0 0 Y1999
DC071 CONWAY FAM11 AUACA ORUNI EVTHE WVSCO ACNRG ACHST 0 0 0 Y1999
DC072 WORSTE FAM11 AUACA ORUNI 
EVHIS 
EVMET WVSCO ACBAC ACRST ACINC 0 0 Y1999
DC092 MCKIBB FAM11 AUSCI ORUNI EVTHE 
WVECO 




 Coding and tabulating the family identification and rhetorical elements facilitates 
the analysis of families to examine whether the elements I have theorized as constituting 
network links in fact link the members of individual families. 
 Inspection of Table 6.2 demonstrates that the rhetorical elements of authority 
(ethos), evidence (logos), and worldview (pathos) do indeed link members of families, 
but that proposed actions, the fourth category, do not seem to be links within families. 
 Authority provides within-family links; however, the kinds of rhetors and 
organizations in the climate change debate as a whole constitute a limited set. Scientists 
are the most prominent rhetors in all families except Family #11 (where academics 
predominate), Family #2 (3 nonattributions, 2 trade association representatives, 2 
academics, and a scientist), and Family #4 (2 of the 8 rhetors are scientists and two are 
environmental advocates; the rest are single types). Environmental advocates have 
substantive voices in Families #5, #9, and #10. Organization types provide some – but 
not overwhelming – coherence, as seen in the list below: 
 Family #1 3 total: 3 universities 
 Family #2 8 total: 4 NGOs 
 Family #3 9 total: 3 government, 3 research organizations 
 Family #4 8 total: 6 NGOs 
 Family #5 10 total: 4 government, 4 NGOs 
 Family #6 10 total: 5 NGOs, 2 research organizations 
 Family #7 4 total: 3 government 
 Family #8 5 total: 2 nonattributions, rest single types 
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 Family #9 10 total: 6 NGOs, 3 government, 3 universities 
 Family #10 18 total: 9 NGOs, 3 government, 3 universities 
 Family #11 15 total: 7 universities, 5 NGOs 
 The predominant types of evidence used by all families except #10 and #11 are 
data and scientific literature; this is in keeping with the dominance of scientists as rhetors. 
Family #10 exhibits a wide range of evidence types, with most rhetors using two or more 
types; political analysis (7 uses), data (6 uses), rights-based evidence (4 uses), scientific 
literature (4 uses), and history (3 uses) are the most frequent types in this family. Family 
#11 rhetors have a smaller range of frequently used evidence types: scientific literature (6 
uses), metaphor (4 uses), history (4 uses), and anecdote/personal testimony (3 uses). 
 It is in worldview where the most coherence within families can be seen. As 
expected, in Families #5-9 (who all espouse More Modernization) an ecomodern 
worldview predominates; Family #4, also a pro-modernization family, has 3 instances of 
an ecomodern worldview and 5 instances of a political worldview. Two members of 
Family #1 and three members of Family #2 hold the view that nature is robust; the 
remaining Family #1 member holds a political worldview, and in Family #2 three other 
members hold an economic worldview and the remaining two hold a ecomodern 
worldview. Three-quarters of Family #10 rhetors hold moral, nature-as-fragile, or 
political worldviews, in keeping with the focus on inequality. And almost all Family #11 
rhetors hold ecocentric, nature-as-fragile, or social constructivist worldviews. 
 No such coherence can be found in the actions proposed by rhetors within 
families. Proposed actions are not clustered in families, with a few exceptions: Family #1 
members all propose no action; 5 (of 8) members of Family #2 and 7 (of 10) members of 
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Family #5 propose technology solutions; and 6 (of 10) members of Family #6 and 7 (of 
10) members of Family #9 propose emissions reductions. Especially when one considers 
that rhetors proposed up to 5 actions, this lack of agreement within families is striking. 
 
Results of the Ucinet Analysis 
 Details of the software methodology are given in Chapter 3. Results from the 
analysis of all factors are shown in Table 6.3 (All Factors). The table also gives details of 
the four rhetorical factors. Ucinet/CONCOR partitioned the set into four groups, three 
fairly even in size (35, 30, and 31 members) and one 4-member group; the table lists 
these groups, numbered for convenience to show the subgroups. The group compositions 
are identical to the groups formed by CONCOR when only the worldview values were 
used. Only the subgroups in Group 2 are somewhat different. 
 
 
Table 6.3. Ucinet Groups from Analysis of All Factors 
Ucinet 
Group 
Author or Title Argument Family 
(number) 
Authority Evidence Worldview Proposed Actions 




History, rights Economic, moral Polluters pay, cap per capita 
emissions 
 Chandler Reduce inequality 
(10) 
Scientist, NGO Data, expert 
testimony 
Economic Reduce emissions, monitor, fund 
projects 
 Toman Economics (8) Scientist Utilitarian Economic Reduce emissions, , prepare to 
adapt, continue to negotiate 





Could be good (2) Trade organization, 
industry 




Could be good (2) Trade organization, 
industry 
Data Economic Develop technology, do more 
research, revise govt incentives 
 Coon Could be good (2) Academic, NGO Policy analysis Economic Develop technology, do more 
research 








Policy analysis Economic, policy Develop technology, reduce 
emissions, emissions trading, 
work toward equality, build 
sustainability 




Scientist, NGO Data Economic Educate, monitor, do more 
research 





NGO Data, rights Policy Reduce emissions, , emissions 
trading, , contraction and 
convergence, developed 
countries first 




Policy Adopt Kyoto Protocol 
 Müller Reduce inequality Member of a trade Data, policy Moral, policy Assist the most affected 
 
 
(10) organization analysis 
 Quick Reduce inequality 
(10) 
Church Rights  Moral Contraction & convergence, 






Scientist Policy analysis Policy Continue to negotiate 






Moral Work toward equality, reduce 
per capita emissions 
 Ribot Reduce inequality 
(10) 




Moral Work toward equality, use 
history to understand 




Scientist, NGO Scientific 
literature 
Moral, policy Reduce emissions, work toward 
equality, reduce per capita 
emissions, continue to negotiate 




History Policy Integrate climate change with 
other policy, build sustainability, 
no regrets, , do more research 
 Lindzen No problem! (1) Scientist, university Scientific 
literature 
Policy Develop technology, do more 
research, do nothing 








Integrate climate change with 
other policy, assist the most 
affected 
 Glantz Reduce inequality 
(10) 
Scientist, research 






Educate, do more research 











Adopt Kyoto Protocol 
 Edwards Political mod-
ernization (4) 
Scientist, university History, data Social 
construction 
Improve models, act-learn-act 






Work toward equality, restore 
people-nature balance 
 Conway, Keniston 
& Marx 


















Back to nature, restore people-













Work toward equality, continue 
to negotiate 


















Reduce emissions, prepare to 
adapt, work toward equality 
 Shove Mitigation plus 
adaptation (9)  
Scientist, university Data, theory Social 
construction 
Work back from desirable 
scenarios 
All.1d Greening Earth 
Society 
Could be good (2) NGO Anecdote, data Nature robust Do nothing 
 US Dept. of State Could be good (2) Government Data Nature robust Develop technology, build 
sustainability, do more research 
 Idso & Idso Could be good (2) Ngo Scientific lit Nature robust Do nothing 
 Singer No problem! (1) Scientist, university Data Nature robust Do nothing, improve models 
 Calder No problem! (1) Academic, 
university 
Scientific lit Nature robust Do nothing 
All.2a National Wildlife 
Federation 
Rights of nature 
(11) 
NGO Scientific lit Ecological Reduce emissions, revise govt 
incentives 




Metaphor  Ecological Restore people-nature balance 
 McKibben Rights of nature 
(11) 
Scientist, university Theory Ecological, 
religious 
Build sustainability, work back 
from desirable scenarios 




Policy Ecological No regrets 
 Taubes Science solutions 
(3) 
Research org Case studies, 
expert 
testimony 
Ecological Do more research 












Data Ecological Build sustainability, do more 
research 
 Clean Water 
Action 
Mitigation (6) NGO Data, policy 
analysis 
Ecological Reduce emissions, restore 
people-nature balance 
All.2b Society, Religion 
& Technology 
Project 
Mitigation (6) Church Theory Religious Reduce emissions, develop 
technology 
All.2c Braasch Mitigation plus 
adaptation (9) 
NGO, university Scientific lit, 
data, pictures 
Nature fragile Reduce emissions, back to 
nature, build sustainability 




Data Nature fragile Reduce emissions, develop 
technology, revise govt 
incentives 
 Worldwide Fund Mitigation plus 
adaptation (9) 
NGO Scientific lit, 
data 
Nature fragile Reduce emissions, adopt Kyoto 
Protocol, prepare to adapt, 
educate, engage industry 




Government Scientific lit, 
anecdote 
Nature fragile Reduce emissions, develop sinks 
 Berger Rights of nature 
(11) 
Scientist Scientific lit, 
metaphor 
Nature fragile Reduce emissions, revise govt 
incentives 
 Suzuki Rights of nature 
(11) 
Scientist, NGO Scientific lit Nature fragile Reduce emissions, adopt Kyoto 
Protocol 








Integrate climate change with 
other policy, restore people-
nature balance 








Back to nature, restore people-
nature balance 
 Friends of the 
Earth Int. 
Rights of nature 
(11) 
NGO Scientific lit, 
anecdote 
Nature fragile Adopt Kyoto Protocol, work 
toward equality, reduce per 
capita emissions 
 Meyer-Abich Rights of nature 
(11) 
Academic Scientific lit, 
policy analysis 
Nature fragile Restore people-nature balance, 






Rights of nature 
(11) 
NGO Scientific lit, 
data 
Nature fragile Reduce emissions, continue to 
negotiate 
 Linden Economics (8)  Anecdote Nature fragile Engage industry 
 Burnett Mitigation (6) NGO Scientific lit Nature fragile Educate, grow economies 
 Johansen Mitigation (6) Scientist & 
academic, NGO & 
university 
Data Nature fragile Reduce emissions 











Nature fragile Integrate climate change into 
other policy, build sustainability, 
restore people-nature balance 






Nature fragile Develop technology, monitor, do 
more research 
 McMichael Reduce inequality 
(10) 
Scientist, NGO Scientific lit, 
data 
Nature fragile Reduce emissions, control 
population, work toward equality 






Integrate climate change with 
other policy, work toward 
equality 
 German Advisory 




NGO Scientific lit Nature fragile Reduce emissions, develop 
technology, build sustainability, 
fund projects, do more research 








Prepare to adapt, work toward 
equality, assist the most affected, 
educate 




Scientific lit Policy, nature 
fragile 
Develop technology, integrate 
climate change with other policy 
All.3a Benedick Political 
modernization (4) 




Develop technology, continue to 
negotiate 





Develop technology, integrate 
climate change with other policy, 


















History, data Modernization Reduce emissions, adopt Kyoto 
Protocol 
 Ausubel Could be good (2) Academic, 
university 
Anecdote, data Modernization Develop technology, fund 
projects 
 Council for Ag 
Science & 
Technology 
Could be good (2) Scientist, NGO Scientific lit, 
case studies 
Modernization Prepare to adapt, build 
sustainability, do more research 











Modernization Prepare to adapt, build 
sustainability, no regrets 




NGO Scientific lit, 
data 








Data Modernization Integrate climate change with 
other policy, educate, revise govt 
incentives, improve models 











Government Case studies, 
data 
Modernization Reduce emissions, develop 
technology 




Data Modernization Reduce emissions, adopt Kyoto 
Protocol 





member of trade 
ass’n, government 
& industry 
Data Modernization Educate, no regrets 




Data, theory Modernization Develop technology 
 
 




Government Scientific lit, 
policy analysis 
Modernization Develop technology 
 Hoffert, Caldeira, 







Modernization Develop technology, do more 
research, continue to negotiate 




Modernization Emissions trading, do more 
research, revise govt incentives 
 Shackelton Economics (8) Scientist, 
government 
Scientific lit Modernization Work toward equality, no regrets 
 Browne Mitigation (6) Industry Case studies, 
data, metaphor 
Modernization Reduce emissions, build 
sustainability, no regrets, do 
more research 




Mitigation (6) NGO Case studies, 
data 
Modernization Reduce emissions, no regrets 
 Hansen, Sato, 
Ruedy, Lacis & 
Oinas 




Modernization Reduce emissions, develop 
technology 
 IPCC WG3 Adaptation (7) Scientist, NGO Scientific lit, 
data 
Modernization Prepare to adapt, monitor, do 
more research, improve models 
 Stakhiv & 
Schilling 
Adaptation (7) Scientist, 
government 
Scientific lit Modernization Develop technology, integrate 
climate change with other policy 
 UK Climate 
Impacts 
Programme 
Adaptation (7) Scientist, 
government 
Policy analysis Modernization No regrets, act-learn-act 




Scientific lit Modernization Educate, monitor, no regrets 




Modernization Monitor, do more research 
 Huq Reduce inequality 
(10) 
Scientist, NGO Policy analysis Modernization Prepare to adapt, continue to 
negotiate 




Rights Modernization Developed countries first, 











Case studies Modernization Assist most affected 
 Adhikary Rights of nature 
(11) 
NGO Data, expert 
testimony 
Modernization Fund projects 
All.3c Koteen, 
Bloomfield, 









Reduce emissions, prepare to 
adapt 
All.4 Meyerson Mitigation (6) Scientist Data Modernization, 
nature fragile 
Control population, reduce per 
capita emissions 
 Sathaye & 
Ravindranath 







 Ecimovic, Stuhler, 
Vezjak & Mulej 
Science solutions 
(3) 
Scientist, university Data Modernization, 
nature fragile 
Build sustainability, continue to 
negotiate 
 Rosenzweig & 
Hillel 








 I attribute this at least partially to a feature of the data. There are only 9 
worldview values, contrasted to 12 values for author and organization (which were 
considered together as constituting the authority of the rhetor), 12 values for evidence, 
and 31 values for proposed actions. Furthermore, it is not unusual to have missing values 
in the author and/or organization types, if these were not given in the document – but 
every document expressed at least one worldview. Thus, it is easier to correlate 
documents by worldview than by any other type of variable. 
 However, the sub-networks formed have, in general, ties in addition to worldview 
ties. Group 1 has four subgroups. The first (9 members) contains documents from five 
different families, has five scientist-rhetors, seven rhetors from NGOs, five arguments 
using data as evidence, four proposals to develop new technologies – and all espouse an 
economic worldview. The second subgroup (10 members) is more diverse, linked most 
strongly by two worldviews, either morality or policy – and, in two cases, both 
worldviews, which is how members of this sub-network are linked.14 The third subgroup 
(11 members) all express the worldview that nature is socially constructed, ten are 
scientists or academics, and seven are affiliated with universities. The fourth subgroup (5 
members) are linked by the worldview that nature is robust and (except for one) that the 
world should do nothing about the prospect of climate change. 
                                                 
14 That is, any member of the subgroup can link to another; a member who holds only a 
morality worldview can link to another member who holds only a policy worldview via 
one of the members who holds both worldviews. 
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 Similarly, Groups 2 and 3, and their subgroups are linked most commonly by 
worldview: an ecological worldview (all 8 members of Group 2, first subgroup), the 
worldview that nature is fragile/unknowable/finite (all 19 members of Group 2, third 
subgroup) or that nature is fragile/unknowable/finite AND human actions are most 
importantly political (both members of Group 2, fourth subgroup), and the worldview 
that humans can manage their environment successfully (all members of Group 3, with 
additional worldviews demarcating small subgroups of 1 and 2 members). 
 The four members of Group 4 have four links in common: they are all scientists, 
all use data as evidence, and all hold two worldviews: that nature is fragile/ 
unknowable/finite and that people can manage their environment so as not to damage it 
(modernization). 
  However, as important to this study as links is diversity. That is, I am interested 
in whether rhetors and arguments that appear to be closed and of little influence outside 
their own “families” have network ties that link them to other families. This appears to be 
the case, as indicated by the Ucinet-assisted analysis. Tables 6.4-6.6 show the results of 
the analysis for each factor separately (except for Worldview, which are almost identical 




Table 6.4. Ucinet Groups for Authority of the Rhetor (followed by family number) 






















































































































Table 6.5. Ucinet Groups for Evidence (followed by family number) 



















































































































Table 6.6. Ucinet Groups for Proposed Actions (followed by family number) 



















































































































 For example, the actions proposed are potential ties among rhetors from different 
families. There are 31 actions proposed in this set of documents; many rhetors propose 
more than one action. Some of the proposed actions, such as reducing emissions and 
developing new technologies, span many families, many types of rhetors, and many types 
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of evidence. These links may be particularly potent bases for agreement, as is suggested 
by other global debates. For example, in the population debate, disparate actors joined 
forces because they, for different reasons, favored a certain course of action. (In the case 
of the population debate, feminists and neo-Malthusians both wanted female 
emancipation and education in the form of birth control programs.) 
 If rhetors can agree on one or more actions they wish to see taken, they may be 
able to put aside (or at least table) their different worldviews or evidence in order to 
mutually agree on a course of action to address climate change. For example, the 
recommendation to develop new technologies to address climate change is made by 
rhetors in 8 of 11 families – only the arguments “Science Provides Knowledge about 
Climate Change,” “More Modernization Is the Cure (Economics),” and “Rift with 
Nature” documents contain no pro-technology arguments. Similarly, proposals for new 
technologies span 6 of the 9 worldviews (all except moral/inequality, ecocentric, and 
social construction). 
 As expected, individual rhetors tend to have close ties with fellow members of 
their argument families, but they frequently have multiple ties outside their families. For 
example, Ashford is a member of Family 3, “Science Provides Knowledge about Climate 
Change,” which has a total of 9 members. Like many other family members, he is a 
scientist (6 members total), uses data and models as evidence (5 members total), and 
advocates education, monitoring, and research (7 members advocate one or more of 
these). However, there are 36 other scientists, spread out across all other families; 43 
rhetors, again, spread out across all other families, use data and/or models as evidence; 
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and there are 20 instances of one or more proposed actions that Ashford also proposes, 
spread out across eight other families. 
 What are the practical implications of having so many social network ties? For a 
rhetor like Ashford, who advocates non-aggressive and relatively low-cost actions, the 
existence of these links could prompt him to 
• Explicitly associate his arguments with those made in other families – for 
example, in pointing out the necessity for education, monitoring, and research to 
accomplish the more aggressive goals of the “More Modernization” arguments 
• Demonstrate how his evidence and other types of evidence – and results from 
other models and data – can reinforce each other 
• Provide additional arguments, at the first and second stases, about the need to 
study and monitor in order to establish whether or not something has happened 
and, if so, whether or not that something can be defined as climate change. 
 
Conclusion 
 This study used multiple tools to study the question of whether or not there are 
bases for agreement in the arguments made in the global climate change debate. 
Rhetorical analysis provided the framework for a two-step content analysis of 100 
argumentative documents that make specific proposals for action with regard to climate 
change. Then social network analysis was used to show links among rhetors based upon 
rhetorical elements of their arguments. The social network analysis revealed multiple 




CHAPTER 7: PROSPECTS FOR THE DEBATE: ENDLESS RECYCLING  
OF ARGUMENTS OR MOVEMENT TOWARD AGREEMENT? 
 
 Even at the relatively heady time surrounding the Rio environmental agreements 
in 1992, dissident voices could be heard. Indeed all the arguments that have both 
promoted and retarded “coming to agreement” were present at that time: arguments about 
domination and inequality, the deep distrust of modernity and modern solutions as 
opposed to rethinking human relationships with nature, and cautions about the 
uncertainty of the science and other hypotheses about causes of climate change. A book 
published shortly after the Rio Summit collected the dissident voices from the so-called 
South. 
 However, since the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was 
ratified, the debate has not remained static. Scientific advances in understanding and 
monitoring the climate, better understanding of international processes (and more 
experience with them, e.g., in the World Trade Commission), the proliferation of NGOs 
with expertise in climate change issues, and the continuing negotiations under the 
UNFCCC have all contributed to the evolution of the debate. Such evolutionary change 
has not been fast enough to satisfy people who fear the collapse of the climate system, 
nor slow enough to satisfy those who fear taking on a burden of costs when both problem 
and solutions remain highly uncertain.  
 If one element of the debate has received more emphasis than others, it is the 
scientific evidence. What is the nature of the evidence? Those looking for direct 
experience of “global warming” have been pulled up short again and again. The 
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excessively hot summer of 1988 seemed likely enough evidence that climate change was 
manifesting itself – likely enough to spark urgent calls for action from the U.S. Congress. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration scientist James Hansen testified before 
Congress that he was almost certain that hot weather was part of a pattern of human-
induced climate change. But it was easy for people, including governmental 
policymakers, to retreat from such calls for action when temperatures returned to more 
normal ranges – and perhaps to feel that scientists had “cried wolf.” Subsequent evidence 
about longer term warming trends have not generated enough support to establish 
widespread programs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, either in highly industrialized 
or non-industrialized countries. The empirical evidence as manifested in charts such as 
the one in the figure below generally is not as convincing as people’s experience of 
seasonal weather. 
    
 The “Keeling curve,” showing rising carbon dioxide concentrations in 
 the atmosphere. 
 
 If the evidence itself seems indirect, the methodologies used to gather and 
interpret data on current conditions, and to model future climatic changes are highly 
techno-scientific, difficult to explain to nonscientists, and easy to criticize. The 
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“greenhouse effect” itself (which is in important ways not like a greenhouse) is not well 
understood. Ways to measure the concentration of greenhouse gases and even to 
determine air temperature involve complex instrumentation, estimation, and modeling 
(Norton and Suppe 2001). Models of climate are routinely criticized for not including 
important variables, lacking the basis for verification, and needing large-scale tuning 
factors (“flux correction”). Scientific uncertainties are debated and acknowledged by 
scientists. For nonscientists to swallow the climate change hypothesis requires a generous 
helping of faith. 
 No wonder, then, that there is still lively discussion at the first and second stases 
of the argument: what is happening and is this a problem? 
 The primacy of the scientific arguments cannot be ignored by those who frame 
climate change as a social problem – of economics, governance, human and nature 
relationships, or technology. These various social problems may exist, but if they are not 
manifested in resulting problems – such as “killer smog” or nuclear “accidents” – the fact 
that we construct them as problems is not in itself a reason to try to solve them, except, 
perhaps, theoretically or as part of our university humanities classes. 
 There is no straight-line process from scientifically accepted evidence to 
widespread change in policies and behaviors. The need for scientific evidence and 
hypotheses to enter the realms of economics, politics, and what Habermas has called the 
public sphere make it at least advantageous and probably necessary to analyze the debate 




 In this study I have examined scientific and other types of arguments together. 
The debate as a whole must take cognizance of all arguments that have found at least 
partial adherence. And no type of argument can be ignored. Because both the scientific 
construction of climate change and the relationship issues that are tied inextricably to 
climate change are essentially social in nature, both these kinds of arguments can be 
examined on a more-or-less equal footing. Instead of taking the scientific arguments as 
logically first or as more important in the debate – i.e., the prospect of climate change 
must be proven before we can talk about how to address the issue – arguments at all 
stases may be examined together. 
 In this endeavor, research that appears to be helpful often is not. In Chapter 2, I 
examined three subdisciplines that offer some insights into areas of the debate but that 
finally fail to address all arguments in a theoretical space in which the arguments stand 
on their own terms rather than being weighed on political, scientific, or environmental 
scales. The subdisciplines comprise social movement theory, sociology of science, and 
environmental sociology. 
 Social movement theory provides useful tools for analyses of some types of 
arguments. Research on political opportunity and mobilization structures focuses on 
political power and interested rational actors, and, thus, along with international relations 
theory, helps to identify these dimensions of arguments about global climate change. 
However, the implicit assumptions that politics is at the base of all the arguments and that 
rational choice (maximization of self-interest) is the most important element in a debate – 
or even in choosing to act – do not serve the analysis of the climate change debate well. 
Many arguments are explicitly not political, but instead concern identity and solidarity 
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(perhaps through shared interests, but likely through shared kinship, ethnicity, 
experiences, and other elements), economic and cultural activities, and so on.  
 Also within the social movement subdiscipline are cultural arguments about 
framings and identity construction; these are useful concepts and constructs (and will be 
discussed again later in this chapter), but they emphasize the individuals and groups who 
make up a social movement. Moreover, although environmental social movement groups 
exist, relatively few have climate change as their primary focus; for climate change, 
important groups other than environmentalists include scientists, businesses, other 
cultural organizations such as churches, and government policymakers at all levels (not 
just the nation-state level). Again, social movement theory addresses only part of the 
debate. 
 Sociology of science is another subdiscipline that, again, provides only partial 
insights into the climate change debate. The examination of how scientists make truth and 
build scientific consensus is an invaluable element in areas of the debate that are about or 
rest on scientific evidence. The most important result from research into the workings of 
science is that, although science is indeed a particular brand of truth-making, with its own 
rules-of-the-game, scientists have no very special claim to ultimate truths that must be 
accepted unquestioningly by nonscientists. This result from sociologists of science 
creates the level playing field within which all arguments, both scientific and 
nonscientific, can be examined together. However, the tools of the subdiscipline are used 
to deconstruct scientific claims more than to discern bases for agreement among scientists 
and other groups. Typically, scientific discourse is exposed as metaphorical, rhetorical, 
political, or narrative instead of objective and rational. However, “science persistently 
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refuses to collapse into politics … far from exposing science as just another ideological 
or marketing fraud, this understanding prompts us to protect and nurture ethical 
dispassion, acceptance of criticism, tolerance for dissent, and appeals to reason and 
evidence that are built and sustained by the norms and ideals of scientific communities” 
(Brown and Malone 2004:120). Scientific arguments have certain claims to truth that 
should be recognized, just as other arguments have other types of claims to other truths. 
 Environmental sociology would seem to have direct relevance to global climate 
change issues and the debate, but environmental sociologists have paid very little explicit 
attention to arguments made about global environmental changes. Instead, they focus on 
issues of the relationship between humans and nature. They make arguments but do not 
examine the debate. Those who identify themselves as environmental sociologists in the 
United States have tackled such issues as providing an alternative view to the classical 
sociological assumption that humans are superior to and can manage nature. European 
theorists such as Beck have adopted a critical theory stance, providing sharply detailed 
analyses of where modernity has gone wrong vis a vis the environment. Again, the 
questions of the right relationship with nature and the role of world inequalities 
(including colonialism) in damaging the environment are threads in the fabric of the 
debate, but by no means the whole debate. The climate change debate includes rhetors 
who believe that modern management of nature is necessary and desirable as well as 
those who believe that humans should get out of the nature-management business. Both 
views must be examined together, without judging which is better or which could “win.” 
 The difference in foci of these subdisciplines illustrates a difficulty in analyzing 
the debate. An assumption that, at bottom, the debate is really about one thing – about, 
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say, politically oriented rational action, OR about whose knowledge is legitimate, OR 
about the human-nature relationship – precludes an ability to see the debate whole, with 
its varying motivations, goals, and strategies. 
 Where to go from established subdisciplines? I turned to globalization theorists. 
Globalization issues in many respects parallel those of climate change; both include 
economic, political, and cultural dimensions of a world becoming both more the same 
and more different. Globalization theorists include topic areas that are, for many debaters 
about climate change, at the heart of the issue: inequality, development, the relationship 
of nations to one another and to the non-human environment. Global science and global 
environmental pollution and change are included in the purview of some globalization 
theorists as well. 
 The classification of both globalization and climate change theories and 
arguments into political, economic, and cultural emphases provides an initial mapping of 
the dimensions in the debate. Rhetors indeed argue from particular worldviews that 
reduce the issues to one dimension and then translate other messages into the language of 
that dimension. A good example is an economic argument that discusses cultural (i.e., 
non-priced) aspects of the climate change debate into economic terms, thus creating such 
problematic notions as a “willingness-to-pay” for protected environments and the 
“existence value” of, e.g., iconic locations (Mount Fuji, the Grand Canyon, etc.). 
Attempts to price the environment and to create, for example, water markets, have had 
only limited success. Indeed, it appears that many parks and wonders of the natural world 
are not very highly valued in monetary terms – although most people do indeed favor 
having parks and preserving natural beauties. 
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 If the comparison with globalization theory illuminates a principal aspect of both 
debates, it also neglects another principal element of the climate change debate – the role 
of science. Globalization theorists tend to black-box science as an enabler of 
globalization (in modern transport and communication, for instance) or as one part of a 
culture whose more interesting aspects are the arts, fashion, folklore commodification, 
museumification, and so on. 
 With social movement theory, sociology of science, environmental sociology, and 
globalization providing theoretical grounding, an empirical study provided the necessary 
complement, correction, and spur to better theoretical constructs. A direct examination of 
actual arguments made in the climate change debate may validate/undermine/extend one 
or more of the theories reviewed and provide new ways of thinking about this debate and 
perhaps about other debates. For example, if I could extend the categorization matrix of 
climate change theories developed in Chapter 4 and use framing analysis from social 
movement theory, I could perhaps show how arguments in one domain can be reframed 
around similarities in rhetorical elements – a complex effort but, if achievable, it would 
build theory and provide practical help to rhetors wishing to come to agreement. 
 The 100 documents examined for this study represent a wide range of the 
argument space in the climate change debate (although not, as noted in Chapter 3, a 
representation of the shares of each argument in that space). Using the objective 
classification scheme provided by classical and modern theorists of rhetoric/ 
argumentation provided a framework that is not anchored in a single dimension (political, 
economic, cultural, scientific) of the debate. Nor does a rhetorical analysis valorize or 
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denigrate scientific arguments vis a vis other types of arguments. Thus, arguments are 
seen as arguments, and the focus is kept on the wide debate space. 
 To conduct a comparative rhetorical analysis, I identified the coherent arguments 
themselves and four principal rhetorical features of each argument: the authority of the 
rhetor (as given by his or her professional standing and affiliation), the type(s) of 
evidence used to support the claims made, the worldview(s) expressed, and the action(s) 
proposed. Using this framework allowed both comparison of the arguments and 
clustering of them into “families” of coherent arguments, ranging from denials of the 
hypotheses that the climate is changing and that humans are contributing to the changes 
to impassioned advocacy for making immediate changes in human activities to mitigate 
effects on the world’s climate. 
 Families cohere not only around statements of the arguments but also in terms of 
sources of authority, types of evidence, and worldview – especially worldview. The 
comparative analysis shows that different worldviews are strongly associated with 
families. The families also exhibit some basic agreements and numerous affiliations 
across families. Basic agreements include the following: 
• All families take the question of climate change seriously, and none rules the 
prospect completely out. Even the skeptics treat the hypothesis as unproven rather 
than as false; they agree that there is evidence that atmospheric concentrations of 
carbon dioxide are rising, for example, although they dispute the meaning of the 
evidence. 
• All agree that vast uncertainties exist, although again the implications of 
uncertainties are disputed. Some claim that uncertainty is a reason to wait and see, 
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or to do further research and monitoring. Others view uncertainty as a reason to 
address the potential for climate change swiftly and effectively. 
• All agree that climate change involves issues of societal well-being and lifestyle. 
Increased greenhouse gas emissions are principally the products of 
industrialization and modern farming methods, and of rising demands for food 
and goods by an increasing global population. Proposals for reducing emissions of 
greenhouse gases and adapting to climate change impacts such as sea level rise 
raise issues of societal development, inequality, the relationship between humans 
and the rest of nature, and the credibility of science in providing evidence of a 
problem and pathways toward solutions. 
• All argue from definition, although some families also include cause-and-effect 
arguments. That is, the rhetorical basis of the arguments concerns the definition of 
the issue as a scientific or political one, whether or not the evidence can be 
defined as climate change, whether or not climate change can be defined as 
problematic, whether climate change is a technical problem solvable by new 
technology or a systemic problem solvable by a retreat from technology, and so 
on. 
• Also, families share a commitment to science. There are scientists in every 
family, and scientists are the most prominent rhetors in all families except three. 
• Similarly, at least some members of all families use scientific literature as 
evidence for their argumentative claims. The predominant types of evidence used 
by all families except #10 and #11 are data and scientific literature. 
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These basic agreements at least keep members of different families talking to one 
another, although they may not provide enough of a foundation to come to agreement. 
 The social network analysis also explored rhetorical elements in common across 
family lines – members of different families who have the same claims to authority or use 
the same kinds of evidence or hold the same worldview or advance the same proposals 
for action. 
 The social network analysis explored these cross-family links, positing that any of 
the rhetorical elements of their arguments constituted network ties among rhetors. If 
families hold strong ties in common, with few links across families, there would be little 
basis for thinking that the overall debate contained pathways for coming to agreement. 
That is, if all coherent arguments are closed off from other arguments, voices in the 
debate are simply talking to themselves without the possibility of building agreement.  
 I analyzed each element separately, then all together. The results showed a dense 
network of ties, with the strongest correlation between worldview and overall linkages. 
The bases for coming to agreement as demonstrated by network ties include the 
following: 
• Although the most common links are by worldview, these links are by no means 
purely identified with families. Even the rhetors in Families 1 and 2 (“No 
problem!” and “Climate change could be good for you”) span four different 
worldviews, and the rhetors in Families 4-9, who agree that “More modernization 
is the answer,” hold eight of the nine worldviews (all but the view that nature is 
robust and will survive anything humans could do). 
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• Similarly, links by worldview is a poor predictor of other links, which prove to be 
diverse. The nine members of one sub-network all espouse an economic 
worldview, but the group contains only five scientists, seven rhetors from NGOs, 
five arguments using data as evidence, and four proposals to develop new 
technologies. Another sub-network, whose eleven members hold the worldview 
that nature is socially constructed, are almost all scientists or academics and 
predominantly (seven members) at universities – but they differ in family 
membership (five families), type of evidence used (eight types), and actions 
proposed (18 different actions). People can hold a basic worldview in common 
and yet both disagree among themselves and agree with people who hold other 
worldviews about what argument to make, evidence to use, and actions to 
advocate. 
• Looking at the ties other than worldview also indicates potential bases for coming 
to agreement. For example, if rhetors can agree on one or more actions they wish 
to see taken, they may be able to put aside (or at least table) other differences 
among them. For example, the recommendation to develop new technologies to 
address climate change is made by 21 rhetors in eight of eleven families, spanning 
six of the nine worldviews. 
• Although rhetors tend to have close ties to other members of their families, they 
also frequently have multiple ties outside their families – to fellow members of a 
profession, employees of the same type of organization, a preference for certain 
types of evidence, a worldview, and/or proposed actions. Any of these ties can 
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link individuals and families, providing a basis for agreement on at least one 
aspect of the climate change issue. 
 
Potential Pathways to Agreement 
 If there are bases for agreement, why do people persist in disagreeing? With this 
question we come back to theories of how people debate, change, come to some level of 
agreement, act to change a situation, then debate again. In Chapter 4 we approached this 
theoretical discussion by examining Habermas’ ideas about the ideal speech act and the 
orientation of speakers toward coming to agreement. But Habermas is himself only one 
voice in a conversation about how people do this. 
 One non-Habermasian view of how people come to agreement is a co-evolution 
of modern functional systems, such as the political, economic, and scientific systems. 
Systems theory emphasizes difference and communication; “all information processing,” 
says Luhmann (1995[1984]:240), “’takes off’ not from identities (e.g., grounds) but from 
differences.” When social systems form themselves, they do so by differences from their 
environments, differences that have “operative significance, informational value, and 
connective value” (Luhmann 1995[1984]:474). However, the complexity of modern 
functional systems and subsystems means that any attempt at intervention, any 
management plan, becomes one impulse among many, with effects that may or may not 
be intended but which are impossible to foresee. In the area of human love, for instance, 
Luhmann emphasizes the improbability of effective communication, given the 
proliferation of modern functional systems (Luhmann 1986[1982]). This line of 
reasoning seems to lead to despair; but, as Weingart (1990) points out, the empirical 
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evidence demonstrates that systems do change and have changed in the direction of 
environmental awareness and protection. Therefore, the focus of social science research 
should be on “the learning mechanism that connects the different social systems, and on 
the rules of translation which allow communication to be transformed from one system to 
the other” (Weingart 1990:58). 
 Eschewing with both the elaborated descriptions and pessimism of systems 
theory, other social scientists, providing the empirical evidence that Weingart refers to, 
have documented and mapped a gradual shift in values over the past several decades, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. There are both historical and future-oriented explanations for this 
shift. The former posits a return from the detour of modernity to the pre-modern direct 
human-nature relationship of mutual dependence and human respect for the rights of 
other elements of nature to exist in a state of well-being. The future-oriented explanation 
is that expressed by Inglehart (1977, 1990): people, when they are advanced materially, 
develop “postmaterial values” that include environmental ethics (see also Steger et al. 
1989, Van Liere and Dunlap 1980). As the ethical shift (Thompson et al. 1998) proceeds, 
people will increasingly agree that the human species is grounded in its environment and 
that its environment must be accounted for. Having agreed on postmaterial values, people 
may then agree on actions to understand and live in harmony with the rest of nature. 
Cultural theorists (Thompson et al. 1990, Rayner 1995), who hypothesize the historical 
simultaneity of various views of nature, point to the “canaries” who raise the alarm about 
environmental issues and the increasing attention paid to these alarms by others. 
Thompson et al. (1998) explain the difference between “value shift” and “cultural theory” 
views in this way:  
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Instead of one homogeneous traditional blob, miraculously transformed into an 
equally homogeneous modern (or postmodern) blob, we need the idea that we 
always have been and always will be heterogeneous, with different social 
solidarities… The relative strengths of these solidarities will change over time, as 
will their patterns of interaction, and it is in these dynamic and structured 
contentions and transformations that we should seek to anchor our explanations. 
 Another view comes from political realists and neo-realists, who frame the issue 
of coming to agreement as a matter of competing interests among nation-states as rational 
actors. Thus, the desire of each nation for power relative to other states, coupled with a 
recognition of limits to power (transaction costs), will drive nations to agree about 
matters that tend toward their mutual benefit, such as protecting resources that are 
available to all – the global commons, including the oceans, atmosphere, and climate. Or 
nations may severally attempt to free-ride, i.e., not pay the costs of protecting 
environmental resources but enjoy the benefits of others doing so. In either case, nation-
states are the principal actors, and environmental agreements depend upon national-level 
leadership and actions.  
 Institutionalists among political theorists hold that new ways of dealing with the 
environment – new international institutions – will arise as evidence emerges that there 
are needs to address, such as pollution, overfishing, and other issues, including climate 
change. These institutions will provide the impetus to action and the persistence to 
eventually effect change. However, these “international regimes” must ultimately work 
through governments, and governments may successfully resist if they feel their interests 
are threatened (Haas et al. 1993). 
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 One of the best known concepts used to describe the process of institutional 
change that is not limited to states is epistemic communities. The term was first coined in 
the 1970s (see Antoniades 2003 for a history of the phrase) and came to prominence in 
the 1990s to describe an alternative approach to studying international policy, along with 
neo-realism, neo-liberalism, dependency theory, and post-structuralism. Haas (1992:3) 
defines an epistemic community as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise 
and competence in a particular domain or issue-area.” Such a network has (a) shared 
normative and principled beliefs, (b) shared causal beliefs, (c) shared notions of validity, 
and (d) a common policy enterprise. The epistemic community concept thus joins 
knowledge and power, both scientists and policymakers; it is typically international and 
includes people within and outside of governmental structures. 
 Economists do not have a specifically economic theory about coming to 
agreement outside of agreements to buy and sell. Writ large, however, this theory 
becomes a universalist assumption that people are primarily motivated to increase their 
own (economic and material) well-being. Economists thus often seem paired with neo-
realists in positing individual rational actors maximizing self-interests. These interests are 
focused on consumption of goods and services, and the well-being that results from 
consumption. Moreover, the utilitarian assumptions of most economic theory imply the 
greatest good for the greatest number as an invariant and universal goal. Earlier, this 
meant that the sum total of individual maximizing actions would produce societal well-
being. But because markets are not perfect and economists have proved that general well-
being could not result from the sum of self-interested actions (see Arrow 1972), 
management of the economy is seen to be necessary, although how this should be 
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accomplished is more a matter for experts, not for general coming-to-agreement. Coming 
to agreement is thus based on a demonstration that the costs of addressing climate change 
will be small, and well-being (or at least avoidance of damages) will be worth the costs. 
 Aside from these well-developed and –discussed theories, other views abound of 
how people may come to agreement in the contemporary world. Some examples follow: 
• Delanty (2001) studying new forms of violence, carefully distinguishes the 
activities involved in political protest (which he locates in civil society) and those 
involved in conflict resolution through talk/negotiation, located in cosmopolitan 
public spheres. It is the cosmopolitan public spheres that provide a forum for 
debate and coming to agreement.  
• Daly (2001), looking at the same situation but focusing on the economic 
dimension, distinguishes between globalization and internationalization, and 
strongly favors the latter. Globalization, he says, entails “national economic 
disintegration – parts are torn out of their national context (dis-integrated), in 
order to be re-integrated into the new whole, the globalized economy” (Daly 
2001:17). But it is the national-level players who protect the identities and well-
being of their citizens from the monolithic dictates of transnational corporations. 
That is to say, economic globalization silences the debate in the exclusive 
adoption of economic goals and rationales, whereas the disparate voices of 
nations keep the conversation/debate going.  
• Rayner (2003), discussing the range of voices in the decision process, concludes 
that most efforts to engage the public in decision-making about issues such as 
pollution of the environment result in just another layer of technocracy, as 
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governments and firms set the agenda and provide the list of possible solutions. 
He suggests a “discourse of mobilization” that “begins with social issues of 
identity and emergent solidarity rather than technocratic ideas of risk” (Rayner 
2003:7), although he provides few clues about how this might be accomplished. 
• Star and Griesemer (1989) develop the concept of “boundary objects” as a way of 
communicating between scientists and nonscientists. Boundary objects can 
contain both scientific definitions and specifications, and values for amateurs. For 
example, museum scientists placed conditions on specimens to be collected by 
amateurs who were acting from different motivations. Again the creation or 
development of a common communication space/object is important in a debate. 
• Cultural analysts of social movements track framings and how they are re-framed 
over time to represent concepts and arguments defined by members of social 
movements. 
 In the end, there are as many theories about how people come to agreement as 
there are about how society is structured and changes. This is because rhetorical language 
is a principal nonviolent medium through which people understand themselves as social 
beings, and negotiate their daily and longer term interactions. Language, used in 
argumentative debates, is the common mechanism for the processes described by 
theorists of all stripes. Systems theory emphasizes that human societies need not respond 
to the environment but may do so through communication. Weingart, building on 
Luhmann, recommends focusing on how translations and communication work. 
Explanations, say cultural theorists, depend upon interactions, contentions, and 
transformations – not only in words, but certainly in words (as well as in eating, 
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shopping, etc.). Political scientists discuss interests and power as they are manifested in 
the “talk” of nations – agreements, policies, conferences, negotiations, and so on. 
Economists emphasize consumption choices as the principal market force, rather than 
language. Social systems, postmaterial values, new institutions, epistemic communities, 
cosmopolitan public spheres, a discourse of mobilization, boundary objects, framings – 
all conceptualize spaces and mechanisms for communication, argumentation, and coming 
to agreement. 
 But the social world is not a mush of free-floating arguments, a postmodern sea of 
equal-meaning rhetorical statements. Neither is the social world rigidly and almost solely 
determined by the privileged knowledge of elite policymakers, corporate boards, and 
scientists. Some arguments persuade more than others; some logically unassailable 
arguments are never taken up by those who could act in response to them. That is to say, 
the social world cannot be predicted exclusively by structure, nor by functional 
relationships, nor by random movements. The ideal speech act, systems theory, epistemic 
communities, and other frameworks and tools fall short of providing full explanation, 
much less predictive capability. 
 What do individuals, groups and societies do when confronted with new types of 
problems? At one end of a spectrum of possible responses, they throw up their hands and 
refuse to deal with the situation. They deny, rationalize, or despair. At the other end of 
the spectrum, they set to work to convince others to reduce energy use, develop 
technologies that do not emit greenhouse gases, and develop binding international 
agreements – and to do all these things simultaneously and immediately. Between these 
“nothing” and “everything” responses, individuals and groups and societies debate 
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whether or not the climate is changing, what if anything humans contribute to that 
change, and what might be done to ensure human well-being by mitigating or adapting to 
climate change. 
 But in all these responses, individuals, groups, and societies attempt, first, to 
connect new problems with their experience and, second, to develop solidarities based on 
shared trust and knowledge. A principal medium of these attempts is language. In 
discourse, in arguments, they make connections based on shared understandings, attempt 
to co-create further shared understandings, and work toward increasing their audiences’ 
adherence to certain arguments. 
 Thus, the climate change issue has been fitted into many frames, as shown in the 
arguments and argument families. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971) call this 
association – that is, if a rhetor puts an argument into a frame acceptable to the audience, 
members of that audience will make sense of the argument in the way the rhetor wants 
them to. If, for example, the “Man versus Nature” argument makes sense to an audience, 
an interpretation made by a rhetor that climate change can be fitted to this frame will 
likely make sense to that audience. Economics, politics, culture, and science provide at 
least partial framings for arguments in the climate change debate space. But these 
framings are being continually reconstructed and re-imagined as new information enters 
the debate – new rhetors, new organizations, new evidence, new worldviews or new 
statements of worldviews, and new proposals. Debaters consciously react to other rhetors, 
moving closer to or farther away from agreement. Stable images, like the “big blue 
marble” or the greenhouse, may have multiple meanings, and users of those images select 
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meanings that they feel will increase the adherence of their audiences to the argument 
presented. 
 One of the central frameworks used in the climate change debate is that people 
can manage nature: extract resources, develop technologies, and exploit intangibles such 
as scenery and space. (The ability to manage nature can be also defined by its double: the 
ability to not manage nature.) Nature provides free and essentially inexhaustible gifts.15 
Scientists, technology developers, and others may make mistakes that result in 
undesirable outcomes (pollution, disease, etc.), but these can be corrected through better 
technologies and institutional arrangements. 
 Most of the proposals about climate change mitigation and adaptation rest on this 
underlying belief and, thus, it provides a widely shared basis for agreement. By a process 
of association, rhetors characterize climate change as the same class of problem as many 
success stories: the ban on DDT (and development of other pesticides), Superfund-type 
cleanups, the agreement to eliminate ozone-depleting substances, and so on. Similarly, 
associating climate change with another kind of success story, rhetors may invoke the 
history of energy technology development, citing the need to transform the energy system 
to one that is environmentally benign. First there was small-scale biomass burning, then 
coal, then oil, then nuclear fission (with solar and hydropower becoming more used as 
                                                 
15 Although a theoretical limit may be acknowledged, past successes at bypassing 
forecasted limits may lead to the conclusion that no one knows what the limits are but 
that they are surely beyond current predictions. 
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technologies improve). The next transition can be simply another transformation, but this 
time mindfully harmless to the environment. 
 The history and achievements of science and technology provide the basis for 
devising science-and-technology-based strategies to address climate change. But, by the 
same token, the existence of scientific disciplines and professional specialties ensures that 
there will be plenty of disagreement about what actions to take and the priorities of any 
set of actions. These can be couched as disagreements, differences in orientation, i.e., 
whether it is more important to get political and policy agreements in place, get the 
economic markets right, jump-start new technologies and promote technology transfer, or 
change people’s consumption expectations and habits. Or more specific disagreements 
emerge: nuclear versus renewable energy, energy conservation/efficiency versus big 
technology, mitigation versus adaptation. 
 Such arguments at the fifth stasis contain much common ground and many 
potential bases for agreement. Moreover, these arguments continue to be cognizant of 
arguments at the other stases – for example, acknowledgements of great uncertainties and 
advocacy of “no regrets” actions. The lively debate continues about global climate 
change, leading to the expertise and institutional capabilities that have resulted in an 
increasing orientation toward coming to agreement and an increase in links among 
rhetors that can provide bases for agreement. 
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APPENDIX 1: FIRST-STEP ANALYSES OF ARGUMENTS 
#1: Agarwal, Anil and Sunita Narain 1996. The atmospheric rights of all people on Earth: 
Why is it necessary to move towards the ‘ultimate objective’ of the Framework Convention 
on Climate Change? Centre for Science and the Environment, 
http://www.cseindia.org/html/cmp/cmp31.htm  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Agarwal and Narain are known for definitive statements of the developing country 
perspective on climate change (cf. Global Warming in an Unequal World) 
Secondary: the authority of CSE as a voice in the climate change issue, beginning before FCCC 




Type of argument     
Primary: The world is unequal; rich countries have caused global warming (“historical 
emissions”) and should pay the true costs of their consumption (“polluter pays”) and should set 




Type of evidence     
Primary: historical recounting of events in negotiations; first, ozone, which “remains a weak 
treaty, then WRI vs. “Global Warming in an unequal world”’ CSE’s role in climate issues 
Secondary: facts about total emissions vs. per capita emissions 
Tertiary: 
Notes: what the developed countries say, but what we say 
Worldview/view of 
nature 
    
Primary: Economic orientation: atmosphere a global public good; rich countries who damage it 
should pay for the damage. 
Secondary: World system is unequal; environmental agreements perpetuate inequality. 
Tertiary: 
Notes: 
Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “rights-based approach in regulating climate change; treating the atmosphere as a 
limited common resource to be managed under an equity regime based on per capita entitlements 
(freezing the per capita entitlements on the basis of a population distribution index for a chosen 
year)” 
Secondary: “Surplus entitlements with less polluting countries can give way to an international 
emission trading regime. An international tax can be levied on countries exceeding the limits 








#2: Benedick, Richard E. 2001. Striking a new deal on climate change. Issues in Science and 
Technology Fall 2001, 71-76. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Benedick was the principal US architect of the Montreal Protocol and the senior State 
Department official in population programs in the 1980s 




Type of argument     
Primary: Rational actors must negotiate doable policies 
Secondary: Good diplomacy results in agreements that can trump “spoilers” (the US, in this 
case) 
Tertiary: Montreal Protocol can be used as a comparative model  technology provides an 
irresistible incentive for developing countries to accept commitments 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Evaluation of policy/agreement options and likely outcomes 
Secondary: “Awards” for “diplomatic agility” (Japan, Australia, Canada), “flexibility” (EU), 
“suspense” (Russia), “outstanding consistency” (developing countries), and “politeness” (US) 
Tertiary: informal conversations with “well-placed officials” 
Notes: history of the Kyoto Protocol and Bonn COP 
Worldview/view of 
nature 
    
Primary: Humans can control the harms they do to the environment (e.g., Montreal Protocol) 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: US could renegotiate Kyoto Protocol commitments based on negotiations in Bonn; 
everything can be considered open for revision: base year, timetable, targets, sinks 
Secondary: US should abandon its unaccustomed outside role, if for no other reason than to 
improve its position for constructively influencing future climate negotiations 
Tertiary: (long-term) we develop a new generation of cost-effective technologies that 
dramatically reduce dependence on fossil fuels and/or that capture and sequester carbon (“start 
reducing emissions … invest in a technological revolution … adopt technology-based objectives 
… accelerate technology transfer and joint implementation”) and key developing nations curtail 






#3: Ausubel, Jesse H. 2001. Some ways to lessen worries about climate. The Electricity 
Journal (January-February), 24-33. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Ausubel is “director of the Program for the Human Environment at The Rockefeller 
University, New York. He was one of the main organizers of the first United Nations World 
Climate Conference, held in Geneva in 1979.” 
Secondary: 
Tertiary: 
Notes: “This article is adapted from the keynote address to the Business Roundtable’s National 
Summit on Technology and Climate Change,” August 31, 2000. 
Type of argument     
Primary: It is likely that human emissions of GHGs will change the climate but we do not know 
how and probably cannot know. “But gambling with the climate does not strike me as a good 
bet.” 
Secondary: “Societies are always trying to climate-proof themselves” (25) and many successful 
adaptations exist. 
Tertiary: Technological change is a continuing process that demonstrates our adaptability, 
potential to design offsets, and engage in prevention strategies such as the Zero-Emission Power 
Plant (ZEPP). 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Graphics showing technological cycles and improvements (recording media, RAM, 
transportation modes, and power plant size), with accompanying text 
Secondary: long lists of ways we adapt to climate, e.g., “from antifreeze, air conditioning, and 





    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “So, I say, let us prepare, just in case. Purchase some insurance. … Publish and private 
entities should research and invest in all three” forms of climate insurance: adaptation, offsets, 
and prevention (25).  
Secondary: “We should choose long-term solutions for emissions compatible with the evolution 
of the energy system. This means shift to methane, focus offsets on the carbon in methane, 
prepare the hydrogen economy, and anticipate the nuclear millennium that will follow our 






#4: Rayner, Steve and Elizabeth L. Malone 1998. Ten suggestions for policymakers. In 
Human Choice & Climate Change, Vol. 4: What Have We Learned? Battelle Press, 
Columbus, OH 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Steve Rayner, student of Mary Douglas, influential in institutional aspects of 
environmental, especially climatic, change 
Secondary: Elizabeth Malone, relatively unknown at the time of publication 
Tertiary: Human Choice & Climate Change has been widely cited in “soft science” journals and 
the IPCC 2001 assessment 
Notes 
 
Type of argument     




Type of evidence     






    
Primary: Social solidarity determines the view of nature; at least four different worldviews 
(hierarchy, egalitarian, market, fatalist) exist, each with a different worldview (nature is robust 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: See the problem in real-world context of (more important) development, other issues; 
act regionally and locally; design mitigation and adaptation strategies broadly; use a pluralistic 
approach (not just rational) to planning and decision-making; recognize institutional limits (just 








#5: Goulder, Lawrence H. and Brian M. Nadreau 2002. International approaches to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Pages 115-149 in Climate Change Policy: a Survey, 
Stephen H. Schneider, Armin Rosencranz and John O. Niles, eds. Island Press, Washington, 
DC. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Lawrence H. Goulder: Well-known in economics and international environmental 
policy at Stanford 
Secondary: Brian M Nadreau: Master’s student at Stanford 
Tertiary: Stephen H. Schneider, the 1st editor, has been an outspoken advocate of policy to 
combat climate change 
Notes: Island Press is a publishing venue for environmentalists 
 
Type of argument     
Primary: Analytic assessment of options, with advantages and criticisms (emissions trading 
systems and carbon taxes; project-based emissions reductions [JI and CDM] 
Secondary: Combining features to address criticisms (e.g., equity concerns) 
Tertiary:  
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Modeling results and resultant cost and abatement curves 
Secondary: Economic rational choice theory, benefits of trade 
Tertiary:  
Notes: Presumption that climate change should be addressed; begins with “the centerpiece for 
recent international policy discussions … the Kyoto Protocol” (115) 
Worldview/view of 
nature 
    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “Climate change is a global problem, and dealing successfully with this problem will 
require the efforts of many nations. Although some climate policies can be implemented 
unilaterally, international coordination of national efforts is crucial to addressing climate change 
in the most effective & equitable manner.” (115) 
Secondary: Engaging “less developed countries,” even without near-term abatement 
requirements, is important to having a global system for GHG reductions 
Tertiary: Flexibility is important to reduce costs and to change policies as efforts continue. 






#6: Jamieson, Dale 2001. Climate change and global environmental justice. Pages 287-307 in 
Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance, Clark A. 
Miller and Paul N. Edwards, eds. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Dale Jamieson is a professor at Carleton College, has published widely in 
environmental philosophy. 




Type of argument     
Primary: Analyzes competing definitions of global environmental justice “that lie at the heart of 
the North-South debate about climate change.” (289) 
Secondary: Philosophical (argument from cases) 
Tertiary: 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Narrative of policy debates with many names of organizations and individuals 
Secondary: Philosophical cases of common property rights (analogy to emissions rights) 
Tertiary: 
Notes: Starts with Rio Summit and the FCCC, then Berlin Mandate (1995), then Kyoto 
Worldview/view of 
nature 
    
Primary: Everyone has an equal right to common property resources, including air 
Secondary: Justice is primarily concerned with people 
Tertiary: 
Notes: 
Action(s) proposed     
Primary: distribute to every person “the same level of GHG emissions as every other person” in 
some index year (1990 or another) 
Secondary: Industrialized countries should pay much of the cost of poorer countries’ adaptation. 
Tertiary: “the post-Kyoto process must find ways of addressing contentious normative issues, 
including those bound in with scientific representations of nature, if we are going to be able to 
mobilize support among diverse and far-flung publics for the kinds of social and economic 






#7: Meyerson, Frederick A.B. 2002. Population and climate change policy. Pages 251-274 in 
Climate Change Policy: a Survey, Stephen H. Schneider, Armin Rosencranz and John O. 
Niles, eds. Island Press, Washington, DC. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Frederick A.B. Meyerson is described as “ PhD ecologist, demographer and former 
attorney.” 
Secondary: Stephen H. Schneider, the 1st editor, has been an outspoken advocate of policy to 




Type of argument     
Primary: More people, more consumption, more “anthropogenic dominance of the biological 
assets of the planet” also “also decreased the ability of the global ecosystem to absorb and store 
carbon by … ecosystem simplification” (253) of complex natural systems to agriculture 
Secondary: “two demographic factors – the initial per capita inequity established by the Kyoto 
Protocol and the greatly different population growth trajectories of the Annex B countries – put 
additional strain on an already problematic and politically besieged international environmental 
agreement.” (261) 
Tertiary: “Although there is an international consensus that improving reproductive health and 
family planning has positive economic, social, and environmental effects, a few fundamentalist 
countries, along with the Vatican, have been able to slow down progress toward many of the 
Cairo goals” (258) – a few in the US “have been able to block or weaken population-related 
legislation” (258) 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Correlation between pop growth and emissions growth assumed to be causal 
Secondary: Model projections of both population and emissions (CDIAC and UN demographic 
projections) 
Tertiary: 
Notes: begins with pop/consumption/emissions growth (1900-) , projected effects on pop, then 
backs up to 1800 
Worldview/view of 
nature 
    





Action(s) proposed     









#8: Meadows, Donella H. 1997. “Mother Gaia reflects on the global climate conference.” 
http://csf.colorado.edu/forums/ecofem/dec97/0009.html  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    





Type of argument     
Primary: “I may have made a mistake when I evolved that two-legged, large-brained life-form. 
… Deciding the composition of the atmosphere by counting up money ‘costs’ makes as much 
sense as deciding whether a plane will fly by the position of a football on a field. Wrong measure. 




Type of evidence     






    
Primary: Nature is much larger and still in charge. Humans are arrogant if they think they can try 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “If they don’t figure that out, I’m going to have to take a few million years and try to 
evolve a higher form of intelligence.” 
Secondary: “Maybe that won’t be necessary, though. … The big-brains do have the capacity to 
see beyond power and money, see into the future, understand the fundamentals of my laws, 
distinguish between symbols and reality. Some of them know how many kinds of energy they can 
harness that don’t put carbon back into the atmosphere. …But they’d better hurry. … I hope they 







#9: Martens, W.J.M., J. Rotmans and L.W. Niessen 1994. Climate Change and Malaria Risk: 
An Integrated Modelling Approach. GLOBO Report Series no. 3, Rijksinstituut voor 
Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygiene, Bilthoven, The Netherlands. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    





Type of argument     
Primary: Malaria is an important disease whose risk may rise because of increased temperature’s 
effect on disease vectors. 
Secondary: “The process leading to the impact of a human-induced climate change on malaria 
incidence can be represented by a sequence of indicators representing the cause-effect chain.” 
(17)  increased temp  increase in vectorial capacity  increase in disease burden of malaria 




Type of evidence     
Primary: Integrated Assessment Model design (with algorithms) and results 
Secondary: Information about malaria and its vectors 
Tertiary: Schematic diagram of the effect of “human-induced climate change” on “vector-borne 
disease incidence” (3) 




    
Primary: Nature includes humans in the disease cycle; humans affect climate, climate affects 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Modeling “is feasible and can provide valuable insights into the interdependencies 
among climate change, vector population dynamics and human disease dynamics” but additional 
research is needed on biological, ecological and socio-economic factors. 
Secondary: “During all or part of the various simulation runs, there is a failure to meet targets for 
sustainability, defined in terms of temperature and human health. Given insufficient resources to 
deal with malaria adequately in the most affected regions, the anticipated risk of climate change 







#10: USEA/USAID Handbook of Climate Change Mitigation Options for Developing Country 
Utilities and Regulatory Agencies 1999. Energy Resources International, Inc., Washington, 
DC. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Both the US Energy Agency and US Agency for International Development are hands-





Type of argument     
Primary: “Since the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was 
signed in 1992, there has been a growing concern about the potential climate change implications 
of power sector activities, even those classified as ‘best practices’. … Information on more than 
70 climate change action areas is provided in the Handbook for developing country utilities and 
regulatory agencies to avoid, offset or reduce the impact of GHG emissions.” (ES-1) 
Secondary: 
Tertiary: 
Notes: Assumption is that providing information leads unproblematically to desired actions. 
Type of evidence     
Primary: “For each action area, available information on the characteristics, climate change 






    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Adoption of “best practices” that have climate change benefits will mitigate climate 
change. 
Secondary: Information on beneficial regulation, along with contacts and funding sources, will 







#11: Ahmed, Qazi Kholiquzzaman and Ahsan Uddin Ahmed 2000. Social Sustainability, 
indicators and climate change. In Climate change and its Linkages with Development, Equity 
and Sustainability: Proceedings of the IPCC Expert Meeting held in Columbo, Sri Lanka, 27-
29 April 1999. World Bank, Washington, DC. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: The two authors are from the Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad. 
Secondary: Sponsorship of the meeting came from several major climate change-involved 




Type of argument     
Primary: Because climate impacts carry costs and developing countries will be most affected, 
climate change will exacerbate inequality, motivate migration, begin ‘a new vicious circle of 
socioeconomic vulnerability” (99), and destabilize social relations. 
Secondary: “Under conditions of climate change, social sustainability is a reflection of the 
society’s ability to reduce social vulnerability caused by the induced changes. … If a society is 
well prepared in terms of human, physical (infrastructural), and financial capacities; well 
positioned in terms of general awareness and institutional capabilities; and possesses a high 




Type of evidence     




Notes: begins with human dependence on natural systems and threats of “climatic disasters” 
Worldview/view of 
nature 
    
Primary: “Human lives and economic progress are both dependent on natural systems – as sinks 
for carbon dioxide and sources of oxygen, and as the ultimate natural base of the economic 
activity.” (95) 
Secondary: “With the assault on the nature perpetrated largely by the now developed countries 
while increasing their wealth, and more recently by the developing countries seeking to improve 
their economic conditions, the climatic balance has been seriously destabilized.” (95) 
Tertiary: 
Notes: 
Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “Overriding focus” on “empowerment of the people for participating in economic, 
social and political processes in an effective manner, for which ethics and morality must underpin 
the behavior of the people, particularly those who are in decision-making, program 
implementation, and leadership positions.” (102) also social equity must be a “guiding principle.” 
Secondary: Improve human capital, democratic governance, employment and opportunities, 
access to resources and social services; reduce poverty and population growth; improve health 
care; build environmental capacity 
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Tertiary: Protect flood-vulnerable areas; provide irrigation; produce better seeds; alter crop 
calendar; prepare to cope with emergencies & disasters; manage land use; create social 






#12: Gore, Al 1992. Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit. Houghton Mifflin, 
New York. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: At the time of writing, Gore was a US Senator; he became Vice President and was the 





Type of argument     
Primary: Humans are, by thinking of the earth as a storehouse of resources they have only to tap, 
are destroying the ecological balance; “the entire relationship between humankind and the earth 
has been transformed because our civilization is suddenly capable of affecting the entire global 
environment, not just a particular area.” (29-30) 
Secondary: Most scientists believe that humans are increasing the greenhouse effect; although 
there are uncertainties, the conservative approach would be to limit emissions. 
Tertiary: 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Personal story – first, education by Roger Revell and Mauna Loa data; second, 
increasing involvement in hazardous waste and nuclear issues 
Secondary: Metaphors, folk sayings,  and anecdotes (frog in hot water v. gradually warmed 
water, perspective from space looking at Earth, Yogi Berra sayings, borrowing on credit) 
Tertiary: Examples: burning in the Amazon, drying up of Aral Sea, ozone hole, thinning ice cap, 
historical examples of climate anomalies caused by, e.g., volcanic eruptions (1816) and 




    
Primary: “The ecological perspective begins with a view of the whole, an understanding of how 
the various parts of nature interact in patterns that tend toward balance and persist over time. But 
this perspective cannot treat the earth as something separate from human civilization; we are part 
of the whole too, and looking at it ultimately means also looking at ourselves.” (2) 
Secondary: Humans are a natural force, one that threatens to push Earth out of balance 
Tertiary: 
Notes: 
Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “For civilization as a whole, the faith that is so essential to restore the balance now 
missing in our relationship to the earth is the faith that we do have a future.” (368) – ethical 
choice “to pay attention, resist distraction, be honest with one another and accept responsibility 
for what we do” (368) – and begin without delay. 







#13: Edwards, Paul 1996. Models in the policy arena. In Elements of Change, Session 2: 
Characterizing and Communicating Scientific Uncertainty, Susan Joy Hassol and John 
Katzenberger (eds). Aspen Global Change Institute, Aspen, CO. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    





Type of argument     
Primary: “Climate change would not exist as a political issue without models” (159), but 
“Models don’t and probably won’t ever control policy choices because there are other policy 
constraints that are too powerful” (159) 
Secondary: “One role of models for climate science has been to build an increasingly large 
community around the climate change issue in which many groups and elements have come to 
play a role.” (159) 
Tertiary: 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: History of models-for-policy: Club of Rome, Systems Dynamics Group at MIT, 






    
Primary: Because models have important limitations, they have large uncertainties that are 
unlikely to be eliminated, i.e., that cannot represent the climate although the new scientific 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Models should play a heuristic role in policymaking, e.g., “for retrospective policy 
evaluation, helping to determine if a policy worked by comparing what actually happened to 








#14: Rosenzweig, Cynthia and Daniel Hillel 1995. Potential impacts of climate change on 
agriculture and food supply. Consequences: The Nature & Implications of Environmental 
Change 1(2), 22-32. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Rosenzweig is one of the authoritative researchers  on this topic. 




Type of argument     
Primary: “Computer models and other studies confirm that agriculture may not be much 
perturbed by a temperature increase of 1.5 degrees C (the lower limit of the IPCC projections for 
the mid-21st century), but may be severely affected by an increase of 4.5 degrees.” (22) 
Secondary: Possible benefits include enhanced CO2 assimilation, longer growing seasons, and 
increased precipitation. Possible drawbacks include more frequent and severe droughts, heat 
stress, faster growth/shorter growing periods and lifecycle, increased pests and erosion, decreased 
soil fertility, and flooding and salinization from sea level rise. 
Tertiary: “the ability of any country to take advantage of the opportunities and to avoid the 
drawbacks as climate changes will depend on the availability of adequate resources as well as on 
the quality of the research base.” (28) 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: model-based results showing projected impacts of climate change on crops 





    
Primary: Humans are affecting the balance of nature, but can correct their actions through 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Immediate action to prepare for global warming is needed. 
Secondary: Instead of “setting arbitrary levels for atmospheric trace gas concentrations, 
emissions rates, or temperatures to serve as upper limits of acceptability for policy response” is 
misleading; better to assume the “global warming and its manifestations will be in some manner 
proportionate to the increase of trace gas concentrations and that the eventual consequences of 
any significant human alteration of the Earth’s energy balance is potentially serious.” (31)  
Tertiary: A “blind faith in agriculture as a self-correcting process” is also misleading; “In all 
areas of the world the necessary adjustments (such as substituting crops, introducing or 
intensifying irrigation, and modifying field operations such as tillage or pest control) may be too 
costly for many farmers to implement.” (31-32) 
Notes: Not identified as a recommendation, but “The presently inadequate capacity of 
agricultural research systems in the tropics and semi-tropics will need to be rectified, and this task 




#15: Edmonds, Jae and Michael J. Scott et al. 1999. International Emissions Trading and 
Global Climate Change. Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Washington, DC. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Jae Edmonds was one of the first modelers of emissions and energy related to global 
climate change and an early integrated assessment modeler. 




Type of argument     
Primary: Because emissions mitigation addresses a century-scale problem, costs must be low if 
action is to be undertaken (i.e., there is no immediate benefit resulting from costs). 




Type of evidence     
Primary: discussion of the principles of trade 





    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Allow emissions trading in any scheme to reduce emissions. 
Secondary: “Programs must be carefully designed to assure that the potential gains from trade 
are realized.” (iv) Actual costs likely to be lower because “models do not include the various 
measurement, verification, trading, and enforcement costs that would characterize any real 







#16: Greenwald, Judith, Brandon Roberts and Andrew D. Reomer 2001. Community 
Adjustment to Climate Change Policy. Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Washington, 
DC. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: 




Type of argument     
Primary: Just as “the federal government has taken an active role in assisting communities 
facing economic loss” from global competition, defense downsizing, and recession, so too it 
should assist “communities that may face substantial economic loss due to climate change 
policies … those with high reliance of jobs in energy-producing industries (e.g., coal mining in 
West Virginia, oil and gas production in Louisiana); energy-intensive industries (e.g., steel 
manufacturing in Pennsylvania); and industries that make energy-consuming products (e.g., auto 
manufacturing in Michigan).” (1-2) 
Secondary: Ability of communities to adjust to economic dislocation is a function of four 
factors: (1) strength and diversity of the economy, (2) nature of economic assets, (3) ability of 
community members to manage adjustment, and (4) effectiveness of economic development 
institutions in strategic planning and implementation. 
Tertiary: 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: “review of 26 community-based adjustment programs from around the nation and the 
world” (3) – examples, cases 











Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “Designate and fund the Economic Development Administration (E.D.A.) of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce to design and implement an economic adjustment program for 
communities.” (ii) 
Secondary: “Identify and assist communities that are particularly dependent on energy-producing 
and energy-intensive sectors before dislocations occur.” (ii) 
Tertiary: “Leverage and integrate additional resources by involving multiple federal agencies 
and state and local governments through federal and regional task forces.” (ii) 
Notes: Additional action proposed – “Be flexible in addressing community needs by supporting 
locally determined, comprehensive strategies for five to seven years after the implementation of 




#17: “Response Strategies: Building Resilience in Systems” 2002. Chapter V in California 
Regional Assessment Report for the U.S. Global Change Research Program. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: This is one regional report, mandated by Congress to assess the potential impacts in the 
US of climate change and the potential to address climate change – it was widely criticized as 
alarmist and not good science 





Type of argument     
Primary: “The goal of California decision-makers and stakeholders should therefore be to craft 
investment and policy strategies to maintain ecosystem health, productive capacity, and quality of 




Type of evidence     
Primary: Quotations from business leaders and strategists, researchers, one journalist from WSJ 
Secondary: Model programs, such as NOAA NWS Heat Index Program, Village Homes (Davis, 










Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Stress “multiple benefits” and “no regrets” strategies: energy efficiency, waste 
reduction, providing better cost signals to consumers re resources, floodplain management, public 
education. 
Secondary: For ecosystems, limit the footprint of development, restore degraded habitats, 
manage water and pollution for minimal impact, limit bio-invasions, “take the long view.” Build 
resilience in the urban infrastructure in “livable” neighborhoods. Manage stormwater runoff to let 
water percolate into the soil. Build “green.” Plan coastal land use and for fire 







#18: Glantz, Michael H. 2001. Editorial: Global warming yea-sayers & naysayers: time to 
bridge the gap? Network Newsletter, Climate-Related Impacts International Network 
(NCAR and NOAA). 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Glantz is a well-known social scientist in the Environmental & Societal Impacts Group 





Type of argument     
Primary: “There are, however, solid facts that all can (or should) agree on: seventeen of the 
eighteen warmest years in the twentieth century occurred since 1980. The atmosphere has 
warmed. The amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased during the twentieth 
century. Glaciers worldwide are noticeably retreating. And the scariest of all, large chunks of the 
Antarctic’s ice mass have broken away.” 
Secondary: “To stand by and do nothing just for the sake of undoing the policies of a former 
president would be folly.” 
Tertiary:  
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: “Clearly, an increasing number of scientists have been joining the ranks of those 
concerned about the likelihood of human interference in the natural processes that produce the 
earth’s climate (i.e., the yea-sayers).” 
Secondary: “even though we do not think that our house will be struck by lightning, we all buy 
insurance against that likelihood. We just don’t want to take the chance. We buy the insurance 
and hope it never happens. Thus, policies to deal with global warming, regardless of the human 





    
Primary: “I myself am not sure how a global warming, natural of human-induced, will play out 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “The Bush administration has the opportunity to take a fresh look at the global 
warming issue by holding its own ‘global warming court’ that brings together the yea-sayers, the 
naysayers, and those ‘in between’ in order to decide on appropriate tactical and strategic 
responses to this potential global threat.” 
Secondary: “There are enough pieces of the climate change puzzle on the table to prompt 
rational people (including incoming policy makers) to ponder the issue more carefully and with 
less hype, fanfare, and acrimony toward those with opposing views. This is not a call for more 





#19: Darwin, Roy, Marinow Tsigas, Janm Lewandrowski and Anton Raneses 1996. Land 
use and cover in ecological economics. Ecological Economics 17, 157-181. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    





Type of argument     
Primary: Land use/cover is a “integrating concept”: (1) “the main resource governing primary 
productivity can be defined in terms of land” (157); (2) “land remains the primary source of the 
energy and mass that compose our food and fiber” (158); (3) “the most important interaction 
between humans and other biological communities is the competition for land.” (158) 
Secondary: 
Tertiary: 
Notes: “A basic premise of ecological economics is that the world economy is embedded in and 
dependent upon Earth’s ecosystem. This dependency is captured by the concept of ‘throughput’ 
(Boulding, 1966) or ‘entropic flow’ (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971) – the one-way flow of energy and 
mass through an economy that begins with resources and ends with waste.” (157) 
Type of evidence     
Primary: “We present a model that integrates economic-ecological activities with land use and 
cover.” (157) – the Future Agricultural Resources Model (FARM), developed at USDA “to 
evaluate impacts of global climate change on the world’s agricultural system” (158), which 
includes a GIS and a CGE economic model (description 159-171) 
Secondary: 
Tertiary: 
Notes: full-page flowchart of the model, 3 tables and a map re land class endowments 
Worldview/view of 
nature 
    
Primary: “interactions between economic and ecological phenomena are complex” (180) – 
“Whether the correlation with a particular economic variable [and forest depletion in Southeast 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “Results from our scenarios [of global climate change, population growth, and 
deregulation of agricultural trade] indicate that such changes are likely to have adverse effects on 
the health and integrity of tropical forest ecosystems.” (180) 
Secondary: “Improved throughput analyses require better tracking of resource stocks (soil, 
water, forests, fossil fuels, etc.) coupled with waste emission coefficients for various economic 
sectors. Methods for simulating inter- and intraregional labor migration, investment in human and 





#20: Athanasiou, Tom 2003 (March). Two futures, and a choice. Progressive Response. 
http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2003/0303choice.html  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) is a “Think Tank Without Walls,” an international 
network of analysts and activists dedicated to “making the U.S. a more responsible global leader 
and partner by advancing citizen movements and agendas.” It is a joint project of the 
Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. 
Secondary: The author (toma@ecoequity.org) is co-author of Dead Heat: Global Justic and 
Global Warming. 
Tertiary: 
Notes: Other articles in the same issue include “Women, HIV, and the global gag rule: the dis-
integration of U.S. global AIRS funding” and “The Mexican farmers’ movement: exposing the 
myths of free trade.” 
 
Type of argument     
Primary: Invading Iraq and refusing to act aggressively to prevent catastrophic climate change 




Type of evidence     
Primary: the Cheney Report of May 2001, which predicts oil imports to rise by more than 60% 
by 2020 
Secondary: DOE’s Clean Futures study, which shows that U.S. oil consumption can remain near 
2000 levels through 2020 “without harming the economy,” and the Tellus Institute report “The 
American Way to the Kyoto Protocol,” which projects “even greater reductions in both energy 





    
Primary: “The climatic future, for is part, is still open, but it’s closing in significant ways” – “Let 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “policies and technologies available today can put us on a new path – a path to both a 








#21: Ribot, Jesse C. 1996. Introduction: climate variability, climate change and 
vulnerability: moving forward by looking back. In Climate Variability, Climate Change and 
Social Vulnerability in the Semi-arid Tropics, Jesse C. Ribot, Antonio Rocha Magalhães and 
Stahis S. Panagides (eds). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    






Type of argument     
Primary: Social vulnerability is not a direct effect of climate impacts, which “attributes to nature 
causality that can be directly and more productively traced to social organization.” (2) – “the risk 





Type of evidence     
Primary: case studies (the chapters of the book) 





    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “Understanding vulnerability [through its historical antecedents] should thus be used to 
produce more durable and earlier, proactive responses.” (8) 
Secondary: Focus on enfranchisement and empowerment to increase material resources with 
which to buffer against contingencies, including climate variability/change. 
Tertiary: Understand the interdependence of households, rural communities, and the state in 






#22: Calder, Nigel 1999. The carbon dioxide thermometer and the cause of global warming. 
Energy & Environment 10(1), 1-18. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 






Type of argument     
Primary: “Natural agents of climate change, and especially the cosmic rays, control the 
concentration of carbon dioxide in the Earth’s atmosphere. Man-made emissions of carbon 
dioxide have no perceptible effect.” 
Secondary: “The increases in carbon dioxide in the air from year to year are a result, not a cause, 
of climate change.” 
Tertiary: 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: “By calibrating the natural carbon dioxide thermometer to global temperature 
deviations, a carbon dioxide history in inferred, which intersects ice-core data showing elevated 
carbon dioxide concentrations before the 20th Century. The variable year-by-year increments of 
carbon dioxide can also be accounted for, without reference to temperature, by the combined 
effects of cosmic rays, El Nino and volcanoes. The most durable effect is due to cosmic rays.” 
Secondary: “The aa index of the solar wind, used as a long-term proxy for the cosmic rays, gives 





    




Action(s) proposed     








#23: Idso, C.D. and K.E. Idso 2002. Carbon dioxide and global warming: where we stand on 
the issue. Available at http://www.co2science.org/about/position/globalwarming.htm  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: This is a position paper for the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global 
Change, which, according to its mission statement “attempts to separate reality from rhetoric in 






Type of argument     
Primary: CO2 concentrations have risen, attributable to human use of fossil fuels; but there is 
only a weak correlation between this and the slight warming of the Earth over the past century, 
not causal link.  
Secondary: Negative feedbacks, which are “not adequately represented in state-of-the-art climate 
models,” can counter any increased CO2 greenhouse effect. 
Tertiary: “Growth-enhancing effects of CO2 create an impetus for cooling.” And they are “a 
boon to the biosphere.” 
Notes: Another argument: “There is no evidence for warming-induced increases in extreme 
weather.” – although costs of damages have risen. 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Over the past half-million years, no causal relationship can be shown. During the 
“seven greatest temperature transitions…we note that increases and decreases in atmospheric 
CO2 concentration not only did not precede the changes in air temperature, they followed them, 
and by hundreds to thousands of years! There were also long periods of time when atmospheric 
CO2 remained unchanged, while air temperature dropped, as well as times when the air’s CO2 
content dropped, while air temperature remained unchanged or actually rose.” 
Secondary: “the warming predicted to result from a doubling of the air’s CO2 content may be 
totally countered by (1) a mere 1% increase in the reflectivity of the planet, or (2) a 10% increase 
in the amount of the world’s low-level clouds, or (3) a 15 to 20% reduction in the mean droplet 
radius of earth’s boundary layer clouds, or (4) a 20 to 25% increase in cloud liquid water 
content.” 








Notes: “References to the voluminous scientific literature that supports the many factual 
statements of this position paper may be found on our website, which we update weekly.” 
Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “Our policy prescription relative to anthropogenic CO2 emissions is thus to leave well 










#24: Hoffert, Martin I., Ken Caldeira, Gregory Benford, David R. Criswell, Christopher 
Green, Howard Herzog, Atul K. Jain, Haroon S. Kheshgi, Klaus S. Lackner, John S. Lewis, 
H. Douglas Lightfoot, Wallace Manheimer, John C. Mankins, Michael E. Mauel, L. John 
Perkins, Michael E. Schlesinger, Tyler Volk and Tom M.L. Wigley 2002. Advanced 
technology paths to global climate stability: energy for a greenhouse planet. Science 298(1 
November), 981-987. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: A fairly large, interdisciplinary group of scientists 




Type of argument     
Primary: “Arguably, the most effective way to reduce CO2 emissions with economic growth and 
equity is to develop revolutionary changes in the technology of energy production, distribution, 
storage, and conversion.” (981) 
Secondary: The gap between energy that will be needed and the capacity of current technologies 
is larger than realized (including by the IPCC).  
Tertiary: 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: theoretical efficiency limits of current technologies, decarbonization, and 
sequestration; potential for renewables (including undemonstrated technologies), fission and 
fusion 
Secondary: data on population growth, energy-related emissions, and stabilization levels 
Tertiary: 




    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “Stabilizing climate is not easy. At the very least, it requires political will, targeted 
research and development, and international cooperation.” (986) 
Secondary: “Most of all, [climate stabilization] requires the recognition that, although regulation 
can play a role, the fossil fuel greenhouse effect is an energy problem that cannot be simply 







#25: Berger, John J. 2000. Beating the Heat: Why and How We Must Combat Global 
Warming. Berkeley Hills Books, Berkeley, California. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Berger is “an independent energy and environmental consultant.” He holds a PhD in 
ecology from UCDavis and has authored seven books on climate, nuclear and renewable energy, 
environmental restoration, and forestry. 










Type of evidence     
Primary: Ch. 1 (12-25) is an imaginative look at 2100; “you” travel in a personal transport 
device and survey the worldwide changes that have come from warming, SLR, wetlands loss, 
water siltation and pollution, and increased disease; Ch. 3 (41-57) depicts a U.S. Cabinet meeting 
in 2012, when no actions have been taken and now costs are much higher 
Secondary: Ch. 2 explains the greenhouse effect and increases in CO2 concentrations in the past 
century; Ch. 5 describes renewable energy sources and their potential. 





    
Primary: “If you are not sure why we should care if a few more species go extinct, remember 
that nature is an interconnected fabric. Poke enough holes in it, tear it, yank on it hard enough, 
and it will rip. Once in ruins, it is very difficult and costly to mend, and the services it was 
unobtrusively providing are suddenly in jeopardy or gone.” (10) 
Secondary: “If we destroy nature, we eventually destroy ourselves.” (11) 
Tertiary: 
Notes: 
Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Individual actions to reduce energy use, from buying a fuel-efficient car to eating 
locally grown food and less meat to buying from green companies and becoming politically 
active on this issue (17 in all). 
Secondary: Recommended government policies range from removing subsidies to fossil fuel and 
nuclear industries to providing incentives for renewables (firms and individuals) to reducing 
methane and nitrous oxide emissions from agriculture to participating in international emissions 







#26: Kawashima, Yasuko 2000. Nuclear power and climate change: the current situation in 
Japan and a message to the United States. Resources for the Future, 
http://www.weathervane.rff.org/pop/pop9/kwashima.html  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    





Type of argument     
Primary: Japan is committed to reduce emissions, but lately support has shifted from expansion 
of nuclear power to renewable sources and “a shift towards less energy-consuming lifestyles.”  
Secondary: The U.S. “has already achieved more progress than Japan in the use of soft energy 
such as wind power, but this advantageous position has not been expanded much recently. … On 




Type of evidence     






    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “I hope experts in the United States will come up with a recommendation for a win-win 








#27: Toman, Michael A. n.d. Climate Change Economics and Policies: An Overview. 
Retrieved from Resources for the Future website (www.rff.org) 03/12/03. (Last date in 
reference list is 2000.) 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Toman has written widely about economics and climate policy for the think tank 





Type of argument     




Type of evidence     
Primary: Economic theory as embodied in climate policies. 
Secondary: 
Tertiary: 
Notes: cites “dangerous” quote of UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol 
Worldview/view of 
nature 





Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “basic points for evaluating climate change risks and response costs:” (1) “Think 
comprehensively about risks.” (2) “Address adaptation.” (3) “Consider the long term.” (4) “Make 
the focus international.” (5) “Keep in mind distributional issues.” (6) “Estimate costs 
comprehensively and realistically.” 
Secondary: “what constitutes effective and efficient climate policies:” (1) “Incorporate economic 
incentives into emissions-reduction policy.” (2) “Provide opportunities for emissions reductions 
wherever possible.” (3) “Allow flexibility in the timing of cumulative emissions reductions to 
reduce overall costs.” (4) “Encourage the development of the climate change knowledge base and 







#28: Inovest Strategic Value Advisors 2002. COE Briefing from Climate Change and the 
Financial Services Industry. United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiatives, 
http://www.unepfi.net  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 






Type of argument     
Primary: “even small changes (<10%) in even severity can generate multiple increases in 
damage”; however, threats and opportunities exist in every financial sector. 
Secondary: “Market solutions will play a pivotal role in tackling climate change whatever the 
international policy framework. Financial institutions will therefore have a key role to play” in 
making an efficient market system and efficient emissions trading system; and providing 
products/services “that contribute towards adaptation and mitigation efforts,” “manage their own 
property risks,” “pursue environmental management leadership,” and “engage with stakeholders 
to work towards solutions.” 
Tertiary: “Strong government leadership on adaptation and mitigation measures is a prerequisite 
for market-based solutions in order to provide the financial services industry with the necessary 
regulatory architecture.” 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: review of attitudes towards climate change in insurance/reinsurance, banking, asset 
management, project finance, emissions trading, and professional services (mostly unaware 
and/or unprepared, little experience) 
Secondary: Graph on carbon finance at the project level (from the World Bank); graph on 
evolution of carbon as a driver of financial value (government role) (from Inovest) 
Tertiary: 
Notes: cites IPCC conclusions 
Worldview/view of 
nature 
    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Long list of recommendations, from raising awareness and leading by example to 
adapting products; clarifying threats, opportunities and risk; developing tools and products; 
structure current markets in clean technologies, carbon credits, etc.; and develop harmonized 
GHG accounting methods. 
Secondary: Policymakers should establish a long-term policy framework, involve financial 
institutions, and establish emissions trading systems. Governments should sponsor research, 
encourage renewables, and provide support for less developed countries. 
Tertiary: The UNEP Finance Initiatives should sponsor three multidisciplinary task forces to 
raise awareness, developing a quantitative methodology that will capture the implications of 




#29: Preparing for a Changing Climate: The Potential Consequences of Climate Variability 
and Change. Mid-Atlantic Overview. 2000. Mid-Atlantic Regional Assessment Team. 
Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    






Type of argument     
Primary: “Results show that benefits are fewer and smaller than potential damages.” Large 
negative impacts of climate change for the coastal zones (most certain), biodiversity and 
ecological functioning (both uncertain); moderate negative impacts on temperature-related health 
stress (most certain) and fresh water quality (uncertain); other impacts are mixed or low. 
Secondary: “Economic analysis suggests that the MAR economy will be resilient to projected 
climate change. The region’s diversified, technologically advanced economy is highly integrated 
with the rest of the United States and the world and has relatively little dependence on climate-
sensitive economic sectors.” (iv) 
Tertiary: 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: use of climate scenarios from two GCMs (Hadley and CCCM) and socioeconomic 
scenarios from USGCRP (population, income and employment growth) 
Secondary: integrated regional assessment approach (START graphic) 




    
Primary: climate as hazard and resource for people 
Secondary: people stress the environment 
Tertiary: 
Notes: 
Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Win-win actions: (1) “use a watershed perspective to reduce flood and drought 
damages and protect water quality”; (2) remove incentives for practices … that place people, 
investments, and (especially coastal) ecosystems at greater risk to climate variability”; and (3) set 
up communication and learning tools and programs…” (v) 
Secondary: Information needs: improve projections of extreme weather and how it affects the 
environment/human health, how adaptation would help; improve models to evaluate 







#30: Singer, Dr. S. Fred 2000. Interview. 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/warming/debate/singer.html  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Singer “is an atmospheric physicist at George Mason University and… a leading 





Type of argument     
Primary: “the scenarios are alarmist, computer models reflect real gaps in climate knowledge, 
and future warming will be inconsequential or modest at most.” 
Secondary: Climate does change, but humans adapt. The only way to know if climate is 
changing is observations/measurements, but these are ambiguous. Satellite data are better than 
surface data. 
Tertiary: Costs of buying climate change “insurance” are too high 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: critique of models: cannot reproduce clouds, do not agree with each other, are 
“tweaked” to produce current climate 
Secondary: Historical data: satellite data show slight cooling in the past 20 years; CO2 and 
temperature in the long time record are not correlated such that causation is possible 
Tertiary: climate scientists who are funded by USGCRP have a vested interest in producing 




    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “If it warms, it will be good. So what is the concern, really?” 
Secondary: “Certainly we know that the models do not agree amongst themselves. So I think the 
first step is to find out why this is so, and work very hard to at least resolve the differences 








#31: Boehmer-Christiansen, Sonja 1994. Global climate protection policy: the limits of 
scientific advice, Parts 1 and 2. Global Environmental Change 4(2), 140-159 and 4(3), 185-
200. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    





Type of argument     
Primary:  “energy politics rather than uncertain science have had the decisive impact on global 
warming policy and that this process has benefited the institutions of big science and the political 
North” (185) “The primary interest of research is the creation of concern in order to demonstrate 
policy relevance and attract funding. This policy relevance, and therefore the need for scientific 
advice, decline rapidly once a problem is actually dealt with by regulatory, technological or 
behavioural change.” (141) 
Secondary: “It is argued here that energy industries, their R&D sectors, and regulators in 
government who felt threatened by this advice, became major opponents of the alarmist 
interpretation of scientific evidence. They were, however, countered by similarly strong alliances 
of environmentalists and competing energy interests – that is, those who stood to gain from the 
economic impacts of carbon dioxide emission reductions or carbon taxes. This latter green 
alliance, however, grew weaker during the late 1980s.” (185) 
Tertiary: 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: history of international scientific programs re climate change and a map of their 
relationships (WMO, IGBP, ICSU, START, NASA EOS, etc.), history of IIASA’s system 
analysis and the IPCC (WGs and their findings) 
Secondary: Interest linkage between FCCC, which requires little more than “plan and publish” 





    
Primary: The environment and society are the losers when political interests hold sway (i.e., 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “It is therefore concluded that the capacity and responsibility of government (not 
NGOs!) – as elected and accountable representatives of society – in environmental policy making 
need significant conceptual and institutional strengthening. For global climate policy, this 
requires including areas of knowledge that have not so far been tapped and advice which some 











#32: Stakhiv, Eugene and Kyle Schilling 1998. What can water managers do about global 
warming? Water Resources Update 112, 33-40. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    





Type of argument     
Primary: “Engineers can design and operate their systems more efficiently to increase robustness 
and resiliency and reduce vulnerability, but institutional arrangements must be reconfigured to 
ensure that future water resources services can be provided in a sustainable and equitable manner 




Type of evidence     
Primary: cites IPCC report, Ausabel, Lettenmeier, Gleick 
Secondary: declining withdrawals, mostly because of the CWA, SDWA, Water Resources 





    
Primary: Currently, water managers “are continuously adapting to new information and demand-
driven changes” and “managed water systems and river basins … can be effectively managed for 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: explicitly include climate change concerns into planning for new investments for 
capacity expansion, operation of existing systems for optimal use, and maintenance and rehab of 
existing systems – especially using risk and uncertainty analysis 
Secondary: Corps managers should “play a more active role in transferring technologies 







#33: Quick, Martin. “Friends and climate change – contraction and convergence?” 
http://www.quakergreenconcern.org.uk/displayarticle.asp?artcleid. Downloaded March 
2003. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: This statement is on the “Quaker Green Action” site and is linked to Aubrey Meyer’s 





Type of argument     
Primary: “The principle of Contraction and Convergence appears to be a reasonably fair way of 
setting greenhouse gas emissions targets” and “appears to fit well with Friends testimonies and 
concerns.” 
Secondary: “While technology can be expected to enable major reductions in greenhouse gas 
emission to be made, the very large cuts in greenhouse gas emissions needed are likely to require 
some changes in the rich countries to our profligate life style, particularly in use of cars and in 
flying. … Here, Friend’s testimony to simplicity seems particularly relevant, showing that a 
simpler lifestyle can be a positive good for its own sake.” 
Tertiary: 
Notes: C&C sets up emissions trading based on per capita allowances and convergence, over 
time, to one “per head” standard for every country. 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Deals with equity arguments about emissions reductions – industrialized nations 
“negotiated for themselves at Kyoto” emissions levels based on current levels per country, not the 
fairer per capita levels; Russian “hot air” would allow the US to buy its way out of caps (if it 
agrees to join in mitigation) 
Secondary: 
Tertiary: 
Notes: Discusses the UNFCCC, Kyoto, and the IPCC 
Worldview/view of 
nature 
    
Primary: Equity and simplicity among humans must guide the path to needed actions to mitigate 




Action(s) proposed     









#34: “API’s Position.” Downloaded March 2003 (but still refers to the Clinton 
Administration). http://www.api.org/globalclimate/apipos.htm  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: No author given, since this is a trade group position. American Petroleum Institute has 
been a voice for skepticism, but has recently softened its hardline position because of views of 





Type of argument     
Primary: “The oil and natural gas industry believes that the targets and timetables reducing 
greenhouse gases contained in the Kyoto Protocol would exact [too] heavy an economic price 
given our current understanding of the evolving science of climate change.” – cites WEFA, 
Charles River Associates, federal government 
Secondary: The science is uncertain; “We know enough to take the threat seriously, but not 
enough to inflict the economic harm which would result from implementation of the Protocol.” 
Tertiary: 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: “To achieve the Protocol’s targets the U.S. would have to curb its energy production 
and use in ways that would cost millions of jobs and substantially raise the price of essential 
goods, including gasoline, electricity, heating oil and natural gas. Because developing nations are 






    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “focused research on the causes and impacts of climate change and developing 
technologies needed to make reductions of greenhouse gases affordable and efficient.” 
Secondary: “cumbersome government rules, which have discouraged technological 







#35: Natural Resources Defense Council 2002. “Untangling the accounting gimmicks in 
White House Global Warming and Pollution Plans” 
wysiwyg://14/http://www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/agwcon.asp.  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    





Type of argument     
Primary: “Behind the rhetoric of progress, neither plan does anything to curb global warming or 
reduce dangers air pollution. This February 2002 NRDC analysis exposes the administration’s 
fuzzy math.” Furthermore, Bush cites uncertainty “to justify not reducing emissions” and reduces 
spending on research and technology.  
Secondary: Since emissions will rise, the plan constitutes “walking away from the Rio global 
warming treaty” signed by Bush’s father. 
Tertiary: The Voluntary Reporting Program (1605[b]) shows that voluntary programs don’t 
work. “Because the Bush global warming plan relies exclusively on voluntary programs, it won’t 
work either.” 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Review of the “Enron-style accounting” to show that, even as emissions intensity 
improves, overall emissions rise – at a slightly higher rate than during 1990-2000 (14.1% v. 
13.6% in the earlier decade). 






    
Primary: Humans are working against the environment and have a responsibility to reduce 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: In a 2001 open letter to President Bush, John H. Adams, Pres. of NRDC, says, “we 
respectfully urge you  to reevaluate your positions on global warming pollution, and the Kyoto 









#36: Sokona, Youba, Adil Najam and Saleemul Huq 2002. “Climate Change and 
Sustainable Development: Views from the South.” And Huq, Saleemul, Youba Sokona and 
Adil Najam 2002. “Climate Change and sustainable Development Beyond Kyoto.” 
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). http://www.iied.org  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: IIED is a relatively new organization, “an independent, non-profit research institute 
working in the field of sustainable development. IIED aims to provide expertise and leadership in 
researching and achieving sustainable development at local, national, regional and global levels. 
In alliance with others we seek to help shape a future that ends global poverty and delivers and 
sustains efficient and equitable management of the world’s natural resources.” 





Type of argument     
Primary: The short-term focus has been on getting “industrialized countries to agree to some 
targets, no matter how meager. It is time now to refocus on the longer-term objectives of the 
UNFCCC, particularly on its stated goals regarding sustainable development.”  
Secondary: Kyoto is flawed, focused on the interests of industrialized countries, “leaves much to 
be desired in terms of its implications for long-term policy” and “unlikely to produce many short-
term benefits.” 
Tertiary: “Combating climate change is vital to the pursuit of sustainable development; equally, 
the pursuit of sustainable development is integral to lasting climate change mitigation.” 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Many citations to Southern voices, including the authors, and to the UNFCCC 











Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “The goal of the post-Kyoto phase should be clearly tied to atmospheric stabilization 
with a defined focus on emissions limitation and a clear sense of the rules for the future entry of 
developing countries into the regime. In all likelihood this will require moving to per capita 
emission targets and a ‘contraction and convergence’ policy scenario.” – with WSSD, “build on 
the Kyoto promise by returning to UNFCCC basics.” 
Secondary: Refocus on equity, helping vulnerable countries “at greatest risk and disadvantage,” 




Tertiary: “In the past, the South has been routinely reactive in its environmental negotiations 
with the North. It is well past time that they change their strategy. The task of devising and 
putting forth proposals that match their interests lies squarely with negotiators from the South. 






#37: Gyawali, Dipak 1996. “An Extreme Climate Event in Nepal and its Implications for a 
Climate Change Regime.” In Elements of Change 1995. Aspen Global Change Institute, 
Aspen, CO. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Gyawali is a prominent Nepalese scientist, focusing on water resources and 
environmental change; he is also a cultural theorist (Douglas, Thompson, etc.) 
Secondary: 
Tertiary: 
Notes: The write-up is by Susan Hassol, the raporteur at the conference. 
 
Type of argument     
Primary: Shifts in the “monsoon trough can signal drought or flood for particular localities,” 




Type of evidence     
Primary: Facts and figures about monsoon rainfall and the unusual cloudburst 8/93, which wiped 
out “much of the infrastructure in the central area of the country,” killed 2000 people, destroyed 
38 irrigation systems, etc. 
Secondary: Social limits to growth are more important than physical issues. “The last man will 
have eaten the last woman long before the last tree falls.” 
Tertiary: People have loyalties “based on village, religion, ethnicity, region, language, etc.” as 
well as national. “Especially if the state does not serve the interests of the people, their loyalty 





    
Primary: Nature likely to change in ways that will be unmanageable by people. 
Secondary: Analysis of social systems such as bonded labor, loyalties to groups 
Tertiary: 
Notes: 
Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “Important lessons for climate change include the fact that our scientific understanding 
of many natural processes, especially those that occur in non-temperate zones, is very poor and 
must be improved. … it is very difficult to know whether events like this are being exacerbated 
by climate change or not.” 
Secondary: Learn from the unusual events to build in large tolerances in infrastructure and 







#38: Cohen, Stewart J. 1993. Climate change and climate impacts: please don’t confuse the 
two! Global Environmental Change 3(1), 2-6 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Cohen: known for his work on the MacKenzie Basin study, an early “integrated 
assessment” 




Type of argument     
Primary:  UNCED has focused on mitigation, but less attention has been given to adaptation. 
“Without knowledge of potential impacts of climate change, however, other possible adaptation 
strategies will be difficult to identify because governments and the private sector will not know 
what they might be adapting to.” (2) Because the required knowledge and methodologies are 
different, research on climate and research on impacts should be kept separate. 
Secondary: Climate research is grounded in climate modeling, impacts research in studies of 
natural hazards. 
Tertiary: The two are conflated is because the issue has become political; therefore, attacks that 
cite the uncertainty of climate models spills over to impacts research 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: mainstream scientific texts, including IPCC and WMO publications, and impact 
assessments 
Secondary: disciplinary differences between atmospheric scientists and oceanographers, and 
“physical, biological, and social scientists who often work at smaller scales of time and space 
than the specialists who build GCMs” (4) 
Tertiary: 
Notes: begins with scenarios and models, then UNFCCC 
Worldview/view of 
nature 
    
Primary: humans have various strategies for dealing with or managing responses to natural 





Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “Despite the uncertainties, it would be prudent to generate, review and publish 
information about potential impacts of climate change scenarios so that interested parties could 
have access to it, caveats and all. For anyone who believes in reducing uncertainties about global 
warming and its implications for our planet, a continued interdisciplinary effort is really the only 
alternative available.” (6) 
Secondary: Do not wait for reductions in uncertainties of climate science; “long-term resources 
management and planning options are being considered by governments and industries now, with 





#39: Ecimovic, Timi, Elmar A. Stuhler, Marjan Vezjak and Matjaz Mulej 2002. 
Introduction to climate change – present experience related to sustainability and impact on 
society. InfoAndina. http://www.mtnforum.org/emaildiscuss/discuss02/040102377.htm  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: The authors are given honorifics (Drs. And Profs.) and university affiliations or 
Institutes (Climate Change, Sustainable Future) 




Type of argument     
Primary: “Triggered by the development of our civilization, the consumption of natural 
resources, production of synthetic chemicals, life style, and run out from our nuclear technology 
laboratories represent the Number One threat to the existence of our civilization, the second threat 
being the climate change, reflecting a response by the very nature of our Earth, which is already 
evolving and seems to be capable of destroying our civilization.” 
Secondary: “The mountain environments around the earth are an integral part of the earth nature, 
and should keep initiative for nature, space and environment protection as well as protection 
against impact if the climate change.”  
Tertiary: 
Notes: discusses “Our common Future,” the Rio Earth summit, Agenda 21 for Change, and “10 
Years after Rio” 
Type of evidence     
Primary: assertions about impacts, both physical (e.g., “if the mean land mass temperature 
changes by one Celsius centigrade within 12 months, the change will force extinction of up to 






    
Primary:  “Scientifically it is possible to correct global warming by fostering phytoplankton 
reproduction … But if it is used without scientific control, it may produce another Ice Age…” 
“Without appropriate human intervention in the future, the climate change system ultimately 
would change living conditions within the biosphere and geography of the Earth so much that our 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “It is necessary to work out an action plan for the better implementation of 
sustainability of our civilization worldwide. The platform offered by United Nations (UN) at … 







#40: Sathaye, Jayant A. and N.H. Ravindranath 1998. Climate change mitigation in the 
energy and forestry sectors of developing countries. Annual Review of Energy and the 
Environment 23, 287-437. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Sathaye is a prominent scientist at DOE’s LBNL, specializing in energy efficiency. 





Type of argument     
Primary: “Mitigation studies indicate that if energy efficiency and forestry options are 
implemented judiciously, emissions can be reduced at a negative cost without affecting economic 
growth.” 
Secondary: “The studies also suggest that this would increase significantly the worldwide 
demand for natural gas and renewable technologies.” 
Tertiary: “Country studies show that the aggregate mitigation potential in the forestry sector is 
higher, and the costs per tonne of carbon are lower, than reported earlier by global studies.” 
Notes: Many scientists feel that the bottom-up/engineering-type studies used by these scientists 
are overly optimistic. 
Type of evidence     
Primary: (showing overall knowledge): types the mitigation studies as inventories, mitigation, 
V&A; “Precursors to today’s mitigation studies were led by research groups; the first effort was 
coordinated by the LBNL…” and brief history of other studies – many references to LBLN 
studies 
Secondary: tables and data of emissions, baseline projections (from IPCC, top-down); then 
methodologies, technology options, data and models for bottom-up analysis – for both energy 
efficiency and forestry 
Tertiary: brief discussion of barriers, mostly governmental 




    
Primary: “the earth’s fragile atmosphere is changing with the continuing release of greenhouse 














#41: Van Asselt, Marjolein B.A. and Jan Rotmans 2002. Uncertainty in integrated 
assessment modeling: from positivism to pluralism. Climatic Change 54, 75-105. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    





Type of argument     
Primary: “It is argued that a pluralistic approach to uncertainty is needed to comply with the 
social scientific evidence that different interpretations of uncertainty and different risk 




Type of evidence     
Primary: Description of the model, parameters, and calibration 
Secondary: IA model uncertainty: “Are all relevant processes considered? Are the system 
boundaries legitimate? Does the model reproduce actual behaviour of the mirrored system? Is the 
conceptualization used inline with established theories?” (82) – but these cannot be addressed by 
current methods 
Tertiary: brief historical discussion of science as bringing certainty, not uncertainty + a 




    
Primary: Constructivist/culturalist view of nature – different attributes depending upon the 
worldviews of different people 
Secondary: The future is unknowable and will depend upon dominant worldview(s). 
Tertiary: 
Notes: 
Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Use the theoretical ideas “to think systematically about uncertainty treatment in 
relation to scenarios, qualitative assessment and participatory IA.” (100) 
Secondary: “Systematic uncertainty research is still needed to advance uncertainty management 









#42: Scharper, Stephen Bede 2002. Green dreams: religious cosmologies and environmental 
commitments. Bulletin  of Science, Technology & Society 22(1), 42-44. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: The author is “an assistant professor in the Department for the Study of Religion and 
an associate of the Institute for Environmental Studies at the University of Toronto, where he 





Type of argument     
Primary: “We are, as a human community, facing what many see as a ‘global environmental 
crisis.’” (42) “What is happening in our times is not just another historical transition or simply 
another cultural change. The devastation of the planet that we are bringing about is negating some 
hundreds of million, even billions of years of past development on the earth” (quote from Thomas 
Berry) 
Secondary: Religions “around the world” are becoming more ecology-minded, especially 
through their cosmologies; instead of a “communion of subjects,” a consumerist cosmology sees 
the universe as a “collection of objects.” (43) 
Tertiary: 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Imaginative reconstruction of early settlers’ experience of a forest now gone, then 
“think of the place in nature that was special to you growing up … Does it still exist?” 
Secondary: Invokes science, the evidence of pollution, “We are destroying these cornucopias of 






    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Recover “the awesome delight of a magnificent sunset or the sense of wonder we feel 
when gazing at an array of stars on a soft summer night” (44) 








#43: Koteen, Laurie, Janine Bloomfield, Timothy Eichler, Cathryn Tonne, Rebecca Young, 
Helene Poulshock and Andree Sosler 2001. Hot Prospects: The Potential Impacts of Global 
Warming on Los Angeles and the Southland. Exec Sum, Intro, first two chapters. 
Environmental Defense, Washington, DC. Also at http://www.environmentaldefense.org  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Environmental Defense (formerly Environmental Defense Fund) is a major 
environmentalist group. 
Secondary: ED supported research at Columbia U and NASA/Goddard; support was 
acknowledged from the Mary Livingston Griggs and Mary Griggs Burke Foundation, John D. 









Type of evidence     
Primary: Photo on front cover is smog over LA; inside, picture of child with asthma, a pier 
destroyed by storm, fire near homes – in recommendations, a wind farm; graph of increasing 
temp in LA 1910-2000, bar charts of projected change (temp, precip, 4 GCMs), scientific figures 
on El Nino. 
Secondary: Data on climate change during 20th c., scientific evidence of anthropogenic causes 
(including quotes from IPCC), and projections: more storms, winter rainfall, hot summer days, 
smog, respiratory illness, hantavirus, erosion of beaches and hillsides, destruction of wetlands, 





    





Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Extend short-term strategies for CA’s “energy woes” to long term: “conservation, 
increased energy efficiency and renewable energy” (vi) – ee appliances and vehicles, less cooling 
and driving,  
Secondary: 10 adaptation strategies, including education, health care, urban environment, 
emissions controls, protection of marine species, shoreline/beach mgmt, flexible water resource 






#44: La Vina, Antoinio G.M. 2002. From Kyoto to Marrakech: global climate politics and 
local communities. Working Paper. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC. (NYC?) 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: The author is a Senior Fellow at the WRI 
Secondary: WRI is an environmentalist organization, but well respected for the quality of its data 
and analyses (many such org’s are seen as biased). 
Tertiary: 
Notes: “This briefing paper provides a background on the threat posed by climate change, 
particularly on the Global South & on poor and impoverished communities.” (i) 
 
Type of argument     
Primary: “Climate change, expected to result in global warming, is probably the most serious 
environmental problem that the world faces. … the burden will fall disproportionately on local 
and impoverished communities,” which “depend greatly on climate conditions and natural 
resources for their daily survival and sustenance and they do not have the resources to adapt to 
the changes global warming will bring” (i) 
Secondary: “The progress that has been made on fashioning a global response to climate change 
is actually remarkable given the complexity of the politics of climate.” (ii) – not just a 
North/South question 
Tertiary: “Almost from its inception, there has been a high level of participation by civil society 
organizations as well as by industry”: Climate Action Network, environmental orgs, Global 
Climate Coalition, ICLEI/CCP, women, religious and youth orgs – but not local and 
impoverished communities 
Notes; words such as “threat,” “peril” and “combat”; discussion of UNFCCC and stabilization, 
Kyoto, Bonn, Marrakech, and WSSD. “Consequently, there is high expectation that the Kyoto 
Protocol will come into force by late 2002.” (ii) – even with US “abandoning” 
Type of evidence     
Primary: catalogue of effects: desertification, coastal and low-lying areas, extreme weather 
events, public health/diseases (greatest on countries least responsible, ironically); intro invokes 
IPCC, list of GHGs, emitting activities 
Secondary: analysis of interests: North EU and Eur “call for accelerated action by the North”; 
US and Aus “equivocation in the face of lingering scientific and economic uncertainties; Global 
South all think that tech/$$ transfers are necessary, but debate about level of participation; diffs 
between OPEC and AOSIS; wariness re commitments (Brazil, China, India) v. eagerness to have 





    
Primary: nature fragile, susceptible to climate change 
Secondary: 
Tertiary: 
Notes: words such as “threat,” “peril” 
Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Participation of local and impoverished communities must be enhanced: supporting 
info/ed campaigns, promoting their participation in UNFCCC and coalition building to national 











#45: Climate Change Programme 2003. World Wide Fund. 
http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/what_we_do/climate_change/problems/index.cfm  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    





Type of argument     
Primary: “The impacts of global warming are evident from the equator to the poles.” 
Secondary: “There’s no shortage of solutions – we must act NOW, and we can!” 
Tertiary: 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: lists: of impacts (coral reefs bleached, alpine forest struggling, polar bears under 
pressure, glaciers melting, economic damage (insurance); and actions (wind and solar power, 
technologies to reduce CO2 emissions), simple things like better windows/ 
insulation/lighting/appliances/cars, reducing energy use 





    
Primary: nature at the mercy of humans; “It is humans who create the heat trap: every bit of 
coal, every litre of oil or gas that humans burn adds to the load of gases in the atmosphere that 





Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “fighting CO2 pollution” – education, push to ratify Kyoto, partnerships with 










#46: Lindzen, Richard S. n.d. (downloaded March 2003). Global Warming: The Origin and 
Nature of the Alleged Scientific Consensus. Cato Institute, Washington, DC. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Lindzen is a prominent skeptic, well respected as a scientist (MIT) but also affiliated 





Type of argument     
Primary: “as a scientist, I can find no substantive basis for the warming scenarios being 
popularly described.” 
Secondary: “Moreover, according to many studies I have read by economists, agronomists, and 
hydrologists, there would be little difficulty adapting to such warming if it were to occur.” 
Tertiary: “present hysteria formally began in the summer of 1988” with a hot summer and James 
Hansen’s meaningless statement, and quickly became a “global warming circus” – scientific 
debate OK, politicization dreadful – warming does fit with other agendas, such as ee, reduced oil 
from the MidEast, dissatisfaction with industrialization, international competition, enhanced 
revenue from C taxes, and enhanced power 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: “Such was also the conclusion of the recent National Research Council’s report of 
adapting to global change. Many aspects of the catastrophic scenario have already been largely 
discounted by the scientific community.” 
Secondary: examines the arguments: agrees that CO2 in the atmosphere has been increasing, but 
says an inaccurate model was used to predict a doubling of preindustrial levels by 2030 – “The 
simple picture of the greenhouse mechanism is seriously oversimplified.” – water vapor and 
clouds account for most of the effect, convection must be taken into account, models cannot 
duplicate the motions of the atmosphere, feedbacks are highly uncertain and not understood – 
predictions are exaggerated 
Tertiary: history of the political process; Al Gore, environmental advocacy groups, Claudine 
Schneider (“scientists may disagree, but we can hear Mother Earth, and she is crying”), refusal of 
Science to print Lindzen’s critique, various actors, Michael Openheimer/EDF, Greenpeace, etc. 




    
Primary: “improved technology and increased societal wealth are what allow society to deal 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Allow science to take its course, admitting the flaws of the models – get politics out of 
the picture. 











#47: Browne, John 1997. Climate change speech. Given at Stanford University. Available at 
http://icc370.igc.org/bp.htm  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    





Type of argument     
Primary: “The passing of some of the old divisions reminds us we are all citizens of one world, 
and we must take shared responsibility for its future, and for its sustainable development.” – 
people who work at BP have these convictions, so do consumers 
Secondary: “The time to consider the policy dimensions of climate change is not when the link 
between greenhouse gases and climate change is conclusively proven – but when the possibility 
cannot be discounted and is taken seriously by the society of which we are part. We in BP have 
reached that point.” 
Tertiary: 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: the science is uncertain, but scientists and others take the possibility seriously (i.e., we 
are all in this together) – metaphor of a journey, with partnerships and accommodations to the 
interests of all who are on the journey 
Secondary: factual evidence – CO2 like a small weight that overbalances, and only a small 
fraction comes from transport, and only a fraction of that from BP (~95 Mt) 
Tertiary: catalogue of actions that show BP is proactive: reduced oil discharges to the North Sea, 
investing $100M to eliminate VOCs, reduced flaring in Norway; example of project in Bolivia to 









Action(s) proposed     
Primary: First, do the low-hanging fruit: control own emissions, fund research, initiatives for JI, 
develop alternative fuels, contribute to public policy debate 
Secondary: strive toward sustainability, “simultaneously being profitable and responding to the 








#48: Summary for Policymakers 2001. Pp. 1-17 in Climate Change 2001: Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability. A report of Working Group II of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: The IPCC scientists are an inclusive and large group; the summary for policymakers is 
adopted word for word by member countries of the IPCC. 
Secondary: “This report builds upon the past assessment reports of the IPCC, reexamining key 
conclusions of the earlier assessments and incorporating results from more recent research.” – 
“Further details can be found in the underlying report.” (3) 
Tertiary: 
Notes: Although the IPCC reports do not explicitly make policy recommendations, the selection 
and arrangement of topics and conclusions of course makes arguments. 
 
Type of argument     
Primary: Nine “emergent findings”: (1) Recent regional climate changes have already affected 
many physical and biological systems. (2) Some human systems have been affected by recent 
increases in floods & droughts (preliminary indications). (3) Natural systems are vulnerable to cc, 
and some will be irreversibly damaged, (4) Many human systems are sensitive to cc, and some 
are vulnerable. (5) Projected changes in climate extremes could have major consequences. (6) 
The potential for large-scale and possibly irreversible impacts poses risks that have yet to be 
reliably quantified. (7) Adaptation is a necessary strategy at all scales to complement cc 
mitigation efforts. (8) Those with the least resources have the least capacity to adapt and are the 
most vulnerable. (9) Adaptation, sustainable development, and enhancement of equity can be 
mutually reinforcing. (3-8). 
Secondary: Effects on and vulnerability of natural and human systems: hydrology and water 
resources, agriculture and food security, terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems, coastal zones and 
marine ecosystems, human health, human settlements/energy/ industry, and insurance/financial 




Type of evidence     
Primary: No references to research studies, but to chapters in the TAR where the summary items 
are covered. 






    
Primary: Nature is essentially knowable and can be managed. For example, “the greatest 
vulnerabilities are likely to be in unmanaged water systems and systems that are currently 
stressed or poorly and unsustainably managed due to policies that discourage efficient water use 
and protection of water quality, inadequate watershed management, failure to manage variable 






Action(s) proposed     
Primary: High priorities for assessment and research: quantitative assessment of sensitivity, 
adaptive capacity, and vulnerability to climate change and variability; assessment of thresholds; 
study of dynamic responses of ecosystems to multiple stresses at multiple scales; development of 
approaches to adaptation responses; assessment of full range of cc impacts; improving tools for 
IA, including risk assessment; assessment of opportunities to include scientific info on impacts, 
etc. in decisionmaking processes, risk mgmt, and SD initiatives; improvement of systems and 
methods for long-term monitoring. (14-17) 
Secondary: Water is obviously a, if not the, major focus (3 of 7 sectors, plus water implications 
for agriculture/food security and human health). 
Tertiary: 
Notes: The emphasis on vulnerability, adaptation and sustainable development marks a departure 






#49: Summary for Policymakers 2001. Pp. 1-13 in Climate Change 2001: Mitigation. A 
report of Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: The IPCC scientists are an inclusive and large group; the summary for policymakers is 
adopted word for word by member countries of the IPCC. 
Secondary: “Research in cc mitigation has continued since the publication of the IPCC Second 
Assessment Report (SAR), taking into account political changes such as the agreement on the 
Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC in 1997, and is reported on here. The Report also draws on a 
number of IPCC Special Reports …” (3) 
Tertiary: 
Notes: Although the IPCC reports do not explicitly make policy recommendations, the selection 
and arrangement of topics and conclusions of course makes arguments. 
 
Type of argument     
Primary: Mitigation challenges: Global/long-term problem. Different development paths  
different emissions paths. Relation to broader SE policies and trends. Different resources among 
and within nations and regions, and between generations. “Lower emissions scenarios require 
different patterns of energy resource development” (4). “Significant technical progress relevant to 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction has been made since the SAR in 1995 and has been faster 
than anticipated” (5). Terrestrial ecosystems offer carbon mitigation potential. “No single path to 
a low emission future” (8). “Social learning and innovation, and changes in institutional structure 
could contribute to cc mitigation” (8). Estimates of costs and benefits differ because of how 
welfare is measured, the scope and methodology of the analysis, and the underlying assumptions. 
There are “no regrets” opportunities to reduce GHGs. Cost estimates for Annex B countries 
differ, in addition to the considerations above, also  because they “depend strongly upon the 
assumptions regarding the use of the Kyoto mechanisms, and their interactions with domestic 
measures.” (10) “Cost-effectiveness studies with a century timescale estimate that the costs of 
stabilizing CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere increase as the concentration stabilization level 
declines. Different baselines have a strong influence on absolute costs.” (10) Uneven distribution 
of costs & benefits. Spillover effects, e.g., oil, trade, carbon leakage. “Needs to overcome many 
technical, economic, political, cultural, social, behavioural and/or institutional barriers which 
prevent the full exploitation of the technological, economic and social opportunities of these 
mitigation options.” (11) Portfolio of policy instruments will be more effective. “The 
effectiveness of climate change mitigation can be enhanced when climate policies are integrated 
with the non-climate objectives of national and sectorial policy development …” Coordinated 
actions can reduce costs. CC decision-making is a sequential process under general uncertainty. 
“The desired mix of options varies with time and place.” (12) “There is an inter-relationship 
between the environmental effectiveness of an international regime, the cost-effectiveness of 
climate policies and the equity of the agreement.” (13)  
Secondary: Re “significant technical progress,” “Half of these potential emissions reductions 
may be achieved by 2020 with direct benefits “energy saved” exceeding direct costs (net capital, 
operating, and maintenance costs) and the other half at a net direct cost of up to 
US$100tCequivalent (at 1998 prices).” (6) “At least up to 2020, energy supply and conversion 
will remain dominated by relatively cheap and abundant fossil fuels.” (5) Other reductions can be 
achieved through use of biomass, landfill methane, wind and hydro energy, extension of nuclear 
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power plants (to 2010). Carbon removal and storage can reduce net emissions after 2010. Other 
gases can be reduced. 
Tertiary: 
Notes 







    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “high priorities for further narrowing gaps between current knowledge and policy 
making needs:” further exploration of technical potentials; economic, social and institutional 
issues; “methodologies for analysis of the potential of mitigation options and their costs”; 
“evaluating climate mitigation options in the context of development, sustainability and equity.” 
(13)  







#50: Meyer-Abich, Klaus M. 1993. Winners and losers in climate change. Pp. 68-87 in 
Global Ecology: A New Arena of Political Conflict, Wolfgang Sachs (ed). Zed Books, London.
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 






Type of argument     
Primary: We should believe in climate change, in the same way that Pascal argues it is prudent 
to believe in God (to avoid being damned, should God really exist) – but, since it is not in the 
interest of industrialized countries, we should expect that “everything will be done to do nothing 
at present” (85) 
Secondary: “With respect to climate change, it is often emphasized that we are all in the same 
boat, but this is exactly what one must expect to hear from those who are looking forward to 
being the winners.” “Instead, risks can be assessed; even if the economic data were available, 
vulnerabilities need also to be taken into account.” (71) – most vulnerable depend heavily on 
agriculture, cannot help themselves easily, already suffer from droughts, etc., and will suffer from 
flooding with SLR  Third World. Industrialized countries will be better off; “Climate policies 
of the industrialized countries then will have to balance uncertain but possible long-term 
advantages against fairly certain short-term disadvantages.” (78) 
Tertiary: “The foregoing analysis shows that those who cause about three-quarters of the cc will 
be least affected by the implications or will even have absolute advantages. Those who will suffer 
from it most, share the responsibility only to the extent of about one-quarter.” (81) 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: “draws mainly on the IPCC report, particularly on the impact assessment” (69), also on 






    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Increasing awareness of the issue, short-term interest in avoiding negative impacts, and 
going back to the man-nature relationship under which our present political institutions were 









#51: Linden, Eugene 2003. Who’s going to pay for climate change? Time (February 7). 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 






Type of argument     
Primary: “The Bush administration, so warlike in response to terrorism, has revealed a pacifist 
streak in its approach to the threat of climate change. … By leaving moot the question of cause, 
and by implying that no one could have done anything about it, the administration also implies 
that no one is responsible. … Nice try, but don’t be surprised if there are few takers for this line 
of reasoning.”  
Secondary: Weather-related loss of revenues and insurance losses/policy cancellations  will 
prompt businesses to act in spite of Bush’s “no fault” approach. 
Tertiary: 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Penn State estimate of weather-related loss of revenue, example of insurer exits from 
NC Outer Banks and the Hamptons (no coastal storm coverage). 
Secondary: Scenario from Swiss Re: insurer will refuse cc coverage to companies that say they 
don’t think it’s a problem. (Swiss Re has sent customers a questionnaire.) 




    




Action(s) proposed     









#52: National Wildlife Federation 2000. Climate change. In The Toll from Coal: How 
Emissions from the Nation’s Coal-Fired Power Plants Devastate Wildlife and Threaten 
Human Health. National Wildlife Foundation. See http://www.nwf.org  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: The acknowledgements include “a generous grant by the W. Alton Jones Foundation” 





Type of argument     
Primary: “The burning of carbon-based fuels such as coal has sent tremendous quantities of 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere and has caused the average global 
surface temperature to rise.” (16) – ”Current efforts to curb global climate change are not 
sufficient.” (18) Coal must be reduced, there must be an international strategy, and the US must 
play a major role (e.g., controlling CO2 emissions in the electricity sector). 
Secondary: “This warming is disrupting the planet’s climate system, threatening people and 
wildlife around the world. … For wildlife and ecosystems already weakened by acid rain, 
mercury, ozone, and other forms of pollution, global warming – and resulting climate change – 
may deal the final blow.” (16) 
Tertiary: 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: IPCC’s “exhaustive review of the subject. Using sophisticated computer models, direct 
observation, and data gather from ice core samples – and drawing on the work of more than 2,000 
of the world’s leading climate researchers…” (16) – correlation between temperature rise and 
GHG emissions 
Secondary: “scientists expect” “scientists predict” impacts on forest, mammals, sea birds, 





    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “Stop favoring aged power plants….Toughen restrictions on sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxides from power plants. … Cap emissions of mercury and carbon dioxide. … Promote 
energy efficiency and renewable energy resources…. Make environmental protection part of 
utility restructuring. … Implement a meaningful international strategy to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. … Provide an effective transition for coal-dependent economies.” 
Secondary: Speak up! Think of “our children and grandchildren.” Pay now or later. Your actions 
make a big difference. Join the activist team at the National Wildlife Foundation. 
Tertiary: Coal mining “has been a story of denuded landscapes, contaminated waters, destroyed 
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wildlife habitat, eroded mountain sides, collapsed land surfaces, and homes that are crushed or 
damaged from blasting, mudslides, waste dam breeches, and other reckless mining practices.” 
Mountain top removal permanently changes the landscape. Coal washing pollutes water. Coal 








#53: Parks, Noreen 2002. Measuring climate change. BioScience 52(8), 652. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    





Type of argument     
Primary: Assessing and forecasting climate change is hampered by a lack of accurate and long-




Type of evidence     
Primary: Expert testimony: Kevin Trenberth (NCAR), and Thomas Karl (NOAA), Edward 
Sarachik (UW), Eric Barron (Penn State), well-known atmospheric scientists; NRC report 






    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “Given the potential social, environmental, and economic consequences of global cc, 
further delay in establishing a scientifically strong observation system could drive costs much 
higher. As Sarachik ruefully noted, ‘In a hundred years, people will look back and ask, why 








#54: Taubes, Gary 1997. Apocalypse not. Science 278 (7 November), 1004-1006. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    





Type of argument     
Primary: “Henderson, Gubler, and other argue that breakdowns in public health rather than 
climate shifts are to blame for the recent disease outbreaks – and that public health measures will 
be far more important than climate in future disease patterns.” (1004) 
Secondary: But the future may be different.  
Tertiary: 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Brief history of the controversy, including names and quotations of scientists who have 
said cc “may” bring increased death and disease, and those who downplay such scenarios. The 
former include Paul Epstein (Harvard), Rita Colwell (UMD), Anthony McMichael (London 
School of Hygiene), and Jonathan Patz (Johns Hopkins). The latter include Duane Gubler (CDC), 
D.A. Henderson (Johns Hopkins), Mark L. Wilson (UMich). 
Secondary: Review of current changes in climate that have brought no epidemics and outbreaks 





    




Action(s) proposed     









#55: Suzuki, David 2002. Waiting to fight climate change is not a viable option. 
http://production.enn.com/extras/printer-friendly.asp?storyid+47610  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: This text is linked to the David Suzuki Foundation; “Since 1990, the David Suzuki 
Foundation has worked to find ways for society to live in balance with the nature world that 
sustains us. Focusing on four program areas – oceans and sustainable fishing, forests and wild 
lands, climate change and clean energy, and the web of life, the Foundation uses science and 





Type of argument     
Primary: Some climate change is inevitable, according to scientists; the goal is to avoid 
“dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate. 
Secondary: We need to start mitigation actions by any means to hand. 
Tertiary: 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Based on an unnamed article in Science and unnamed authors “from Brown and 
Princeton universities” – defining “dangerous, examining coral reefs as possibly close to their 
“upper thermal limits,” the merits of adopting a carbon dioxide concentration goal of 450 ppm to 
“prevent whole-scale disruption of the climate system, which could result from the disintegration 
of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (this alone would raise sea levels by an astonishing four to six 
meters) or the shut-down of density-driven ocean currents such as the Gulf Stream.” 
Secondary: “The point is that the immediate goal is not to completely stop or reverse climate 





    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “Kyoto, it seems, is more than just one choice in an array of possibilities to ‘prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference’ with our climate. Given the length of time it takes to 
create these complex international treaties and the speed with which emissions continue to 








#56: Friends of the Earth International 2000. Gathering Storm: The Human Cost of Climate 
Change. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: FoEI is based in Amsterdam and London, but is obviously trying to appeal to a much 
wider audience, with a cover picture of Asian people walking through flood waters with a few 






Type of argument     
Primary: “People will be exposed to unacceptable risks for as long as governments ignore the 
immediacy of the dangers posed by human-induced climate change. Negligence at the national 
level is mirrored by complacency at the international level with the failure of the world’s 
historical polluters to reduce their carbon emissions.” (5) 
Secondary: [Current climate events], “overlain on a more gradual change in environmental 
conditions, would have serious knock-on effects for ecosystems, fires, pest outbreaks, human 
health, our settlements and food security.” (15, Part 3) 
Tertiary: 
Notes: “the world’s historical polluters” is an obvious reference to the work of Agarwal and 
Narain in India 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Narrative of “a trail of climate disasters [that] have wreaked havoc with people’s lives 
and livelihoods around the world.” (5 and Parts 1 and 2) (although acknowledgement that no 
single event can be attributed to cc) 
Secondary: personal testimonies from survivors of these “climate disasters” (Part 2) e.g., “The 
weather is getting crazier and crazier…. My guess: global warming. Maybe this was just a freak 
occurrence? I have no idea, I am not a scientist. But people are worried about it recurring.” (14) 





    
Primary: nature fragile; humans are tipping the balance on the way to catastrophe – all that can 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “Ensure that the Kyoto Protocol results in real and permanent emissions reductions 
through the development of renewable energy sources and energy efficiency measures” (5) 
Secondary: “Commit industrialized countries to achieving 80% of their Kyoto objective through 
emissions reductions at home” (5) 
Tertiary: “Enshrine the principles of equity in the framework for emissions reductions in the 









#57: Hayes, Denis 2000. The Official Earth Day Guide to Planet Repair. Island Press, 
Washington, DC. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: “Earth Day” evokes environmental activism, particularly at the local level; in 2000 the 
focus was on climate change – “a particularly clear example of a problem that involves thresholds 





Type of argument     
Primary: “no other issue intersects with a wider variety of environmental problems than what 
kind of energy we employ to power society, where we get it, and how efficiently we use it. The 
wasteful use of outdated energy sources is producing climate change, oil spills, strip mines, 
nuclear waste, plutonium proliferation, smog, sulfate particulates, acid rain, childhood asthma, 




Type of evidence     






    
Primary: “Once we no longer live beneath our mother’s heart, it is the earth with which we form 
the same dependent relationship, relying … on its cycles and elements, helpless without its 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “Take control of your own life” 
Secondary: “Pressure politicians to change how they run the world.” 
Tertiary: On Kyoto: “Make More Efficient Cars: 22 percent. … “Create a National Utility Trust 
Fund: 20.5 percent…. Create Incentives to Reduce Industrial Energy Use: 14 percent…. Establish 
a Federal Renewable Portfolio Standard: 11 percent. … Encourage Combined Heat and Power: 
10 percent. … Close the Power Plant Emissions Loophole: 9 percent. … Build Better Buildings: 
4.5 percent. … Manufacture Efficient Appliances: 4.5 percent. … Set Greenhouse Gas Standards 







#58: Adhikary, Pushpa 2002. Climate change on the roof of the world. Taken from Tough 
Terrain: Media Reports of Mountain Issues. Asia Pacific Mountain Network and Panos 
Institute South Asia. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: No identifying information is given about the author. 




Type of argument     
Primary: “What happens to the water towers of the Tibetan plateau has a bearing on about three 
billion people in China, Southeast Asia, and South Asia” – and there are signs of thinning ozone 
and warming, resulting in low water flows 
Secondary: The cause could be a warming cycle, but Professor Zhang “from the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing believes that global buildups in the levels of carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases are accelerating the current natural warming cycle in Tibet.” 
Tertiary: 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Naming the rivers and identifying their paths to the sea, then giving stats about less 
runoff in recent years. 





    




Action(s) proposed     









#59: Council for Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST) 1992. Preparing U.S. 
Agriculture for Global Climate Change. Report 119. CAST, Ames IO. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: CAST “is a nonprofit organization comprised of 29 member scientific societies and 
many individual, company, nonprofit, and associate society members.” It considers itself 





Type of argument     
Primary: “Autonomously, without outside encouragement, farmers will adapt to ease the impact 
of climate change” (2) – changing crops, animals, and management; water may be a limitation 
Secondary: Farmers can emit less (use less fuels, reduce methane from livestock) and “stash 
away” carbon in soil and trees 
Tertiary: “Leaders must, therefore, prepare the nation by encouraging adaptations that cut the 
costs of climate change to acceptable levels” (4) – diversity/flexibility, free trade 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: comparison of no-climate scenario, Dust Bowl climate, and projected climate change 





    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “A prudent way to hedge the risk of those costs is to hold a diverse portfolio of 
agricultural climate change assets and assure the flexibility to use them” (86) 







#60: Sandalow, David B. and Ian A. Bowles 2001. Fundamental of treaty-making on climate 
change. Science 292 (8 June), 1839-1840. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Sandalow is with WRI, Bowles with the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 





Type of argument     
Primary: Climate change is “an especially challenging public policy issue both for nations and 
for the international community as a whole” (1839) 
Secondary: “A treaty response in the short to medium term should accomplish at least three basic 
objectives. It should (i) create strong incentives to start to reduce GHG emissions, (ii) provide a 
cost-effective framework for international cooperation, and (iii) maintain options and flexibility 
as an international regime is built over the coming years and decades” (1839) 
Tertiary: 
Notes: 1992 FCCC and provisions 
Type of evidence     
Primary: IPCC citations about “scientific and political time scales are mismatched,” “responses 
to climate change involve modifications in energy and transportation infrastructure” (=”enormous 
investments already sunk in the status quo”), “widely varying national circumstances complicate 
policy responses,” and “defining the relative responsibilities of industrialized and developing 
countries in a manner acceptable to each is particularly challenging.” (1839) 





    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Adopt the Kyoto Protocol as possessing the “seven key elements we present for an 
effective treaty.” Policymakers “should be guided by a clear understanding of the urgency of the 








#61: Chandler, William 1997. The Economic Rewards of ‘No Regrets’ Climate Policies. 
Conference on Strengthening the Russian Economy through Climate Change Policies, 
Moscow, UNEP. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    





Type of argument     
Primary: “Cooperation between Russia and the developed nations such as the United States to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions would benefit both parties” (3) – Russia trading its cheap 
emissions reductions 
Secondary: Current economic tools (both macro & micro models) are inadequate for economies 
in transition – micro doesn’t account for economic restructuring costs; macro assumes 
equilibrium; both overestimate 
Tertiary: 
Notes: Discusses Joint Implementation under the FCCC 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Begins with a White House Conference on CC at which Clinton warned it would be a 
“grave mistake” to ignore global warming – ends with a quotation from Russian historian 
Nicholas Riasanovksy (ideas quickly give way to interests in a democracy) 
Secondary: Reality of poor Russian economy, which is still 1/7 of GDP and 3 Russian 
advantages: one of the world’s most energy-inefficient economies, possesses over half the 
world’s natural gas reserves, high level of technical sophistication could enable it to utilize 
advanced energy tech (data on all points) 
Tertiary: Model results and critique, along with Russian data & case study 
Notes: Uses IPCC data and scenarios 
Worldview/view of 
nature 
    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “A set of measures to share the burden of emissions reduction and to share resources 
for achieving those reductions may be the best one can expect in a less-than-perfect world. That 
means the [JI], offsets, and financing of projects would be desirable. A system of monitoring and 
verification would be necessary, but should be practicable” (10) 







#62: Shackleton, Robert G. 2003. The Economics of Climate Change: A Primer. Congress of 
the United States, Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC. Also available at 
http://www.cbo.gov  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Shackleton has written on the economics of climate change at EPA 
Secondary: The study was prepared at the request of the “Ranking Member of the House 





Type of argument     
Primary: “Over the next century, human activities will produce large quantities of greenhouse 
gases, and their accumulation in the atmosphere is expected to affect regional climates throughout 
the world. Those effects are very uncertain yet could prove serious and costly in at least some 
regions. However, restraints on emissions would also be costly and could be difficult to achieve 
in an efficient manner” (summary). 
Secondary: “The atmosphere is freely available to all, and greenhouse gases spread around the 
world no matter where they are emitted. Those characteristics make it very difficult to create 
property rights and markets for use of the atmosphere – and they make the climate issue 
international in scope. It may therefore fall to governments to develop alternative policies for 
addressing the risks posed by climate change” (summary). 
Tertiary:  
Notes 
Type of evidence     







    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “The challenge will be to develop policies that take advantage of low-cost 
opportunities to reduce emissions throughout the world, and to find an acceptable way to 
distribute costs and benefit among countries and regions with dramatically different 
circumstances and interests” (summary). 
Secondary: 
Tertiary: 
Notes: assumption that economic policies can accommodate the challenges of the atmosphere as 





#63: Chatterjee, Pratap and Matthias Finger 1994. “The Framework Convention on 
Climate Change” and “Conclusions.” In The Earth Brokers: Power, Politics and World 
Development. Routledge, London. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Chatterjee is “Global Environmental Editor of the Inter Press Service, Washington, 





Type of argument     
Primary: “Global ecology” brings into question the assumptions that industrial development will 
lead to “a rational society of free and responsible citizens” (3) – the means has become the end in 
the “development myth” – global ecology also undermines the nation-state and the military 
Secondary: “The negotiations for the climate convention are a good example of what happens if 
a global environmental problem cannot be turned – unlike the case of biodiversity – into the 
promotion of further industrial development. Therefore, the climate negotiations are probably 
best characterized as an ‘effort to avoid conflicting positions through vagueness and ambiguity’” 
(44) and the Convention is careful to state that the process should “enable economic development 
to proceed…” 
Tertiary: “Rather than facing up to the challenge of the limits to growth and the prospect of 
deindustrialization, UNCED has raised the promotion of economic growth to a planetary 
imperative” (172-3). 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Mostly assertion/theory about power relations and the development myth – calls the 
FCCC “this toothless framework” (45) and says it reinforces the notion that development will 
stop the poor from degrading the environment 
Secondary: Uses IPCC conclusions (“which stated in 1990 that unless emissions of greenhouse 
gases such as carbon dioxide were cut significantly, the world could face unprecedented global 
warming” and impacts (44) 
Tertiary: Quote from a representative of youth, Wagaki Mwangi (Kenya), who spoke on the day 
before Bush’s speech “Multinational corporations, the United States, Japan, the World Bank, The 
International Monetary Fund have got away with what they always wanted, carving out a better 
and more comfortable future for themselves…” (167). 
Notes: brief history of the Rio process leading to the FCCC 
Worldview/view of 
nature 
    





Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “Question The development process in its entirely … we must think and collectively 
behave in terms of the sustainability of a closed and finite system of local and regional resources, 
as well as of socially and culturally rooted users … we have no choice but to focus on the local, 
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its people, and its communities … and collectively un-learn the development paradigm of which 








#64: Plumwood, Val 1993. Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. Routledge, London. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 






Type of argument     
Primary: We need a common, integrated framework for the critique of both human domination 
and the domination of nature – integrating nature as a fourth category of analysis into the 
framework of an extended feminist theory which employs a race, class and gender analysis” (1-
2). 
Secondary: The man-nature dualism provides a basis to construct a “master story” that links the 
domination of humans and the domination of nature. 
Tertiary: Most attempted revisions of the master story (e.g., deep ecology) succeed only in 
reversing the terms. 
Notes 
Type of evidence     






    
Primary: “The category of nature is a field of multiple exclusion and control, not only of non-
humans, but of various groups of humans and aspects of human life which are cast as nature … 
passive, as non-agent and non-subject, as the ‘environment’ of invisible background conditions 
against which the ‘foreground’ achievements of reason or culture (provided typically by the 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “creating a democratic culture beyond dualism, ending colonizing relationships and 
finding a mutual, ethical basis for enriching coexistence with earth others” (196). 
Secondary: “If we are to survive into a livable future, we must take into our own hands the 
power to create, restore and explore different stories, with new main characters, better plots, and 







#65: Porritt, Jonathan 2003. “Take action or Climate Change Programme will fail to 
deliver. Press Notice (12 February). http://www.sd-
commission.gov/uk/events/news/pressrel/030212.htm  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Porritt is a known advocate of green politics. He is chairman of the Sustainable 





Type of argument     
Primary: “The Government’s Climate Change Programme is in danger of failing to deliver on its 
key goal … for reducing emissions of carbon dioxide.” “However, we believe the UK is likely to 
achieve its Kyoto target for reductions in greenhouse gases as a whole.” 
Secondary: “The emissions reductions from the 10 year transport plan are particularly at risk. 
And international air travel, not even included in the calculations or the goal, threatens to blow 
away all the good work in industry and other sectors.” 
Tertiary: 
Notes 
Type of evidence     






    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Do not “abandon the goal” but “redouble efforts to achieve it. There is still time to do 
so.” 
Secondary: The Government must now seize the opportunity of using the energy White Paper to 







#66: McMichael, A.J. 1993. Planetary Overload: Global Environmental change and the 
Health of the Human Species. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Especially 
“Introduction,” “Greenhouse Warming and Climate Change,” and “The Way Ahead.” 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: McMichael is a demographer who has written extensively on health and population 





Type of argument     
Primary: Humans may be an “endangered species”; “the risk arises from the disruption of 
natural systems because we are exceeding the biosphere’s carrying capacity – i.e. we are 
overloading the planet’s ‘metabolic’ capacity to absorb, replenish and restore” (1). 
Secondary: “If I had to reduce my argument…” (a) “:the one underlying problem is the 
entrenched inequality between rich and poor countries, which predominantly reflects recent 
imperial history, power relationships and the global dominance of Western industrial technology 
and economic values” (b) “the two central manifestations of this inequality are: (1) rapid, 
poverty-related, population growth and land degradation in poor countries, and (2) excessive 
consumption of energy and materials, with high production of wastes, in rich countries” (c) three 
possible outcomes: (1) exhausting various non-renewable materials, (2) toxic contamination of 
localized environments, and (3) impairment of the stability and productivity of the biosphere’s 
natural systems” (7). 
Tertiary: “it is likely … that the indirect effects [of climate change] will, in aggregate, outweigh 
the direct effects. Alterations in patterns of vector-borne infectious diseases, reductions in 
agricultural productivity and the social disruption caused by sea-level rise and associated disasters 
could all become major public health problems. Regional declines in agriculture will accelerate 
the flight to the cities by impoverished rural dwellers” (169-170).  
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Statistics about climate, the greenhouse effect (with diagram), carbon cycle (Earth’s 
“metabolism”) (with diagram), emissions of GHGs (with table and graph), and cc projections 






    
Primary: The Earth has a finite “carrying capacity” that humans are exceeding; “planetary 
overload” will destroy the Earth’s ability to support life. 
Secondary: 
Tertiary: 
Notes: Cc included in a list of global changes: cc, ozone layer depletion, land degradation and 
loss of biodiversity 
Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “The solution lies in controlling world population growth, weaning societies off cheap 
fossil-fuel energy and redistributing international wealth to obviate the need for inefficient 
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#67: UK Climate Impacts Programme, Department for Environment Food and Rural 
Affairs, and Environment Agency 2003. Climate Adaptation: Risk, Uncertainty and Decision-
Making. UKCIP, Oxford, UK. Also at http://www.ukcip.org.uk  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: The UK CIP has been actively engaging stakeholders in projecting climate impacts for 
various regions of the UK and in proposing adaptation strategies and actions. 
Secondary: The booklet is targeted specifically at decision-makers, to help them if they “manage 
the consequences of present-day variability in weather or climate; make decisions with long-term 
consequences (decades or longer) for land-use, built assets or population groups; are responsible 




Type of argument     
Primary: “We now have convincing evidence that our climate is changing and that these changes 
are not part of a natural cycle. However,” both the nature of the change and its effects are 
uncertain (1). 








Notes: assumption that readers agree with the arguments made 
Worldview/view of 
nature 
    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Use an eight-stage decision-making framework: identify problem and objectives, 
establish decision-making criteria, assess risk, identify options, appraise options, make decision, 
implement decision, monitor (then return to identify problem and objectives – start over) (4) 
Secondary: “Try to keep your options open and flexible … avoid making decisions that will 
make it more difficult to cope with future climate … try to find ‘no regret’ options, which will 







#68: The World Energy Modernization Plan. http://www.heatisonline.org/contentserve  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: This is a report of an ad hoc group that met during the summer of 1998 at the Center 
for Health and Global Environment at Harvard Medical School. Conveners were Dr. Paul 
Epstein, Associate Director of the Center; and Ross Gelbspan, author of “The Heat Is On.” 
Secondary: Twelve other participants are named, some academics, some from environmental 




Type of argument     
Primary: [See five proposals in “Secondary” below.] 
Secondary:  
Tertiary:  
Notes: Text begins with the Kyoto Protocol and the “dangerous” quote from the FCCC. 
Type of evidence     






    
Primary: implicit – focuses on human choices about which resources from nature to use (fossil 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “We propose a worldwide project to modernize the global energy infrastructure over 
the next 15-25 years. … We believe a set of interactive and mutually reinforcing strategies based 
on an international fund combined with fossil fuel efficiency and renewable energy standards can 
help accelerate a global energy transition, the benefits of which would reverberate through our 
social and economic systems.” 
Secondary: Five specifics: (1) “The elimination of national subsidies in industrial countries for 
fossil fuels and the provision of equivalent subsidies to develop and deploy renewable and highly 
efficient energy techs and job retraining for displaces workers in the fossil fuel industries.” (2) 
“The adoption internationally of progressively more stringent Fossil Fuel and Renewable Content 
Standards as a complement to the emissions ‘cap and trade’ system embodies in the Kyoto 
Protocol.” (3) “The elimination of regulatory barriers which impede competition and support 
wasteful, inefficient high-carbon techs in order to create freer competition in energy according to 
the criteria of cost, efficiency and low-carbon content.” (4) “The creation of a World Energy 
Modernization Fund using the revenues from a tax on international currency transactions or other 
comparable revenue sources to finance the development and transfer of climate-friendly 
(renewable, high-efficiency and low-carbon) techs to developing nations.” (6) “The creation of a 
new agency or the authorization of an existing agency under the Kyoto Protocol to facilitate a 
rapid transition to climate-friendly … energy facilities worldwide through transfer of techs and 









#69: Burnett, H. Sterling 2002. “Ask the Expert.” Global Warming Hotline. National 
Center for Policy Analysis. http://globalwarming.ncpa.org/askthex/  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: The NCPA “is a 501 (c)(3) nonprofit public policy organization” that believes in 
private sector solutions to public policy problems. 
Secondary: Dr. Burnett is identified as the “environmental expert” from NCPA. 
Tertiary: 
Notes: This is a series of questions from students and answers from Burnett about climate 
change. 
 
Type of argument     
Primary: Although there is correlation between current warming and rise in greenhouse gas 
emissions, there is no proof of causation. 
Secondary: However, we should attempt to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions because global 
warming may be occurring and we can benefit from doing so. 
Tertiary:  
Notes 
Type of evidence     






    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: The “key to preventing tragedy from human caused global warming” is a strong 
economic “which will grow the worlds [sic] wealth” so that we can “prepare for and mitigate the 
negative impacts of climate change. 







#70: Harré, Rom, Jens Brockmeier and Peter Mühlhäusler 1999. Greenspeak: A Study of 
Environmental Discourse, especially pp. 22-3, 61-8, 115-116, 173-188. Sage, Thousand Oaks, 
CA. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Harrè “has long been a preeminent and influential voice whose work is recognized in 
many disciplines. In the last 20 years he has been a pioneer in developing the theory and practice 
of discursive psychology. … His interests range from the analyses of emotions to social theories 
and linguistics.”  
Secondary: Brockmeier “teaches psychology and philosophy at the Free University of Berlin,” 
has a recent book The Literate Mind: Literacy and the Relation Between Language and Culture. 
Tertiary: Mühlhäusler has a background in linguistics; “from 1979 to 1992 [he] was University 
Lecturer in General Linguistics and a Fellow of Linacre College at the University of Oxford, 
where jointly with Rom Harré he began to offer classes on language and environment.” 
Notes 
 
Type of argument     
Primary: Make room for all the voices in the debate; in particular, the public should “be charged 
to apply the standard: ‘How do we wish to live?’ to scientific plans, results and hazards” (Beck, 
quoted on 188). 
Secondary: The metaphors of Gaia and the greenhouse are opposed because Gaia is self-
regulating and humans have no effect, whereas in the greenhouse humans control nature. A third 
model, cycles and balances, pictures humans as affecting the environment much faster than 
earlier “photobionts.” 
Tertiary: Other metaphors include “buying insurance,” the “carbon budget” and the “memory of 
the atmosphere.” No one agreed-on metaphor describes global warming. 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: material from the Linacre Lectures 1992-1994, reports of and contributions to the Rio 
Summit (where the FCCC was adopted), manifesto of the British Green Party, Statement on the 
use of nuclear energy by British Nuclear Fuels, C.C.W. Taylor’s 1992 collection of essays on 
environmental topics, examples collected by Mühlhäusler 1976-1996, and scientific papers from 






    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Keep the conversation going; build on the prevalent rights-based arguments and 
enlarge “the scope of morally protected beings” (182). “The ultimate value that we believe we 
can see running through the centuries of ever-changing Greenspeak is aesthetic, the conception of 
a certain rightness in the way human life must fit in as part of nature” (187) – also “the moral 
center, namely, that we do have moral responsibility and rights and duties with respect to the 
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#71: Conway, Jill Ker, Kenneth Keniston and Leo Marx 1999. The New 
Environmentalisms. Pp. 1-29 in Earth, Air, Fire, Water: Humanistic Studies of the 
Environment, Jill Ker Conway, Kenneth Keniston and Leo Marx (eds). University of 
Massachusetts Press, Amherst. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    





Type of argument     
Primary: Environmentalism is not one thing, but a “diffuse collection of ideas and groups” (7) 
including the National Rifle Association, deep ecologists, tree huggers, etc. They can be 
classified on different axes: ecocentrism versus anthropocentrism, apocalypticism versus 
gradualism, materialism versus idealism, primitivism versus presentism, worldview versus issue, 
global versus local perspective, ecofeminists versus material feminists, North versus South, wise 
use versus forever wild, government intervention versus market changes. 
Secondary: Many positions are not incompatible but must be matched to the problem; for 
example, apocalyptic views were appropriate for the ozone problem. 
Tertiary: “the well-being of the environment seems to involve importantly both changes in the 
values that issue in rampant consumerism … and, at the same time, changes in technology that 
will permit them to do so and will permit other nations to realize their aspirations for a more 
adequate standard of life without overloading the planet’s fragile environmental balance.” (25) 
Notes 
Type of evidence     






    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Humanists have two tasks: “to study the ways that human beings actually interact with 
– not merely talk about – nonhuman nature … contribute to an understanding of environmental 
discourse” and “to study the precise ways that culturally and psychologically patterned behavior 
contributes to the despoliation of the environment and the possibility or impossibility of 
alleviating it” – e.g., why people over-consume, pursue endless growth, are not mobilized against 
environmental problems (7)  
Secondary: “In contrast, there are other issues where a prudent gradualism makes sense: for 
example, issues involving the causes and remedies of global warming. In this case, present 
knowledge is limited, and existing models do not enable us to predict catastrophe if we fail to 
take immediate, costly action, even though prudence would nonetheless seem to justify a serious 










#72: Worster, Donald 1999. Climate and History: Lessons from the Great Plains. Pp. 51-77 
in Earth, Air, Fire, Water: Humanistic Studies of the Environment, Jill Ker Conway, Kenneth 
Keniston and Leo Marx (eds). University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Worster “is Hall Distinguished Professor of American History at the University of 
Kansas. He has published nine books on environmental history, the history of ecology, and the 
history of the American West. His book on the Dust Bowl of the 1930s (Oxford U Press, 1979) 





Type of argument     
Primary: The rosy views of the climate of the American West and the ease of adjustment to its 
climatic shifts are both unrealistic (“naïve” and “wildly misinformed”). The climate is not so 
salubrious, and “the road from 1900 to the present has required massive demographic dislocations 
and great human and ecological costs and has produced a sharp-toothed anxiety gnawing at our 
national self-confidence” (55). 
Secondary: “It is hard to adapt to a climate that you do not fully understand or do not fully want 
to accept” (56). 
Tertiary: Three lessons: “Climate, we are now beginning to acknowledge, is so complicated a 
series of events that we may never be able to make predictions that a farmer can rely on” (59). 
“Trying to control nature through technology is never a fully adequate or long-term approach to 
successful adaptation. … Adaptation to the environment, if it is to be lasting, must be cultural and 
social as well as technological” (61). “the best adaptation to a volatile climate can never be 
achieved merely by a system of private property and marketplace economics. Nor can it be 
achieved by supplementing that system with expensive, endless government relief or subsidies” 
(71-2). 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: historical evidence about the climate and its impacts 
Secondary: cultural history – pioneers wanted the unlimited prosperity the West seemed to offer, 
so constructed the Great Plains as a “garden”; Frederick Clements, convinced of the regularity of 
all natural things, posited a “climax” plant community 









Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “The best hope for avoiding another Dust Bowl lies in restoring more of the plains to 
their natural, preagricultural condition” (65) through “state or federal purchase of land title or the 
purchase of conservation easements in perpetuity” (71) to revert to grassland. 
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Secondary: Reverse the policies that reward risky behavior vis a vis the environment – don’t bail 
farmers out. “What happens when we remove risk from the physical environment? Does it lead to 








#73: U.S. Department of State 2003. United States Global Climate Change Policy. Fact 
Sheet, February 27. http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/fs/2003/18055.htm  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: The State Department should presumably speak for the Administration. 




Type of argument     
Primary: The strategy of reducing greenhouse gas intensity “will set America on a path to slow 
the growth of greenhouse gas emissions, and – as the science justifies – to stop, and then reverse 
that growth.” 
Secondary: “The President’s policy also continue the United States’ leadership role in supporting 
vital climate change research, laying the groundwork for future action by investing in science, 
technology, and institutions.” 
Tertiary: The strategy “emphasizes international cooperation and promotes working with other 
nations to develop an efficient and coordinated response to global climate change.” 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Details of how much $$ will be spent in developing nations, multilateral partnerships, 
and bilateral partnerships  





    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Support “significant funding for climate change-related science and technology 
research, development, and transfer in the developing world.” 
Secondary: Support DOE multilateral climate change-related technology research and 
development 
Tertiary: Commit to “working with other nations, especially developing countries, to build 







#74: Coon, Charli E. March 6, 2002. President Bush’s Climate Change Proposal. 
WebMemo #83, The Heritage Foundation. 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/WM83.cfm?renderforprint=1  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Coon is listed as a senior analyst who has a law degree and is working on a masters in 
environmental science. 




Type of argument     
Primary: After President Bush “courageously rejected the Kyoto Protocol … it is disconcerting 
then, that [he] endorses an initiative to reduce these emissions.” I.e., the policy to cut greenhouse 
gas intensity is inconsistent with his former, correct stance. 
Secondary: Parts of the plan that are good are support for more basic scientific research, and 
advanced energy and sequestration technologies. 
Tertiary: “Likewise the President’s resolve to sustain economic growth while conducting further 
research on global warming is vital” but the structure for voluntary reductions “sends a mixed 
message to businesses and investors as to the President’s commitment to economic growth and 
prosperity.” 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Assertions, e.g., “As the President noted in rejecting the Kyoto Protocol, such 
mandatory reductions would hurt American workers and the U.S. economy.” 
Secondary: Details of the policy, e.g., the 1605(b) voluntary reporting program for ghg 






    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “Committing federal funds to sound research and innovative technologies is the 









#75: Robinson, Dan. February 15, 2002. Environmentalists Criticize Bush Climate Change 
Policy. VOA News. http://greennature.com/article839.html  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    





Type of argument     
Primary: President Bush’s “Clear Skies” initiative has been criticized as inadequate and likely to 
increase greenhouse gas emissions. 
Secondary: Voluntary programs will lead to increased U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.  
Tertiary:  
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Quotations from Jennifer Morgan (WWF), Gregg Easterbrook (Brookings Institution), 






    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: The United States needs to join other nations (Japan, European nations, Russia) in 









#76: Dessai, Suraje 2002. The Special Climate Change Fund: Origins and Prioritisation. 
The Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research and EURONATURA Centre for 
Environmental Law and Sustainable Development, Lisbon. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Dessai is “currently supported by a grant from a Portuguese foundation. An article and 





Type of argument     
Primary: “Prioritising measures to reduce adverse effects (adaptation) would be better since the 
possibility for regret is less.” 
Secondary: “it seems clear that adaptation should be prioritized over mitigation because a market 
mechanism already exists for the latter.” 
Tertiary:  
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Meticulous history of the fund, to explain why so many activities are included. 
“principles suggested in this paper, all based on the Convention” 
Secondary: Model results. Adverse effects are more certain because “scientific knowledge” 
based on models (uncertain both for impacts of response measures and adverse effects) and non-
modeling lit (“There is no supplementary non-model based evidence for impacts of response 
measures … no reliable counterpart information”). Some models say mitigation is more 
expensive, some say adaptation. 




    
Primary: “the fact that the Marrakesh Accords have commodified the atmospheric commons” – 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: The Special Climate Change Fund should give priority in its activities to adaptation 
first, followed by mitigation and finally economic diversification. 
Secondary: “Projects that tackle mitigation and adaptation together could be given priority 
within this fund.” 
Tertiary:  
Notes: “The application of these principles could facilitate the negotiation of the process within 






#77: Braasch, Gary 2003. World View of Global Warming. 
http://www.worldviewofglobalwarming.org/  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: “This project is featured in the Nieman Reports, Harvard University, Winter 2002, in a 
special section on Environmental Reporting.” 
Secondary: “is a project of the Blue Earth Alliance, Seattle, WA, a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt 
organization. The project is supported entirely by donations, grants, and license fees for the 
photographs.” 
Tertiary: 
Notes: The main graphic is a globe with thermometers that one can click on for views of parts of 
the world where warming is occurring. 
 
Type of argument     
Primary: “Science photography” shows how climate is changing “from the Arctic to Antarctica.” 
Secondary: “It is real, it is accelerating across the globe, and as it combines with overpopulation 
and weather crises, it will affect more people than does war.” “This is a story of frightening scale 
and great urgency that is just beginning to be told.”  
Tertiary:  
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Photographs. 
Secondary: Graphs showing global average temperature from 1000 to 2000 and global air 
temperature from 1856 to 2001. 




    
Primary: Nature as victim of humans: “The plants and animals with whom we share the planet 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “We six billion humans are being affected, too, but we have choices to make to help 
correct and ameliorate global warming.” 
Secondary: list of actions (a link), including many ways to reduce energy use, electing 
“responsible leaders,” “Reduce sprawl and the paving of the landscape,” “Build for efficiency and 







#78: Huq, Saleeemul 2001. Climate Change Conference in Bonn: What Does It Mean for 
Bangladesh? Retrieved May 29, 2003 from the internet. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    





Type of argument     
Primary: The Bonn agreement (COP6 in Bonn, July 2001) to ratify the Kyoto Protocol “shows 
the will of the world to carry out the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol even without the US 
(which is the world’s greatest emitter to greenhouse gases) … opens up a sizable new market for 
carbon trading across the world … puts in place several new special funds … from Bangladesh’s 
perspective it opens the door to possibly substantial levels of additional funding.” 
Secondary: Bangladesh, as a country facing severe impacts from global warming, must work 
hard and make “early applications in the correct format” to gain new funding “DCM, adaptation 
capacity building, etc.) 
Tertiary:  
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: association between the consequences of climate change for Bangladesh and the 






    
Primary: “if we move with foresight and skill we may be able to discover the silver lining hiding 
in the dark clouds of climate change looming on the horizon” – i.e., economic gain can come 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “in order for Bangladesh to take advantage of the new development in the climate 
change arena it is necessary for it to make a timely and well thought out push for additional 
funding in the very short term and in the longer term to develop its own capacity to both cope 
with climate change impacts (i.e., to build adaptive capacity) and also engage in the ongoing 









#79: Blanchard, Odile, Patrick Criqui, Michel Trommetter and Laurent Viguier 2001. 
Equity and Efficiency in Climate Change Negotiations: A Scenario for World Emission 
Entitlements by 2030. Cahier de recherché No. 26, Institute d’économie et de politique de 
l’énergie, Grenoble. http://www.upmf-grenoble.fr/iepe  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 






Type of argument     
Primary: “no differentiation rule and no single principle of justice have been found that might 
receive a consensus among all the countries” 
Secondary: “we show that the reimplementation of an international emission trading system 
would re-establish ex post the efficiency which a priori does not exist in the initial allocation of 
rights. The utilitarian concept of justice would therefore also be respected.” 
Tertiary:  
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: theoretical discussion of six equity principles: equality of rights, utilitarian equality, 
democratic equality, causal responsibility, merit, proportional equality. 





    





Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Institute differentiated responsibilities to reduce emissions, based on countries’ 
historical emissions and ability to pay for reductions – the sooner both rise, the sooner they have 
to reduce emissions. Therefore, emissions per capita will converge over time. 







#80: Unfair Burden? “December 9, 1997. Newshour” transcript. 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/environment/july-dec97/india_12-9.html  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Naresh Chandra, the person interviewed, was at the time India’s ambassador to the 
United States. 
Secondary: Margaret Warner is the interviewer on PBS. 
Tertiary: 
Notes: This is part of the run-up to the Kyoto Conference of the Parties (COP-3), that produced 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Type of argument     
Primary: “Well, at the moment we have a much higher and urgent priority, and that is 
eradication of poverty, removal of backwardness, and improving the level of living of our people. 
That is a much great, urgent necessity than the long-term aim of controlling greenhouse gas 
emissions.” 
Secondary: “developed countries have to take the fastest steps” because “the level of energy 
generation and consumption in very high in the developed industrialized nations,” “have the 
resources and the technical competence,” and “”poverty is by itself a great polluter”  
Tertiary: Developing countries are different – some, unlike India, have natural gas resources, 
which will produce little carbon. 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: argument from differences among countries, including natural resources, responsibility 






    





Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Developed, industrialized countries must take the first steps. 








#81: Global Warming – A Corporate Perspective. December 5, 1997. “Newshour” 
transcript. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/environment/july-dec97/air_12-5.html  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Fredrick Palmer “is CEO of Western Fuels Association, an energy cooperative that 
supplies coal to electrical power plants in the Western U.S.” 
Secondary: Margaret Warner is the interviewer from PBS. 
Tertiary: 
Notes: This is part of the run-up to the Kyoto Conference of the Parties (COP-3), that produced 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Type of argument     
Primary: “There is concern over global warming. There are computer models that project 
catastrophic global warming fifty or a hundred years from now, but observations from satellites 
and weather balloons over the last twenty to forty years suggest that there is not human-induced 
global warming.” The models are flawed. The 1-degree increase in temperature over the past 
century is the result of coming out of a little ice age. 
Secondary: Cheap energy from fossil fuels is needed for our way of life. 
Tertiary: “CO2 is a benign limiting nutrient that for plants, agriculture, and forests, a buildup of 
greenhouse gases of CO2 in the atmosphere is something that should be welcomed and not 
feared. The impact will be benign in that we will have more productivity in agriculture…warm is 
good; ice ages are bad.” 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Satellite data show cooling and “satellites are the best measurement of temperature for 
the globe.” 
Secondary: Ground-based data come from cities and reflect the urban heat island effect. 









Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “We want to use more of them [fossil fuels]. We want to use them cleanly and 
efficiently, but more of them.” 
Secondary: 
Tertiary: 





#82: Global Environmental Facility and the United Nations Development Programme. 1997. 
Capacity Building for the Rapid Commercialization of Renewable Energy. Project 
description. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: The GEF “is a financial mechanism that provides grants and concessional funds to 





Type of argument     
Primary: China should implement “an aggressive program to develop renewable energy, 




Type of evidence     
Primary: The increasing need for energy in China, the potential of various sources, and a list of 
the barriers (“limited capacity to disseminate renewable energy through market mechanisms, 
institutional fragmentation, lack of business skills, incomplete assessment of renewable resources, 
lack of facilities for testing and certifying equipment, high cost of renewable energy systems, and 






    
Primary: China is the second-largest contributor to climate change, but can develop renewable 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: First objective is “to develop national capacity for the rapid commercialization of 
renewable energy in China” through “operationalizing market-oriented renewable energy 
dissemination, strengthening China’s center for renewable energy development, training 
policymakers, renewable energy professionals, and businesspeople… and developing standards, 
codes of practice, and certification procedures for the … industry.” 
Secondary: Second objective is to “begin removing barriers to the widespread dissemination of 
promising alternative energy technologies” through “electrification through solar and hybrid 
systems, wind farm development, large-scale anaerobic biogas production, and bagasse 
cogeneration.” 
Tertiary: 





#83: Johansen, Bruce E. 1999. Review of Global Warming: The Essential Facts. 
http://nativeamericas.aip.cornell.edu/fall99/fall99r.html  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Johansen, “Robert T. Reilly Professor of Communication and Native American Studies 
at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, is author of Debating Democracy: The Iroquois Legacy 
of Freedom.” 
Secondary: John Houghton is the atmospheric scientist who has headed the IPCC’s Working 




Type of argument     
Primary: “While a lively debate in political circles and the press questions whether human 
activity is significantly warming the Earth, scientific evidence has been accumulating in support 
of the idea.” 
Secondary: Global warming will likely increase the number of violent storms and associated 
deaths and damage, deaths from extreme heat, and diseases. 
Tertiary:  
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Data about the rise of carbon dioxide and other GHGs in the atmosphere and the 
acceleration since 1950, with large annual variations. 
Secondary: Data about increases in temperature and increased energy use during the same 





    




Action(s) proposed     









#84: Shove, Elizabeth 1996. Working Back from the Future. Unpublished paper, Centre for 
the Study of Environmental Change, Lancaster University, UK. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Shove is a social scientist who studies energy use and lifestyle. 
Secondary: 
Tertiary: 
Notes: This was one output of a workshop on choice, culture, and technology – a working group 
on Sustainable Consumption and “Individual Travel Behavior” 
 
Type of argument     
Primary: The policy relevance of modeling techniques can be improves “by incorporating social 
factors or, more ambitiously, by drawing in ’new’ theoretical approaches from the social 
sciences” (2) 
Secondary: The mechanism of choice is how models account for differences in transportation 
modes, but producers and consumers alike often claim they have “no choice.” 
Tertiary:  
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Typical model projections of the future “have been concerned with the modeling (both 
forecasting and developing scenarios) of demand for energy”; policy=national policy (2). 










Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Think about a future desirable state, e.g., “what else would the social and 
organizational world be like if energy consumption were to be reduced?” or even “What would 
the world be like if 60% of journeys were made by bicycle..?” (7) 
Secondary: For global warming, instead of specifying a future that can be avoided by policy and 
technology, it should be useful to specify a desirable future and explore how the varying time 
horizons of the natural world, technologies, social-cultural practices, economic conditions, and 







#85: Slade, H.E. Ambassador Tuiloma Neroni 2000. Linking Science and Climate Change 
Policy. Overview Address at the Pacific Islands Climate Change Conference, Rarotonga, 
Cook Islands, 3-7 April. 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Slade is the Permanent Representative of Samoa to the United Nations and Chairman 





Type of argument     
Primary: “We would see science as providing an essential component in the search for feasible 
pathways towards the management of the environment and towards sustainable development.” 
Secondary: “Equally, we have maintained that the precautionary approach provides a sensible 
and essential basis for policies relating to complex systems that are not yet fully understood and 
whose consequences of disturbances cannot yet be predicted.” 
Tertiary:  
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: History of the processes and meetings: meeting in Apia in 1996 on Science and 
Impacts of Climate Change in the Pacific, Third Climate Change meeting in New Caledonia, 22nd 
UN General Assembly special session in November 1999 & the priority areas closely related to 
climate change identified there, successive reports to the Commission on Sustainable 
Development pertaining to Small island States 
Secondary: FCCC and its principles, the Kyoto Protocol, established AOSIS objectives deriving 





    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: For science: “enhance scientific understanding; improve long-term scientific 
assessments; strengthen scientific capacities in all countries, especially developing countries and, 
in the context of our conference, small island States in particular; and ensure that the sciences are 
responsive to changing needs.” 
Secondary: For “effective policy implementation that links global environmental issues and 
sustainable development”: “scientific understanding of the nature of the links among 
environmental issues and their relationship to meeting human needs…,” identification of 
innovative combinations of policies that are effective and cost efficient and that encourage the 
public and private sectors to work together; political and public commitment… and improved 
coordination among the national, regional and international institutions charged with developing 
and encouraging adoption of policies and measures to meet human needs, without undermining 









#86: Ashford, Graham and Jennifer Castleden 2001. Inuit Observations on Climate Change: 
Final Report. Institute for Sustainable Development. 
http://www.iisd.org/casl/projects/inuitobs.htm  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Support for the project came from the Government of Canada’s Climate Change 
Action Fund, the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, and 




Notes: The project team visited the community four times, to videotape scenes from the Inuit way 
of life and to audiotape interviews about the changes local people had observed. 
 
Type of argument     
Primary: “This community’s [Inuvialuit of Sachs Harbour] way of life is at risk, an urgent 





Type of evidence     
Primary: data on later autumn freeze-up, spring thaw earlier, smaller sea ice and thinner winter 




Notes: assumption that observations of local people are scientific data 
Worldview/view of 
nature 
    
Primary: “Residents have a close relationship with the Arctic environment. They still harvest 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Continue and expand efforts to communicate the changes in climate being seen in 
Sachs Harbour, especially to policymakers 
Secondary: scale up the research and extend to the opposite side of the world (Siberia) and the 
southern pole region; incorporate findings into education curricula; monitor the health of local 







#87: What about the Effects of Coal Burning on Climate? The Greening Earth Society. 
http://www.bydesign.com/fossilfuels/crisis/html/climate_change.html  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    





Type of argument     
Primary: “CO2 is the stuff of life, so how can CO2 be bad?” 
Secondary: CO2 from U.S. coal burning is “just a tiny fraction of all the burning of stuff done by 
the 6 billion people on the planet, perhaps one quarter of one percent of the total” and “just a tiny 
fraction of the CO2 that comes from other, ‘natural’ sources.” 
Tertiary:  
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: use of down-to-earth language to make “simple” arguments, e.g., “CO2 is what plants 
eat” (so CO2 is good and maybe we should have more of it, not less) and “First of all, the whole 






    
Primary: CO2 is natural, what plants eat, and coal “is nothing but the remains of the billions and 





Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “So right off the bat there are no clear or simple answers regarding climate change or 
global warming. So there is also no clear, simple reason to do anything about it at this time. At 









#88: Minnesotans for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ME3) 2002. Policies for a Clean 
Future: Greening Our Electricity Industry. 
http://www.me3.org/issues/climate/withfire2002.html  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    





Type of argument     
Primary: “Electricity generation is the single largest source of pollution and greenhouse gas 
emissions in Minnesota.” 
Secondary: “We cannot fight climate change without moving to cleaner sources of electricity.” 
Tertiary:  
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: stats about coal use, pie graph 
Secondary: projections of savings, feasibility of increasing the percentage of renewable use to 
10% or 20% 









Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “consideration should be given to tax reforms that promote environmental 
improvements while expanding Minnesota’s economy.” 
Secondary: “We need to make public transit more accessible and reliable by increasing the 
frequency, regularity, and coverage of our transit system,” and government should lead by 
example by “purchasing clean vehicles for their fleets.” 
Tertiary: “Research by ME3 and its colleagues at the Center for Energy and Environment and 







#89: Kirby, Alex 1999 (June 4). Nuking Climate Change. BBC News. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/368584.stm  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Kirby is identified as an “environment correspondent.” 
Secondary: The report the article is drawn from was issued by the Royal Society and the Royal 
Academy of Engineering.  
Tertiary: 
Notes: This is a news article about a report, Nuclear Energy – the Future Climate. 
 
Type of argument     
Primary: “The report says: ‘There is a strong case for acting to mitigate the threat of drastic 
climate change associated with the unrestrained continuation of this trend [toward higher levels of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide].’” 
Secondary: Use of renewables, energy conservation, and efficiency may not be enough; nuclear 
may be needed. 
Tertiary: “’Public confidence is central to the future of the nuclear enterprise.’” 
Notes: The final section of the report says that Friends of the Earth responded, “More radioactive 
waste is not the answer to climate change” and Forum for the Future said, “We do not accept the 
report’s arguments. 
Type of evidence     
Primary: stats and projections about the rise of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere 
Secondary: photo of construction site for a nuclear energy plant and another plant identified in 





    
Primary: climate is being affected by CO2 emissions; people should manage the climate by 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “planners should now assume that new nuclear plants may be required in the course of 









#90: Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout 1997 (November 28). Nuclear Power Is Not the 
Solution to Climate Change. http://www.ccnr.org/no_nukes_cnp.html  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: No author is given. 
Secondary: The article is on the website of the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility 
(CCNR).  
Tertiary: 
Notes: The first paragraph states that Cretien, boosted by the Canadian Nuclear Association, “has 
suggested that nuclear energy may be part of his platform at the climate change negotiations in 
Kyoto.” 
 
Type of argument     
Primary: “Exporting nuclear reactors just adds more problems to those that already exist” (Dr. 
Gordon Edwards of CCNR), seconded by Krene Kock of the Nuclear awareness Project 
Secondary: “Every dollar invested in energy efficiency displaces seven times as much CO2 
emissions as the same dollar invested in nuclear power” – investing in nuclear just diverts money 
that would be better spent. 
Tertiary: The nuclear industry is just trying to save itself, and Cretien should not be its salesman. 
Notes 
Type of evidence     






    





Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “Canada shouldn’t get greenhouse gas credits for selling or using nuclear power, 








#91: Clean Water Action. No date, but internal evidence that it was written post-January 
29, 2003. Renewable Energy/Climate Change. 
http://www.cleanwateraction.org/ct/energy.html  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: No author given. 
Secondary: This is the site of a group, part of a “coalition of over 100 environmental, health, 
religious, and science-based groups throughout New England” that supports the Climate Change 
Action Plan adopted by the New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers in August 




Type of argument     
Primary: Climate is changing (temp, precip and SLR) and will have effects in health, ag, forests, 




Type of evidence     
Primary: Data from US National Climatic Data Center and EPA 
Secondary: Details and side-by-side comparison of the Connecticut Climate Action Project and 





    
Primary: “We can choose to pollute the air which aggravates asthma and other respiratory 
problems, contributes to climate change, and increases our dependence on foreign oil OR we can 
chose [sic] to be part of the vibrant living planet, making sustainable choices that apply human 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: (1) “By 2010, reduce state GHG emissions to levels 10% below 1990 levels.” (2) 
“Establish a schedule and process for developing timelines to meeting the long-term reduction 
goals of 75-85%.” (3) “…establish a system of mandatory reporting of CO2 and other GHG 
emissions by 2005.” (4) “The states should lead by example by reducing state government’s use 
by 25% overall by 2010.” 







#92: McKibben, Bill 2001. Where Do We Go from Here? Daedalus special issue, Religion 
and Ecology: Can the Climate Change? 
http://www.daedelus.amacad.org/issues/fall2001/mckibben.htm  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: McKibben is the author of The End of History. 




Type of argument     
Primary: “Now, responding to the urgent alarms of scientists, historians of religion and 
theologians have pored over old texts and traditions, seeking to find in them sources for a new 
environmental ethics – a repair guide for what suddenly seems our most broken relationship of 
all, namely our human relationship to the natural habitat.” 
Secondary: However, “few religious leaders have stepped forward to make these new 
understandings central parts of their work.” 
Tertiary: “We need to build on the work begun by this project to bring together ideas and 
action.” 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: results from “a series of Harvard conferences and books on world religions and 
ecology” 
Secondary: civil rights movement in the U.S. and liberation theology in Latin America, Asia, and 
Africa “could bring important perspectives to the question of religious understanding of the 
human-Earth relationship” 
Tertiary: visions of “what would happen” if religious leaders joined environmental activist 
causes – might change the political dynamic but would certainly make people think seriously 
“about what their traditions demand. They would have no choice but to begin viewing the facts 
about global warming, laid out with understated power by Michael McElroy, as the story of 
human beings grown too large in relation to their planet, a position that almost requires reference 




    
Primary: “Ecology may rescue religion at least as much as the other way around. By offering a 
persuasive practical reason to resist the endless obliterating spread of consumerism, it makes of 
Creation a flag round which to rally. And it is a flag planted not in the past, but in the present and 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “Political activists within the churches, synagogues, mosques, and temples doubtless 
fear marginalization if they get too far outside the mainstream, but in fact they are marginalized 
now, invisible within the smothering consensus of our society. It is only by getting far enough out 




Secondary: “Imagine gatherings where theologians and scholars and activists came together – 
and did not leave until they had worked out plans for closing down a polluting power plant, 
opening up new funding for alternative energy, or any of a hundred other tasks: specific actions, 
which they would help to carry out in the days and weeks ahead.” E.g., Episcopal Power and 
Light (markets green energy), Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economics (CERES), 








#93: Society, Religion and Technology Project 1998. International Petition to Governments 
of Industrialised Countries. Church of Scotland. http://www.srtp.org.uk/climpet2.htm  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: The petition was initiated by the World Council of Churches (which has a reputation 
for being “liberal”) and has the imprimatur of the Church of Scotland. 
Secondary: When the petition was presented to the chair of the UN negotiating meeting held in 
Bonn in March 1998, “Former German President Richard von Weizsaecker made a strong address 




Type of argument     
Primary: Series of statements: “Climate change is a serious threat to the well-being of God’s 
creation.” International consensus, problem of burning fossil fuels, industrialized countries the 
cause, most impacts on developing countries. 
















Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “The signatories of this petition call on HM Government “(1) to set specific targets for 
reducing CO2 levels in the UK beyond 2000; (2) to implement appropriate measures to 
incorporate the environmental costs of burning fossil fuel in the price of coal, oil, gas and their 
products; (3) to increase energy efficiency by providing greater incentives and assistance to 
domestic and commercial users; (4) to pursue a rigorous policy of replacing fossil fuels by 
renewable energy, making full use of Scotland’s abundant renewable potential; (5) to provide 
assistance in environmentally-friendly technologies to developing countries as they industrialise 
and to countries of Eastern Europe.” 
Secondary: “For our part: we declare our readiness to accept the consequences of such 
reductions on our society, economy and personal lives; we are prepared to take steps in our way 
of life to reduce our energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions; we believe such changes 







#94: Müller, Benito 2002. Equity in Climate Change: The Great Divide. Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies. http://www.ejcc.org/resources_tech.html  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: This paper was also “scheduled to be published as a Viewpoint ‘A New Delhi 
Mandate?’ in Climate Policy 79(2002), 1-3. 




Type of argument     
Primary: North-South Divide: North concerned with setting emissions targets, South with “the 
discrepancy between the responsibility for, and the sharing of climate impact burdens.” (1) The 
North has set the agenda, ignoring the concerns of the South. 
Secondary: Need to “put much greater effort into thinking of innovative ways in which these 
human impact burdens could be distributed.” (2) “The reduction – avoidance and limitation – of 
unacceptable climate impacts on individuals and societies can be achieve both by reducing the 
hazards associated with climatic change (‘climate hazards’) and by lowering the vulnerability of 
the individuals and societies in question.” (3) 
Tertiary: “over the past three decades, the proportion of the global population affected by 
weather-related disasters has doubled…In absolute numbers, these trend figures have almost 
quadrupled over this period.” 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: References to the FCCC, IPCC, Marrakech Accords, Kyoto Protocol, Bonn 
Agreement, and their provisions for burden sharing. Also UNEP (Klaus Töpfer). 





    
Primary: For the North, the problem is human degradation of Nature, which is the victim; for the 





Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “Given the existing threat, particular urgency is attached to a proposal for reform of the 
relevant disaster relief funding mechanism by creating an FCCC Climate Impact Relief (CIR) 
Fund to achieve an international relief system adequate to the challenge. Because this is to 
involve merely a more efficient funding mode, such a reform could be carried out with little or no 








#95: German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) 2003. World in Transition – 
Towards Sustainable Energy Systems. Executive Summary. 
http://www.wbgu.de/wbgu_jg2003_kurz_engl.html  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 






Type of argument     
Primary: “Nothing less than a fundamental transformation of energy systems will be needed to 




Type of evidence     
Primary: IPCC findings , WHO 
Secondary: WBGU scenario showing achievement of 450 ppmv concentrations with “major 
reduction in the use of fossil energy sources; phase-out of the use of nuclear energy; substantial 
development and expansion of new renewable energy sources, notably solar; improvement of 
energy productivity far beyond historical rates.” (graph) – with highly articulated roles for 





    
Primary: Humans are interfering with global life systems through greenhouse gas emissions; but, 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Milestones: Protect natural support systems (global reduction of 30% by 2050 – 80% 
from industrialized countries, no more than 30% rise in developing countries); eradicate energy 
poverty (ensure everyone has at least 500 kWh by 2020); mobilize financial resources for the 
global transformation of energy systems; use model projects for strategic leverage and engage in 









#96: Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy. No date, but after May 1999. Carbon 
Sequestration. http://www.fe.doe.gov/coal_power/sequestration/index.shtml  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: No author is given. 
Secondary: DOE-FE is focused on the continued use of fossil energy, so it may be expected to 




Type of argument     
Primary: “Availability of [fossil] fuels to provide clean, affordable energy is essential for the 
prosperity and security of the United States,” but “To stabilize and ultimately reduce 
concentrations of this greenhouse gas [CO2], it will be necessary to employ carbon sequestration 
– carbon capture, separation and storage or reuse.” 
Secondary: Achieving a goal of reducing the cost of carbon sequestration to $10 or less per net 
ton of carbon emissions avoided by 2015 would save the U.S. trillions of dollars. 
Tertiary:  
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: references and quotations from PCAST report “Federal Energy Research and 
Development for the Challenges of the Twenty First Century” and the SC-FE report (draft at the 






    
Primary: nature is not resilient to increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases, but will be 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Develop carbon sequestration approaches, pilot test options for direct and indirect 
sequestration, and look for “more revolutionary” technologies that will “rely less on site-specific 








#97: Worldwatch Institute. 2002. Global War on Global Warming Heats Up. Press Release. 
http://www.worldwatch.org/press/news/2002/08/01  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Worldwatch Institute is a well-known environmentalist group that produces an annual 




Notes: This is a review of Reading the Weathervane: Climate Policy from Rio to Johannesburg 
by Seth Dunn. 
 
Type of argument     
Primary: “The scientific case for action continued to strengthen” 1990-2001 but most policies 
“have been too weak, only partially implemented, or discontinued”; governments have “failed to 
develop ‘diversified portfolios’ of policies”; and “the existence of ‘perverse practices’—including 
subsidies for fossil fuel production and consumption … has been a major impediment to climate 
policymaking.” Emissions have generally risen since 1990 (e.g., EU, Japan, US, Australia, 
Canada), except in Germany (-17.1%), the UK (-4.1%), and Russia (-30.5%). 
Secondary: India, China and Brazil are not “rogue emitters” but have been slowing emissions 
growth, China because of lower coal use and energy efficiency 
Tertiary: Lowering emissions will not be costly, as conventional model results indicate. 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: stats about emissions, energy intensity, etc. 





    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Bring the Kyoto Protocol into force 
Secondary: Leave the era of voluntary commitments behind 






#98: Hansen, James, Makiko Sato, Reto Ruedy, Andrew Lacis and Valdar Oinas 2000. 
Global warming in the twenty-first century: an alternative scenario. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 97, 9875-9880. Also available at 
http://www.giss.nasa.gov/gpol/abstracts/2000/HansenSatoR.html  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: James Hansen is a prominent researcher at NASA’s Goddard Institute of Space 
Sciences. Hansen testified to the US Congress in 1988 that global warming was upon us, using in 
his presentation data from only the first and last ten years of the century; a critic from the Cato 
Institute commented that “throwing out 80% of the data to make a striking pronouncement hardly 





Type of argument     
Primary: “We argue that rapid warming in recent decades has been driven mainly by non-CO2 
greenhouse gases such as chlorofluorocarbons, CH4, and N2O, not by the products of fossil fuel 
burning, CO2 and aerosols.” 
Secondary: Focusing on CH4 and O3 precursors, reducing black carbon emissions, and slowing 
CO2 emissions “could lead to a decline in the rate of global warming.” 
Tertiary:  
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: model results of separate greenhouse gas emissions and forcings 
Secondary: 71 endnote references to the literature 
Tertiary: 
Notes: references to IPCC scenarios 
Worldview/view of 
nature 
    





Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Reduce non-CO2 GHGs and black carbon (soot) aerosols, which will have other 
benefits such as economic use of now-wasted CH4 and reduction of air pollution. 
Secondary: “require policies that encourage technological developments to accelerate energy 







#99: Department of Natural Resources, Wisconsin. No date; retrieved June 8, 2003. Global 
warming is hot stuff! http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/caer/ce/eek/earth/air/global.htm  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 




Notes: This is a Q&A format for “kids.” 
 
Type of argument     
Primary: “The increase in greenhouse gases is expected to raise the average global temperature 
of the planet by 2 to 9 degrees Fahrenheit over the next 50 to 100 years. Most of the increase is 
due to human activities…” 
Secondary: Impacts would include sea level rise, “temperate places … might become hotter and 
drier,’ plants and animals may become extinct, severe storms “might occur more frequently and 
be more intense.” 
Tertiary: “Just because we’re not absolutely certain of how more greenhouse gases will affect 
the Earth doesn’t mean we should sit back and do nothing.” And our actions will lower pollution 
and conserve energy. 
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: Mostly assertion or “scientists say” 





    
Primary: The natural greenhouse effect keeps the planet warm, but humans are probably causing 




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: “You can help slow global warming by Walking, riding a bike, or taking the bus 
instead of always going by car. Not wasting electricity (turn off the lights, the radio, the TV and 
the computer when you’re not using them). Reducing, reusing or recycling all kinds of items, 
from soda pop cans to clothes, to save energy and raw materials. Planting trees to help absorb 
excess CO2, and to provide shade and windbreaks to keep buildings at more even temperatures so 








#100: Amory Lovins sees the future and it is hydrogen. May 4, 1999. Donella Meadows’ The 
Global Citizen. http://iisd.ca/pcdf/meadows/hydrogen.html  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Notes 
Authority of 
speaker/writer 
    
Primary: Lovins and his wife are noted for making large claims about energy efficiency; the 





Type of argument     
Primary: “It would be better, many people have realized, to run our cars on hydrogen….The best 
part of this scheme is, when you use the hydrogen to run your car, out of your tailpipe comes 
nothing but water vapor.” 
Secondary: Fuel cells are best – quiet, essentially battery driven 
Tertiary: A hydrogen energy system is expensive. “But factor in the avoided costs of air 
pollution, global warming, defense of the Middle East, central power plants, and long-distance 
electric wires and they don’t look so bad.”  
Notes 
Type of evidence     
Primary: description of how hydrogen fuel cells work 
Secondary: “picture this” scenario of having your house, car, an workplace powered by 
hydrogen 
Tertiary: “Says Lovins: ‘This approach offers several strategic advantages. It uses idle off-peak 
capacity in the nature-gas and electricity distribution systems that have already been installed and 
paid for. It is build-as-you-need and pay-as-you-go, requiring investment only in step with 
incremental demand. It is one or two orders of magnitude cheaper than building a dedicated, 
centralized hydrogen production and delivery system from scratch….And vibrant competition 
between gas- and electricity-derived hydrogen, … will exert downward pressure on the prices of 




    




Action(s) proposed     
Primary: Start with stationary sources: workplaces, houses. 
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